Diebold Admits ATMs Are More Robust Than Voting Machines

An anonymous reader points out a story in the Huffington Post about the status of funding for election voting systems. It contains an interesting section in which Chris Riggall, a spokesman for Premier (formerly Diebold) acknowledged that less money is spent making an electronic voting machine than on a typical ATM. The ironically named Riggall also notes that security could indeed be improved, but at a higher price than most election administrators would care to pay. Also quoted in the article is Ed Felten, who has recently found some inconsistencies in New Jersey voting machines. From the Post: "'An ATM is significantly a more expensive device than a voting terminal...' said Riggall. 'Were you to develop something that was as robust as an ATM, both in terms of the physical engineering of it and all aspects, clearly that would be something that the average jurisdiction cannot afford.' Perhaps cost has something to do with the fact that a couple of years ago, every single Diebold AccuVote TS could be opened with a standard key also used for some cabinets and mini-bars and available for purchase over the Internet."

So?

I hate to play devil's advocate, but an ATM is an extremely complicated mechanical device. It doesn't shock me in the slightest that they're more expensive to produce than an electronic voting booth.

Of course, their voting products do suck, although I don't think that cost has terribly much to do with it.

Re:So?

their voting products do suck, although I don't think that cost has terribly much to do with it.

Actually cost is a fair complaint by Diebold. Security is not cheap, but the direct customer (the government, not the citizens) demands a cheap product. And so it is only natural that they would select their voting machines with price being a primary concern equal to or greater than security. These electronic voting machines suck across the board and we can complain all we want about the manufacturers (certainly they have been shady with their tactics of preventing third party evaluation), but ultimately the blame rests on the government's shoulders for passing HAVA without realistic cost estimates and for not purchasing voting machines with quality and security the highest primary concern.

Re:So?

It's not that simple.

I can't "downgrade" a 747 into a vending machine, even though the 747 is the more complex bit of machinery and has proven to be extremely reliable.

They're two separate things entirely. Granted, yes, Diebold's experience with ATMs does make them appear more qualified to build voting machines, though there are still several important fundamental differences present.

Re:So?

> I can't "downgrade" a 747 into a vending machine

Of course you can:
1: Pull 747 up to gate.
2: Allow cockpit crew to leave, keep flight attendants.
3: Cancel engine maintenance contract, keep galley contracts.
4: PROFIT!! (not really, but couldn't resist)

To use:
1: Walk down jetway into 747, take a seat.
2: Push flight attendant button.
3: Flight attendant wheels cart to your seat, prepared to dispense peanuts, mini-pretzels, or soda.
4: Take you peanuts, mini-pretzels, or soda and exit the aircraft.

I didn't say that a downgraded 747 made a very good, convenient, or profitable vending machine, but with a few organic parts, (the flight attendants and ground service for the galley) it can make one. Perhaps a parallel for Diebold voting machines.

Ironically named?

Riggall? That's rich. Yeah, mod me offtopic, I just Felten urge to post this.

Cost isn't the issue

As usual, cost isn't the question.

It's science -- bad science -- of two types:

1. Bad application of technology, including massive security holes.
2. Bad management science, leading to sloppy security and confused product design.

An ATM should be more expensive than a voting machine; the ATM has to dispense cash and be used 24-7 to do so.

A voting machine however should be secure, have an audit trail, and a clear interface so the average person can understand what they're voting for.

Re:Cost isn't the issue

The problem isn't that an average person can understand what they're voting for, it's that you have to be clear to a really dumb person, because they can vote too. If your machine is too complicated for half the people you don't have a fair election.

Re:Cost isn't the issue

As usual, cost isn't the question.

It's science -- bad science -- of two types:

1. Bad application of technology, including massive security holes.
2. Bad management science, leading to sloppy security and confused product design.

I disagree.

Engineering is all about making compromises - the old adage "good, fast, cheap, pick two" holds true today just as much as it always did, even if the three options in the list change occasionally.

In this case, I'd argue that the three options are "Simple, reliable, cheap, pick two".

Simple - any fool can use it, it's really not complicated.
Reliable - Verifiably correct, very hard to mess around with without it being immediately obvious.
Cheap - Pretty self-explanatory.

Yeah, right.

'Cause election jurisdictions can afford to buy entire systems they have to throw away once they're discovered to be inadequate.

ATMs as voting machines

The obvious solution. Banks reload their ATM software for voting on election day. The candidates can buy your votes all the more easily -- cash comes out of the slot.

We are getting stuck on the machines!

It doesn't surprise me that voting machines are not built as well as ATMs. ATMs are filled with thousands and even tens of thousands of dollars. It would be a rich target for all potential thieves. The voting machine electronics must be protected from all sorts of assaults. Voting machines only contain vote totals, so fewer people would be after them. After all, if you smash an ATM, you still get the money. You smash a voting machine, and you simply lose the votes.

The problem is we're stuck on machines vs. voting procedures. New York and New Jersey had voting machines that did not produce a paper trail for almost 100 years, and this was by design. The voting fraud problem in the Northeast was ballot stuffing. Voting machines, by eliminating paper ballots were designed to eliminate this type of voter fraud. The voting machines were designed around voting procedures. A voter had to register before hand. They had to sign in. Their signature was compared to their signature on their original application. The voter was handed a ticket. They handed that to a poll worker who would place the ticket in the voting machine, and pull a big lever which unlocked the machine. The voter would enter the machine, pull another lever to close the curtains and vote. When they finished, they pulled the lever to open the curtains. This cast the ballot and locked the machine. Poll watchers oversaw the whole process.

This machine/procedure combination eliminated ballot stuffing. The voter could only vote a single time before the machine locked up. The poll worker couldn't unlock the machine without the poll watchers noticing. Voter counts were taken from the machine totals, the tickets on the machines, and the sign in list. Since the voting machines were purely mechanical, they were trusted by all parties. All parties could watch the machines being setup and make sure there were no problems. Poll watchers would run tests before the polls opened to verify the machines. This didn't kill the political machines which simply switched tactics, and it didn't entirely eliminate voting fraud, but it certainly helped.

What we need to do is set a procedure up to ensure that elections are fair. Ballots must be secured and watched over by all parties. In Zimbabwe, they counted the votes locally at the polls and posted the results at each poll. This prevents the ruling party from manipulating the ballots. You could go from poll to poll, and add up the election results yourself. We also must ensure that each voter votes only once, and that each voter's vote is totaled as they intended. That was the issue in Florida with the punch card system.

So, we need to think beyond the "technology" aspect of the voting. It isn't paper ballots are simply better. It's about ensuring that we have confidence in the tabulation of the votes and whether it truly reflects the view of the populous. So, think of how you'd secure the paper ballots, how they would be counted. Who would oversee the procedure? How would the ballot boxes be protected from additional votes being added? How do we ensure that voters only vote once and not sneak in additional ballots? How do we verify the ballots? How can we ensure the entire procedure is fair?

The problem with the current Diabold style voting machines is that they are mystery boxes and we cannot tell if they tabulate the vote fairly. We would have to ensure the firmware, the software, and hardware has not been tampered with. A paper trail can help since paper is easier to verify. But, paper is easy to duplicate, toss, and manipulate which is why the Northeast went to the mechanical paperless machines to begin with.

Unless you think of the entire voting process, and ensure the voting process is easy to verify, it doesn't matter how voters cast their ballots.

Re:ATM's are also more secure

I don't think they need to be as physically secure, there's always a voting official in the room in plain sight and several other people working there. It doesn't need to be built like an ATM that will be randomly placed in dark alleys.

Re:ATM's are also more secure

But the voting officials cannot enter the booth, so any attacker could do something to the machine without it being noticed until after the elections.

Re:ATM's are also more secure

You have hit the name on the head!

The problem I have with these electronic voting machines is that their internals are completely closed! Understand that the state of Nevada has more strigent controls over it's slot machines than it's voting machines...

Note, I'm taking this content from an awesome graphic I found on the internet... Thanks to whomever came up with it!!!

Software:
Slot Machine: State of Nevada has access to all software. Illegal to use software that is not on file
Voting Machine: Software is a trade secret.

Spot Checking:
Slot Machine: State gaming inspectors show up unannounced at casinos to compare computer chips with those on file. If there is a discrepancy, the machien is shut down and investigated.
Voting Machine: No checks are required. Election officals have no "known good" to compare against.

Background Security:
Slot Machine: Manufacturers subjected to backgroundchecks. Employees are investigated for criminal records.
Voting Machine: Citizens have no way of knowing, for example, whether programmers have been confvicted of fraud or have conflict of interest issues.

Equipment Certification:
Slot Machine: By a public agency at arm's length from manufacturers. Public questions invited.
Voting Machine: By for-profit commpanies chosen adn paid by the manufacturers. No public information on how the testing is done.

Dispute Handling:
Slot Machine: Casino must contact the Gaming Control Board, which has investigators on call around the clock. They can open up machines to inspect internal mechanisms and records of recent gambling outcomes.
Voting Machine: In most cases, a voter's only recourse is to call a number at the board of elections and lodge a complaint.

I do understand that a slot machine and an ATM works in a much more hostile environment where people are constantly working to break the system.

However, our Democracy is more important than some ATM and thus any system that's put in place that becomes an arbitrator of our Democracy's citizens to choose their elected officals should be held to even a higher standard.

Re:ATM's are also more secure

I don't think they need to be as physically secure, there's always a voting official in the room in plain sight and several other people working there. It doesn't need to be built like an ATM that will be randomly placed in dark alleys.

Not just that; they also do not have to be completely tamper-proof (though the more secure the better, obviously). The point is that we shouldn't labour under the illusion that these machines can be made completely tamper-proof, which is what the manufacturers and politicians are driving at. Rather, we need a reliably way to detect tampering and verify the voting results in case we suspect some tampering has occurred. More importantly, verification must be possible by non-experts, which means that voters can see for themselves that votes are tallied correctly rather than take some experts word for it.

A voting machine that prints off a paper ballot which the voter deposits in a lockbox still seems the best option to achieve this.

Re:ATM's are also more secure

The comparison between security in voting machines and ATM's is a strawman designed to get government officials to throw more money at 'secure as an ATM' voting machines. ATM's are secure because a somebody owns them, runs them, and controls access to them, with voting machines the opposite is true. The slimebags at Diebold cannot be so stupid as to not understand this, they are simply hoping to milk 'upgrade' money out of the taxpayer.

BTW: By voting machine I mean one that counts your ballot, not one that prints your ballot.

Re:Best Parallel Ever!

Polotics and money, what a great parallel.

So the banks are more impportant than the ballots here. But it's what one would expect in a plutocracy.

Tne bankers and stockbrokers know what's important in America, and it isn't your vote. What's important ios the campaign "contribution" bribery to both major party candidates.

Not the same people

So the banks are more impportant than the ballots here. But it's what one would expect in a plutocracy.

I'm not sure this is a valid conclusion. The same people aren't making decisions in each case. And while we like to think we place a high value on the integrity of our voting system, it's hard to put a dollar figure on that, which is what the people running the budget need.

Banks, on the other hand, can easily place a dollar figure on the value of their ATMs' security, and show their decision-makers that X dollars spent on securing them will easily pay for itself.

I'm not happy with the situation, but I don't think you've got a single set of people saying "transactions are more important than votes."

Re:Not the same people

So the banks are more impportant than the ballots here. But it's what one would expect in a plutocracy.

--And--

I'm not sure this is a valid conclusion. The same people aren't making decisions in each case. And while we like to think we place a high value on the integrity of our voting system, it's hard to put a dollar figure on that, which is what the people running the budget need.

Not only that, but I think it's important to point out that there are not a whole lot of people using pickup trucks to smash through the front doors of polling stations trying to steal voting machines. I know everybody thinks that Bush stole the election but it wasn't because the election machine didn't weigh 10,000 lbs. So yeah, I think that maybe you can't compare the cost of an ATM machine to a voting machine. After all, the cost of making paper ballots were never compared to to cost of making a dollar bill.

Re:Best Parallel Ever!

The reason for that box was actually an attempt to lessen the influence of money in the political process. How it is supposed to work is the FEC determines who are "serious" candidates and then distribute the money evenly amongst them. It is fairly tipped and a damn shame though as it strongly favors Republicans and Democrats over third parties.

More info here at the FEC website [fec.gov].

Re:Best Parallel Ever!

In Ontario, you get an option of giving your refund (assuming you have one) to the "Ontario Opportunities Fund" which is just a fancy term for paying off the provincial debt. I'm not sure how many people actually give any money to that. I would love to see statistics.

Re:Best Parallel Ever!

On our taxes it asks "Would you like to donate an extra $3 to the candidates?"

Please mod this down to get rid of the "Informative". You don't pay an extra amount of money, you allocate to the general campaign financing fund an amount of money from the taxes that you're paying anyway. It does not increase the amount you pay. It even says so right next to the check box.

Re:In other words

...unless that money can be used to buy votes elsewhere

The candidate doesn't matter; HE'S the one for sale. The scandal isn't the buying of votes, it's the buying of legislators. When you've donated ten million to the Democrat and another ten million to the Republican, it doesn't matter who loses, you win.

Re:What is Our Democracy Worth?

Unfortunately, voting is a local exercise, despite the federal implications, and as such each jurisdiction has the freedom to implement voting in the manor they see fit. Of course, when we had that little mis-adventure in FL a few years ago, paper was deemed "unacceptable", so the federal government decided to throw lots of money around to help everyone buy *whatever* electronic voting machine they wanted, then when the local politicians made bad decisions (based on ignorance, greed, corrupt vendors or a combination of all three) the politicans are now stepping back in and saying that the electronic voting process is no good, and we need to go back to paper...

A fundamental change is needed, one that will either have the states ceding power tot he federal government to develop "the one true" voting machine used in all districts *or* we get off this technology merry-go-round and use paper ballots - as a bonus it will give the losing politicans more time to round-up lawyers to challenge their loss...

India has affordable/ secure voting machines

Security depends both on the voting / counting process and on the technology (this is true for paper ballots as well). The problem is when the technology can easily be changed in a hidden way that is unverifiable by elections officials.

A simple machine, that has been tested and verify can be sealed with stickers with signatures of election officials.

A machine (think diabold) with all kinds of inputs (think keyboard plugs) and complexity (think OS, DB etc...) cannot be easily sealed and verified by election officials.

I found two interesting articles about India's EVM

The two things I found interesting:
1) EVM cost = $230 (hard to tamper with, and relies on election officials to keep secure)

2) Diebold cost = $3300 (easier to tamper with, and relies on election officials to keep secure)

This points out two things: voting systems don't have to be complicated or expensive to work well, and that security depends both on the machine and the voting process.

Just like with paper ballots the election officials need to ensure security of the voting and counting process.

In Canada we have some electronic voting at the municipal level in some cities (mostly optical scan machines).

A comparison of EVM and Diebold
http://techaos.blogspot.com/2004/05/indian-evm-compared-with-diebold.html [blogspot.com]

Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Voting_Machines [wikipedia.org]

The issue is not about cost. The issue is crappy design, and politics in the selection of voting machine vendors.