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OH NO!!! (Score:4, Funny)
Someone has found an issue with Flash?! Say it isn't so...
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Re:OH NO!!! (Score:5, Funny)
I lost count. Can someone help me out again? This time I'll count using Binary on my fingers.
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Re:OH NO!!! (Score:5, Funny)
I lost count. Can someone help me out again? This time I'll count using Binary on my fingers.
I tried that, but when I got to 132 vulnerabilities, I felt that was an appropriate enough representation of my opinion and stopped counting.
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Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Hmm... looks like you'll need 11 bits to count them all, so please do it in another room.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
It doesn't matter, and unsigned, obviously.
Re:OH NO!!! (Score:5, Funny)
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Re: (Score:3, Funny)
More importantly, what about ECC?
I had a spasm in my left pinky and now I cant remember if its supposed to be bent or not.
Why does a login form need CSRF protection? (Score:3, Interesting)
Back on topic: according to TFA Google added protection from CSRF attacks to their login form. But why is this necessary? AFAIK login forms with passwords aren't vulnerable to this attack unless the user gives their password to the attacker's site.
I ask because on my website I have CSRF protection for all forms except logins and I wasn't able to find specific information about security problems with my approach with a Google search.
Re:Why does a login form need CSRF protection? (Score:4, Insightful)
In this case, it was used to log the user into the attacker's account, which contained the malicious SWF uploaded as an attachment. If the user then logged into gmail (the video uses a registration email to prompt the user to do so), his account would be compromised.
In Gmail's case, there are other privacy consequences to the login CSRF. For example, if the user is logged into an account that I have access to, I can actually view his google search history.
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Re:OH NO!!! (Score:5, Funny)
Useful, but make sure no one is right in front of you when you get to four or they might punch you.
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Re: (Score:3, Funny)
I'll have to find the right web site to browse to in order to handle the carry
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
On the other hand, the more arcane the attack, the less likely it is to get fixed, and so the more websites remain vulnerable. The end result is that an attacker well-versed in a variety of obscure attacks can find a way into just about everything.
This one, though, does affect an awful lot of sites- it's rare to find a site that doesn't allow users to upload some kind of file. The impression I get is that image uploads may be more or less simple to validate, but most other filetypes aren't.
iPhone (Score:5, Funny)
I'm very angry that I can't use this vulnerability on my iPhone.
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Re:iPhone (Score:5, Funny)
I'm very angry that I can't use this vulnerability on my iPhone.
There is not an app for that?
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Broken security model (Score:3, Insightful)
Adobe's answer is just the greatest kind of cop out. "Websites just need to make sure to check all uploaded material". But that's obviously never going to happen -- fuck they can't even do that themselves! End users can't rely on every single website out there to be vigilant at all times and never accept an upload of a flash file.
If this is really unfixable in the flash plugin, then maybe it's because your security model is fucking broken and it's time to throw this piece of shit away?
</profanity>
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Re:Broken security model (Score:5, Insightful)
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Re:Broken security model (Score:5, Insightful)
If you can write an SWF that can be executed to compromise a website, despite the fact that it looks like, acts like, and in fact is a valid MS Word document, I'd call that a problem.
Your JAR example is actually a pretty good one... as TFA mentions, a similar attack with JAR files that looked like GIFs came out in 2008. Sun fixed their plugin [xs-sniper.com].
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Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Adobe's answer is just the greatest kind of cop out.
How exactly would you suggest Adobe modify the flash plugin so that it will run on your computer when I am the one to upload it to my website, but not run it when someone else who I have given permission (thus access) to upload it to my site in my name?
Either you run code from my website, or you don't. You can't base any decisions on if it was my SCP client that uploaded it to the web server, or someone else uploaded it, mainly because there is no possible way for the server nor you to tell the difference.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
mainly because there is no possible way for the server nor you to tell the difference.
I fail. I meant there is no way for the browser to tell the difference.
Obviously the server can tell the difference, and in fact is the only thing that can easily tell the difference, thus why it is a web server issue.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Off the top of my head, here are a few possible changes:
1. Deny connections by default, unless the server specifically says "this application can connect" (This is already how adobe determines policies on remote servers. It would not be so hard to make the object's origin follow the same rules)
2. Check whether the content-type headers of the server delivering the object actually match those of a flash object, preventing the content overloading attacks described in the paper.
3. Implement a signing policy, so
Re:Broken security model (Score:4, Insightful)
Maybe you should have read the whole article. Cross-site scripting is never mentioned, and seeing how Mike Bailey, the researcher in question, won $10,000 with a Cross-site scripting attack [slashdot.org], I think he probably knows the difference
This is a flash attack, dealing with content ownership and poor security controls on flash's part. The end result can indeed be cross-site scripting, but that's not a requirement, and actionscript has different capabilities than javascript.
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Warning - 2nd link points to a FLASH AD (Score:5, Funny)
Kind of ironic that an article that warns about flash vulnerabilities as:
Oh, wait - it's ComputerWorld. Sorry, I had my expectations too high.
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We need to move beyond Flash (Score:5, Funny)
so we can have malware based on open standards.
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NEWS FLASH: Web sites need to screen uploads (Score:3, Insightful)
This is ridiculous. If a web site lets you upload a JavaScript file and then serves it back to you as part of a request, it would be crazy. All that has happened here is that people have worked out that doing the same thing with a Flash file is equally bad.
Of course there's no easy fix apart from web sites being sensible in what they upload -- just like anyone with a clue doesn't let users submit comments with tags in them.
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Re:NEWS FLASH: Web sites need to screen uploads (Score:5, Informative)
You missed the point. Flash is not equally bad as JavaScript, it's far worse.
Suppose I'm an attacker, and I upload a malicious javascript file to www.victimsite.example. I then reference it in a site I control www.seemingly-innocuous.example, the javascript file runs in the www.seemingly-innocuous.example domain sandbox. Even though the file was loaded from www.victimsite.example, it can't actually access anything on the victim's site. In order for that to happen I would have to also upload a malicious html document to www.victimsite.example, and convince unwary surfers to visit this new page.
Now I decide to switch to flash. I upload a malicious SWF to www.victimsite.example, and embed it into a page at www.seemingly-innocuous.example. Unlike the JavaScript example, my malicious SWF now runs in the www.victimsite.example domain security sandbox, and can make any requests it wants to the victimsite.example domain without the visitor to my seemingly innocuous domain being any the wiser.
It is a big deal, and it is nothing at all like JavaScript. But it's also not remotely new. I'm having a hard time finding anything in this article that hasn't been widely know for some time now. It even mentions attacks that have been going on for years.
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The vulnerability (Score:5, Insightful)
The security implications are that even if the site doesn't use Flash itself, a user opening a third party site with Flash could read from the site with the faulty policy.
Say Facebook is vulnerable to this problem (likely it is), and you're logged in. Opening another site will allow Flash on that third party site to read your Facebook details, as it has access to anything you do.
This problem was introduced sometimes Flash 7-8 (I forget) when an ability was added for Flash to read policy files from a custom URL. Prios to that, the only valid location was www.example.com/crossdomain.xml, which is, of course far simpler to lock down and secure. The bottom line is, they can fix this in a number of ways, but not in a backwards compatible manner. For the moment they simply seems to have their bets that people don't care enough about this problem to warrant the effort.
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What the... (Score:4, Insightful)
Instead, Arkin added, Adobe has tried to get the word out to Web application designers and site administrators about the danger of allowing users to upload content. "Sites should not allow user uploads to a trusted domain," Arkin argued. "The real issue here is that developers should be cautious about using techniques that can be misused maliciously. In general, this is a general challenge in managing active content."
Arkin is from Adobe. And he's seriously saying that in order to "fix" this, web site owners must simply disallow users from uploading files. Period. (Not through Flash, but all file uploading .) That's a spectacular answer.
On the other hand... I kind of understand where he's comign from. If you let your users upload content unchecked, and serve that content up, you are potentially giving some level of access to client machines. In this case, it seems somewhat minimal? I'm not familiar with actionscript, but you don't get free reign to the user's machien do you? Only content specifically store under the domain of the owning server, in the context of Flash?
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Re:What the... (Score:5, Interesting)
He said don't allow uploads to trusted domains. If you want users to upload, they should be uploading to a separate domain. For example my-social-networking-site.com should host uploaded files at MSNS-files.com, or something like that. Being able to execute scripts in the context of MSNS-files.com would be worthless, while executing in the context of my-social-networking-site.com is very valuable.
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Uploading a swf with a jpg extension? (Score:4, Interesting)
There's one thing I don't understand from the article.. how can this be triggered through files with other extensions that are served with a proper content type? I mean, let's say you have a phpBB3 (with attachments enabled) forum and some guy uploads a jpg. It's actually a swf in disguise, but phpBB's own checks miss that. Then it's served back to a user with a jpg extension and a jpeg content-type.
According to the article, the SWF can still be executed under these circumstances, but that seems implausible to me. I would think that the browser would simply invoke the jpeg handler, fail to parse the image data, and throw an error.
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Re:Uploading a swf with a jpg extension? (Score:4, Informative)
You'd think so, but you'd be wrong. Embedded content can specify the content-type in HTML (in order for the browser to know what plugin to use to load that content), and Flash trusts that declaration, not the content-type supplied by the server. A properly-designed plugin should trust the server, not the HTML that calls it.
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Bad Adobe! (Score:3, Insightful)
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Flash security has always frightened me (Score:5, Insightful)
I've been worried about Flash security for a long time now. I'd like to point out three features of Flash that bother me.
First, Flash allows a web application to paste data to the clipboard [jeffothy.com] even if the browser itself forbids this. Of the major browsers, only IE allows applications to directly set the clipboard content.
Second, Flash has an XMLHttpRequest equivalent [xml.com] with a lax security policy [adobe.com]. Cross-domain retrieval is controlled by an XML control file listing permissible origins.
Finally, Flash has its own cookie system. These Flash cookies are hidden from the user, and require special tools [fightidentitytheft.com] to remove.
These features are secure in themselves, but are enablers: they give attackers the means to exploit other vulnerabilities.
Unfortunately, this cavalier attitude fits Adobe's business model. Lax security is as much a feature of Flash as its vector graphics. Flash allows web developers "get shit done" with no regard for the security of the web ecosystem as a whole. Web developers then come to rely on Flash, which increases the adoption of Flash Player among users, which in turn increases the value of Adobe's authoring tools. Being insecure is lucrative, up to the point that the vulnerabilities become so egregious that users disable Flash.
On the other hand, browser vendors seem to take a mostly-conservative approach to security (don't laugh yet): consider XMLHttpRequest: sure, its same-origin restriction on the target URL is inconvenient, and the restriction might have been loosened [w3.org] while remaining secure. But this same prudent restriction has also prevented many attacks. Browser vendors have the right incentives because users have a realistic choice of browsers. Flash is an all-or-nothing affair.
I wish I had an answer. Hopefully, HTML 5 will become widely supported enough that websites won't feel compelled to use Flash for graphics and storage, and eventually Flash's market penetration will sink below the point that web developers can consider it a viable way to circumvent browser security.
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Re:Flash security has always frightened me (Score:5, Informative)
These Flash cookies are hidden from the user, and require special tools [fightidentitytheft.com] to remove.
Not to speak to any of your other points, but this isn't true. The Flash cookies are simply in your filesystem somewhere and can be deleted like any other files. (Where they are exactly depends on your browser and OS, but they're still just regular files.)
You can't delete them from within the browser without addons or plugins (in other words, the Flash plugin itself does not let you do this -- at least, not without manually setting the allowed disk space to 0 for every single website, which is impractical at best), but unless you consider bash or Windows Explorer to be "special tools," it's not exactly a heinous task.
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Re:Flash security has always frightened me (Score:4, Insightful)
Most users do.
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Re:Flash security has always frightened me (Score:4, Interesting)
Wrong. The two properties of Flash that make it vulnerable to this class of attack are:
Both of these things are just as true for Silverlight as for Flash, so this issue will affect Microsoft Silverlight and its users as well. The reason that this is being advertised as a "Flash vulnerability" instead of a "Silverlight vulnerability" is, I'm sure, simply due to Silverlight's relatively tiny market share.
On the other hand, HTML 5 + JavaScript, Canvas, etc. is a solution to this.
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Thanks for reminding me ... (Score:4, Insightful)
To disable Flash and Shockwave in my main browser.
It's remarkable how nice it is to surf the modern web without them ... ads (that I don't already block) have small fonts and easy-to-ignore plain text, I can listen to music and surf, and not have some crappy video start playing in a background window ... I'm loving it.
If I need Flash, I'll just surf with one of the alternate browsers for a page or three. The rest of the time ... bliss. Sheer bliss ...
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Am I not understanding this correctly? (Score:4, Insightful)
I get the gist of the article - user flash content shouldn't be served from the same domain as your app.
But here's the thing - I know many, many people who run webservers just for the hell of it, and give free accounts to friends and such (the ubiquitous public_html subdirectory for a user, aka ~ ). So let's say the webserver at example.com has something like a secure login for webmail access or other stuff on there as well. It's not terribly vital, but it's still in place. One of the users maliciously uploads one of these flash files, has another person run it, and then that person logs in to another section of example.com - can the attacker then grab that data? It seems to be the case.
So what the hell are people in this situation supposed to do? Is the only solution to move all that user content to a subdomain as well? Seriously? At least javascript is confined mostly to a single PAGE - please tell me I'm reading this incorrectly.
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Re: (Score:3, Informative)
If I can get a Flash object onto your server, I can execute scripts in the context of your domain.
Only appears to be an issue with servers that accept uploads exactly as TFS says, curiously enough.
Re:Client or server? (Score:5, Informative)
It would probably be more accurate to say that websites (not servers) are vulnerable to such an attack. After all, unless I've misread TFA, no code is actually being executed server side. Instead, what's happening is that any SWF's posted to a publicly-accessible location are being served under the server's domain and therefore any scripts in the SWF will execute with rights to access that domain. There's nothing the SWF can do through scripting that a visitor can't do directly, so depending on how you look at it you could say the server itself isn't vulnerable to this, but the website and the clients are.
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Re:Client or server? (Score:5, Informative)
There is no vulnerability if the clients don't have flash installed.
It's a client-side vulnerability.
Given flash's popularity, webmasters should understand the risk and block uploads of .SWFs and application/x-flash
However, expecting webmasters to scan .jpeg uploads of declared type image/jpeg or declared application/octet-stream uploads to determine if flash might execute them, when they are intended to be simple downloads or image displays is way over the line...
Especially if an attacker can construct an image file that is a valid image, but flash will pick up and execute......
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Re:Client or server? (Score:4, Funny)
Apparently it's a server-side vulnerability, but this puts users at risk since hijacking trusted websites makes it much easier to socially engineer malware onto people's computers. I.e., if gmail were to be compromised, and you login to gmail and there's a link to download some special gmail-improving program, a lot of people will download and install it, even though it was placed there by a hacker and not Google themselves.
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Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Client or server? (Score:5, Interesting)
From what I understood skimming TFA, it's a cross-site scripting vulnerability, meaning the client's account on the server is vulnerable. I upload EvilFlash.swf to some site that allows downloads. Then I send you a link to this file. Your browser opens the .swf and runs it with the plugin. Unfortunately for you, the plug in runs it in the hosting site's domain, so it can access anything that you can access on the download site. If the site is something like PutYourFaceInTheBook.com then it will be able to access everything in your account and even modify everything there. It could then send links to everyone else on your friends list and if they click on them then the same thing happens.
The best way of fixing this would be for Flash to check for public key file in a well-known location on the server and refuse to run any Flash files that are not accompanied by a signature from the corresponding private key (or run them but don't allow them to access any external resources).
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Re:Client or server? (Score:4, Insightful)
I have just read the article. The problem seems to be with sites who allow flash object to be uploaded, then served to other people using the site. Of course, this is just stupid anyway. If I allow you to upload a flash object to my site, I should sanitise it before I allow my server to give it to anyone. The example they give is an animated avatar, but that is poor example as they should be restricted to animated gifs anyway.
This is just more FUD. ActionScript is a very powerful language, and so server admins should only allow flash files they trust to be served up form websites they maintain. To my mind that is just common sense. The only alternative would be for Adobe to cripple Flash beyond belief so it was only useful for a small percentage of what it is currently used for.
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Re:Client or server? (Score:4, Informative)
That really isn't a stretch- most XSS and CSRF exploits work the same way. It just requires that the user be logged into victim.com and click a link to evil.com.
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Re:the article is bullshit. (Score:5, Informative)
Didn't really read the article, did you?
Uploading the swf as an avatar is just the beginning. You can also overload ZIP files, which also includes .docx, making perfectly legal documents that also are executable flash objects. Also, many server-side validation libraries apparently will also not catch properly malformed (if such a thing is possible) pdfs, mp3s, etc.
Ironically, all that email antivirus that require you to zip up your files does no good here... a overloaded zip file can be used to compromise webmail clients (like gmail, as in the example).
Flash's security policy is severely broken. I'd call this a pretty big deal.
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Re:the article is bullshit. (Score:5, Informative)
You, sir, are entitled to the Arrogant Uninformed Derogatory Comment of The Day Award. Here's why, a quote from TFA:
It gets worse. Uploading a SWF with a .jpg extension, or a forged content-type header will get you a long way, but what if you can upload perfectly valid files with malicious content? Remember GIFAR? The basic premise is this: Overload a GIF file with a JAR archive. Specifically, the ZIP file format can be appended to any binary file and still be valid. The GIF format, in turn, can have any binary file appended to it. The JAR archive, being essentially a ZIP file, can be combined with a GIF image to create a a file that is both a valid image and a perfectly valid JAR archive. While SWF files cannot be appended to other formats, the inverse of the GIFAR exploit works- any file format in the ZIP family can have a SWF file prepended to it. This means that ZIP archives, self-extracting executables, Microsoft Office Open XML documents, XPI files, and, if you want to be ridiculous, even JAR files can all be crafted to contain executable SWFs. Additionally, if you don't care too much about compliance with standards (and what attacker does?), many server-side content validation libraries will also allow malformed PDFs, MP3s, and other media formats, so long as you are careful not to mangle them too much. This content overloading technique has countless variations, but the end result is always the same: no matter how good your validation routines, you simply cannot trust user-supplied content.
Short of rewriting everything that has anything to do with several popular formats, you're out of luck.
How, you do ask, is such a prepared file going to be uploaded? A worm that intercepts uploads in the browser, for example. I was able to come up with this in two minuttes, I'm sure that any self-respecting blackhat hacker will as well.
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Re: (Score:3, Informative)
No. Read the quote again.
A malicious Flash payload can be smuggled in an image that looks absolutely harmless for MIME checking libraries. The magic number is there, as are the headers and sometimes even the actual image data that produces an actual image. I'm not familiar with the details of GIF and JPEG payloading, but I've read that clever techniques exist for producing images that can be even read by ImageMagick and similar libraries, for example to produce thumbnails. The thumbnail will not carry the p
Re:the article is bullshit. (Score:5, Informative)
It doesn't quite work like that. Most browsers don't look at magic bytes to try to guess the content of a file, nor do they look at the file extension (since there's no need for anything on the web to actually have a file extension at all); the content-type header is sent by the server for that purpose. (Internet Explorer is one exception to the "most browsers" rule.).
If you click on a link to a .zip file with SWF at the start, the server will (probably) say it's content-type is application/zip or similar, and the browser will do whatever it's configured to do for that kind of content. If the server says its content-type is image/jpeg, the browser will try to interpret it as a JPEG image (and probably fail, resulting in an error being displayed). The browser doesn't try to guess what the content is (unless it's MSIE).
However, you don't normally run a Flash object by clicking on a link to it. When you link to/embed an external resource within HTML, you can specify the content-type within the HTML. Think <link rel="stylesheet" href="..." type="text/css"> for including a stylesheet. This tells the browser not just where it is, but also what it is. This effectively overrides whatever content-type the server sends. It's very often used with <object> or <embed> tags to give the browser an idea of what the object is so it knows whether or not it can handle it before it requests it. It also enables you to put content on servers which don't have a mime-type configured for that file extension and still have them work.
As such, you can embed in a Flash object into a page, referencing an object with a .zip extension, and the browser will ignore the content-type as supplied by the server because it's already been told that it's a Flash object. Therefore, it'll be executed by the Flash plugin. If you also had a normal direct link to the file on the same page and a user clicked on it, it'd be opened in their archive manager, because the browser would be relying on the content-type header sent by the server.
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Re:Client or server? (Score:4, Informative)
Flash files can also be loaded by embedding them in an HTML page with attributes that say "content-type='application-x-shockwave-flash'" or something like that, regardless of extension or the content-type header given by the server. The server may think it's a zip file, but your browser can still be convinced to run it as flash.
So, I drop a malicious .docx on vulnerable site, create my own web page that embeds the object, and get you to visit that page. presto, you're pwned.
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