Computer Scientist Looks At ICBM Security 124
An anonymous reader writes "Computer security guru Matt Blaze takes a tour of a decommissioned ICBM complex in Arizona. Cool photos, insightful perspective on two man control, perimeter security, human factors and why we didn't blow ourselves up. From the article: 'The most prominent security mechanism at the Titan site, aside from the multiple layers of thick blast-proof entry doors and the fact that the entire complex is buried underground, was procedural: almost all activities required two person control. Everywhere outside of the kitchen, sleeping quarters and toilet were "no lone zones" where a second person had to be present at all times, even for on-duty members of the launch crews.'"
Re:And the Futuristic Safety Mechanism Is ... (Score:5, Informative)
I joke but human redundancy is probably your best bet and pretty reassuring considering I've seen Dr. Strangelove twenty times or so. Also I enjoyed this picture [flickr.com]. Is it a good idea to store the keys right above the safe to the Emergency War Orders? No matter, if you know the combination to the lock and have a twenty pound sledge, those hastily welded rings holding on the safety padlocks will take a few seconds to remove.
Did you read the text accompanying that picture?
Those keys would not have been on top of the cabinet there - that's a display for the tourists.
Each launch officer had a key to one padlock, meaning that two launch officers were necessary to open that cabinet. The point isn't to keep some random guy from walking in and launching a missile... That's what all the guards, barbed wire, blast doors, etc. are for. The point is to make sure that it takes two launch officers to launch a missile.
Not classified, not secret, don't worry (Score:3, Informative)
My cousin was one of those guys with the keys and a gun and a buddy for many years. He's retired now and shares the stories at family reunions. He was a colonel so I'm sure he knows exactly what he can and cannot talk about. What's even better are his stories about winter life in rural North Dakota.
This stuff has been out in the open for years.
Re:Good Read. (Score:5, Informative)
Even if the Cuban Missile Crisis had gone hot it wouldn't have been the "end" of the human race nor even the United States. At that point in time the Soviet Union only had a handful of nuclear weapons that could reach the United States. That was one of the reasons they sought to station missiles in Cuban -- to even out the odds. We had hundreds of warheads that could reach the Soviet Union. They had a few dozen that could reach the United States. They could hurt us really badly -- but we could utterly obliterate them.
There's a good alternate history scenario that I once upon a time that posits a Soviet first strike on Washington that takes out Kennedy, Johnson and most of the civilian leadership. In so doing the Soviet Union seals it's own doom -- Kennedy might have ordered a measured strike in response but without him around the military implements the SIOP [wikipedia.org] and proceeds to completely destroy the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev knew about this disadvantage and it no doubt played a part in his decision to back down. The fact that we offered him a behind the scenes deal to dismantle our similar missile installation in Turkey also helped.
Anyway, who knows what the next war will look like, if there even is one. It's entirely possible that we could fight another major war without anybody using them. I don't regard it as likely but there is a precedent for it. Most of the major combatants in WW2 had poison gas programs but none of them dared to use them against each other. The only time gas was used was against countries (China) that lacked the means to retaliate. Right up until the bitter end neither the Germans nor Japanese decided to use their chemical weapons.
Re:And the Futuristic Safety Mechanism Is ... (Score:5, Informative)
Erm, you didn't read the article. The article says, if you had bothered to read it:
"The "Emergency War Orders" (EWO) safe, for example, which contains the launch keys and codes, is locked not just by a single combination, but also by two padlocks, one belonging to each launch officer."
Just in case you have difficulty reading, I'll make that clear:
- 1 combination lock AND
- 2 keys locks, with each key held by a different person.
I don't know about you, but I happen to think that the people who were so terrifyingly clever as to know how to build an ICBM were also capable of building a safe that requires three locks to undo without worrying about The Hinge Problem, by using such fiendish ingenuity as, oh I don't know, using a file-container (slide-out drawer), not a hinged door. As it says in the very next paragraph of the same story you chose to take someone else to task for, because you thought they'd not read it. And guess what, if you have difficulty with words, the nice man even took some pretty pictures where you could actually see that it wasn't a hinged door.
Numpty.
Re:Good Read. (Score:5, Informative)
No, actually they didn't [encyclopedia.com]:
Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, read U.S. weakness in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and blustered publicly that he might retaliate by driving the U.S. out of West Berlin. U.S. President John Kennedy, in return, openly boasted that the U.S. possessed many more (and more accurate and deliverable) nuclear missiles and warheads than the U.S.S.R., and would consider striking first with them if it ever found itself at a military disadvantage. Kennedy's claim was true; in 1962, the U.S.S.R. had at most 20 or 30—perhaps as few as four — functional, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); the U.S. had several hundred. Nevertheless, Kennedy had claimed, during his presidential campaign, that the incumbent Eisenhower's administration had allowed the Soviets to get ahead of the U.S. in missiles, causing a "missile gap." A missile gap did exist, as Kennedy knew, but in reverse; it had always been the U.S. that was far ahead of the U.S.S.R. in such weapons. Once in office, Kennedy dropped the old story about the "missile gap" and brandished the United States's nuclear superiority openly against Khrushchev.
Re:And the Futuristic Safety Mechanism Is ... (Score:3, Informative)
I am a Nuke Officer right now (Score:2, Informative)
All the policies that SAC (Strategic Air Command) enacted are still present in every day life of a Missileer (Those of us who still man underground silos). Mainly concepts like TPC (Two person concept) along with TPC (Two person control). Both of these allow us to operate in a very safe environment. The best time the public hears about nukes is when they don't hear about them.
Re:Good Read. (Score:3, Informative)
to be fair WW1 and WW2 were just another in the long line of European wars going back to the founding of the Holy Roman Empire when the French conquered most of Germany. short time later a bunch of French conquered England and then went to war with the rest of France for the next few hundred years.
the French, Germans and English have been fighting each other on a regular schedule for hundreds of years. after the Spanish drove out the Moors the Spanish added themselves to the regular conflicts. When the Russians became a unified nation they added themselves as well and the sides changed every so often as former allies went to war and then became allies again. for a while the English and the French were bitter enemies for hundreds of years until the mid 1800's when the allied themselves against Prussia and the new nation of Germany
i've read that if you extrapolate the casualties of the 30 Years War to modern population numbers than it was a lot more destructive than WW2.
with the EU and other global organizations we seem to have broken the cycle for now
More links, with photos. (Score:4, Informative)
Re:Good Read. (Score:5, Informative)
Only if you look at them in a vacuum. When you consider the size of the Red Army and Soviet violations of their wartime agreements with the Western Allies the picture becomes more balanced. The Soviet Union had more men under arms than all of the Western Allies combined. Until relatively late in the Cold War it was believed that any Soviet attack on Western Europe would quickly overwhelm Allied defenses and the only two options available would be surrender or the nuclear option.
The disparity in conventional forces was the key factor in many decisions made by the Allies. It was the main reason they allowed the West Germans to rearm -- they needed German manpower to help offset the Soviet advantage. It was the main reason the Western Allies poured so many resources into advanced weapons systems and technology. It was the main reason that the Western Allies invested in nuclear weapons the way they did.
Ever heard of Operation Unthinkable [neu.edu]? It was a British General Staff study made at Churchill's detailing the odds facing the Western Allies in a war against the Soviet Union and the ability to conduct an offensive against them. It shows the odds facing the Allies quite clearly. Consider that context along with the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and it becomes much easier to understand the choices made by the Western Allies after WW2.
Re:co-ed (Score:5, Informative)
Spent 8 years in SAC at ICBM sites on a Combat Targeting Team... we optically aimed the missiles using a theodolite and programmed in the targets and the methods of arriving at the target, as well as the war plans.
If a launch control facility (LCF) did go rogue for some purpose then another LCF would simply "Inhibit" the launch thus preventing it from actually launching. Another safe guard.
Also all members were under the AF 35-7 which was the manual pertaining to human reliability. As an example our team (three man team) had to work together and know each other and if anything seemed to become out of kilter then it was reported for upper staff to review... as an example, one of the guys on my team's wife started talking about leaving him and so he was put on duty in the office until he was evaluated as being "OK".
This was to prevent the stress of a personal relationship of any kind from affecting the work being performed. How often do we hear about someone filing for divorce and the other spouse goes postal... it prevented that kind of thing when dealing from issues of money, family issues, alcohol issues and etc. There was no limit as to what could appear to impact a person and we took it seriously.
Also we each were armed with a side gun to prevent someone from violating the two-man concept spoken about in the article and on some other posts here.
I personally assist in the posturing of missiles at Malmstom, Minot, Whiteman and Grand Forks AFB then was transfered to Vandenburg to assist in launches there.
Each SAC base had a team of experts who evaluated each task that was performed to see that it was completed according to the appropriate technical manual. Also Vandenberg had a special group (3905) that not only evaluated the experts but also the regular staff at all levels again to ensure proficiency and standardization across the various bases.
It was hard work but it was fun too. Sort of like the work we do today.
Re:Good Read. (Score:5, Informative)
No they didn't The ones that they had where not very practical.
That is one reason why the Eisenhower pushed so hard to not go nuts building ICBMs because we had more than we needed.
The SS-6 Which had just gone on alert in 1959 took two days to get ready to launch and was easy to notice. The USSR had four on alert in 1962. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/r-7.htm [globalsecurity.org]
It's replacement the SS-8 didn't enter service until 1965. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/r-9.htm [globalsecurity.org]
The only bomber that could really reach the US was the Bear but they where few and the US Air Defenses where actually pretty good at that time. The M-4 could only reach the US on a one way trip and the USSR didn't make many of them. They did use them a lot for propaganda.
The Bager was a good bomber but the USSR lacked forward bases for them so they where only really a threat to Europe, Japan, and US naval forces.
So the USSR really had only 4 ICBMs that might hit the US and those took a very long time to launch. They did have around 100 Bears and maybe 20 Bisons that could have reached the US but how many would have gotten through the almost completely intact US Air Defensives is up for debate.
At the time of Cuban Missile Crisis the US several delevery systems that could threaten the USSR.
The B-52 fleet was still a real threat.
The B-47 fleet while winding down where still active and could hit the USSR from their forward bases.
The B-58 was active and could hit the USSR as well.
The Atlas was in service.
32 Atlas Ds
32 Atlas Es
80 Atlas Fs http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM-65_Atlas#Service_history [wikipedia.org]
There was around 60 Titan Is in service, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HGM-25A_Titan_I [wikipedia.org]
The US has a massive advantage in Bombers and ICBMs at that time.
In the area of SLBM the US had just about as big of an advantage
And the Polaris was in service and the US had 9 SSBNs in service http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington_class_submarine [wikipedia.org] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethan_Allen_class_submarine [wikipedia.org]
The USSR had 21 Golf class SSBs and 8 Hotel SSBNs So the USSR had a 3 to 1 advantage in the number of boats but that doesn't really tell the whole story.
The USSR's SLBM was the R-13 which had a range of less the 400 miles. Not only that but the Subs had to surface to launch and it took up 10 minutes to launch. The math gets worse for the USSR because each sub only carried 3 R-13s. So the USSR could only threaten coastal areas of the US and had to surface within 300 miles of the coast of the US to launch. The Hotel class was very loud and had very low performance and reliability issues. The Golf was not nuclear so it had to snorkel often. The US ASW forces at the time where the best in the world and I doubt that they would averaged even once shot each.
The US force was composed of all nuclear boats. They had much higher performance than the Hotel class. When you look at the missile things really start to shift for in the direction of the US. The US boats carried 16 Polaris missiles. The A-1 had a range of over 1000 miles and could be launched while the sub stayed submerged. So while they USSR had three times the number of boats the US boats carried five times as many missiles and they had three times the range. There are reports that they warheads on the Polaris may not have not been reliable but thank goodness we will never found out.
The simple fact is that the US had a huge advantage and the USSR was really trying to bluff their way into Cuba so they could have a real threat to the US.
And this is leaving uncounted the other strike options the US had.
The tact
Re:And from above . . . (Score:3, Informative)
Great article. As someone who grew up in Cheyenne, WY near F.E. Warren AFB (an AFB without planes or a landing strip - you can guess the mission) the details of these monsters have always fascinated me. I'd hear stories from my friends whose dads worked either as the missile capsule crews themselves or were maintenance personnel.
If Slashdot readers are flying in and out of Denver International Airport (or any area around CO, NE, WY) you can look out the window and see the launch facilities from the air. Amid the farm lands and country roads, you can look down and see an outcrop of buildings and maybe a quonset hut or two, and then a separate concrete reinforced pad maybe a hundred yards away; the whole area carefully fenced. You can tell they don't quite fit in with everything else. The number of them is startling. Yeah, in fact a little scary. But the author is correct when he states that in the (then) USSR they had the exact same thing pointing at us. Gives me the willies still.
As someone who grew up in part in northern Colorado, and ran across several missile silos while out on horseback or mountain biking, I'd like to point out that Warren AFB has helicopters, lots and lots of helicopters, and I've been told they show up in a hurry if you spend too much time poking about a missile silo because of the rash of anti-missile protests in the '80's. Warren *does* have a landing strip, actually: the WWI flying ace Eddie Rickenbacher wrecked a plane there once in the 1920's. But AFAIK it hasn't been used in 40 years.
If anyone is bored, here's a list of coordinates for known ICBM sites [siloworld.com] in the US. Here's satellite photography of a silo I found while out riding horses [google.com]. It's empty. There was a silo you could tour at Greeley's Missile Silo Park [poudretrail.org] but from what I've heard, the tornado two years ago ripped up all the above-ground stuff, including the museum, so it might not be all that interesting now.
Clearing up some details. (Score:3, Informative)
The authors discusses PALs and wonders about their absence. ICBM warheads were (and are) not equipped with PALs, because they are only required on weapons that may be exposed to capture or loss.
The authors mentions the security seems to "have a hard shell and a soft interior". That's because he discusses the veru visible security measures (meant to protect against external threats) but only briefly discusses the surety procedures (meant to protect against internal threats and unauthorized launches) and doesn't realize the full import of the latter. (The full details of the surety procedures are classified and are much more extensive than detailed in the article or in any public source.) I don't think he even realizes there is a difference between the two. I suspect, like the computer geeks I've seen here on Slashdot, that he's a little fuzzy on the difference between electronic (computer and network) security and security in the physical world.
Disclaimer: Yes, I am a former ICBM crewman - though I wore Navy blue rather than chair force blue.
Re:There was no security (Score:1, Informative)