Microsoft Certificate Was Used To Sign Flame Malware 194
wiredmikey writes "Microsoft disclosed that 'unauthorized digital certificates derived from a Microsoft Certificate Authority' were used to sign components of the recently discovered Flame malware. 'We have discovered through our analysis that some components of the malware have been signed by certificates that allow software to appear as if it was produced by Microsoft,' Microsoft Security Response Center's Jonathan Ness wrote in a blog post. Microsoft is also warning that the same techniques could be leveraged by less sophisticated attackers to conduct more widespread attacks. In response to the discovery, Microsoft released a security advisory detailing steps that organizations should take in order block software signed by the unauthorized certificates, and also released an update to automatically protect customers. Also as part of its response effort, Microsoft said its Terminal Server Licensing Service no longer issues certificates that allow code to be signed."
Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:3)
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:5, Insightful)
So much for "SafeBoot". maybe we shoulc now start calling it "unsafe boot"?
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Well,
YOu are already thrusting MS to run code (the "OS") on your computer. The boot is then the least of your worries. Unless you want to run an other OS. But as red-hat concluded, buying a 99 dollar certtificate was a better option than to setup your own CA.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:3)
Mostly it feels like Microsoft is thrusting us. ;-)
Comment removed (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
But isn't Windows (then and now) supposed to be easy while Linux requires you to be some kind of computer genius to use (according to MS PR)?
Something doesn't seem quite right there!
Note that I can install a 12 year old Debian system, do a dist-upgrade and be running the latest and greatest. Of course, since I can as easily download a current iso without Debian grabbing at my wallet, there's no need to do that.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:3)
Exactly. Until the linux crowd stop reinventing the wheel, commit to an API/ABI standard and actually support an upgrade path, this shit will continue to happen.
I even had one kernel upgrade swap the order of NIC detection around on a firewall, so that eth0 (inside) became eth1 (outside) and vice versa due to the internal hardware detection order changing. Nice one. Thus, after that I moved all my NIC drivers out to modules to force them to load in a particular order - but no doubt eventually even that would get broken due to soem genius deciding to scan the PCI bus in a different order or something and 2 NICs of the same chipset would get swapped.
And yes, until they get a stable driver ABI, expecting hardware OEMs to bother trying to keep up support for such a niche platform is a joke. It works both ways kids - don't expect people to write drivers for your OS if you can't provide a stable standard interface.
Comment removed (Score:3)
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:3)
However, this shows that the main 'benefit' MS claims for their lock in and lock down scheme is likely just hot air. If they can't keep their cert under control, the 'safe boot' becomes all downside.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:3)
YOu are already thrusting MS to run code (the "OS") on your computer.
No I'm not, I'm running kubuntu. Not trusting MS is one of the many reasons why.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Because someone having to steal a certificate first, and then get malware to spread significantly before the certificate is revoked is so much less secure than not signing your code at all?
Oh please. Next you'll be saying we shouldn't bother to lock our doors because someone can just throw a brick through the window too, yes?
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:5, Interesting)
I kind of thought Microsoft would make damn sure someone else couldn't duplicate their signatures (barring an employee or a government doing it).
Given the blurb for this story that also appeared today [slashdot.org]...
All three were most likely developed by a Western intelligence agency as part of covert operations [..] consumer-grade antivirus products can't protect against targeted malware created by well-resourced nation-states with bulging budgets
I think that *this* part of your comment:-
(barring an employee or a government doing it)
may answer your own question. Aside from the fact that governments would have had massive resources to start off with, it's also probable that MS were (at least) forced to allow those governments access or involvement at some level to otherwise secure or confidential aspects of their software.
If this is the case, then at the very least, they could have used such knowledge to give themselves an advantage. Going one step further, it's possible that they used or exploited this to help steal or get access to those keys.
But given that it's widely claimed that the US government was involved in the creation of Stuxnet, it's equally plausible that MS willingly gave- or were pressurised into giving- them those certificates knowingly, even if they might not have known exactly what they were for.
This is just speculation- I don't know any of this for sure, or have any special knowledge of the situation. But it does add up to being at least plausible.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:5, Informative)
"What we found is that certificates issued by our Terminal Services licensing certification authority, which are intended to only be used for license server verification, could also be used to sign code as Microsoft. Specifically, when an enterprise customer requests a Terminal Services activation license, the certificate issued by Microsoft in response to the request allows code signing without accessing Microsoft’s internal PKI infrastructure."
So, guys, turns out that we accidentally built our phone-home DRM such that the cryptographic "OK, your CALS are worthy unto Redmond and thou mayst remote desktop" message is also a valid signing key with a chain of trust going right back up to a default-trusted Microsoft cert... Oops.
Now, given that (so far as we know, clearly team AV isn't in any position to tell us) this little mistake was not widely known or exploited, clearly the Flame guys were on the ball(and far more interested in spying on Iran or whoever than in improving the security of domestic computers... thanks a whole fucking lot on that one, feds).
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:5, Insightful)
I have a little knowledge, not a lot, and yes this is exactly the kind of thing that can happen. it is quite impressive what happens when as a company you tell NSA no. In my limited experience, it changes to yes less than a month later.
Simple reality, microsoft probably let a bug/flaw slip through a while back, if that was not the case then they were told to. laugh all you want, but if any other operating system had been the target, do you think the outcome would have been any different? oh, and here is another amazing fact; it will happen again if desired.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Clamp it troll.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
You are wrong about my employment history. Just keep making up stuff without facts only supports my statement.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:5, Insightful)
Stuxnet was signed by stolen certificates: http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792208/Stuxnet_Duqu_The_Evolution_of_Drivers?print_mode=1 [securelist.com] . it's possible that Flamer was signed by compromised certificates, but if we believe that Stuxnet and Duqu were the products of a nation state level actor then we could conclude that Flamer is in the same category.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Back when Kaspersky first went public on Flame, I saw that one if the Israeli government ministers essentially said "didn't we do well!" a day or so later. I don't remember his name, it meant nothing to me.
Of course as a politician he could well have been misinformed, lying (trying to position himself as a hawk) or just too stupid to keep his mouth shut. On balance, I tend to see Israel being wholly or at least partially responsible - "partially" would probably implicate the US as partners. Why do the Iranians persist in using Windows?
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
I don't buy it. Microsoft would give their left nut to maintain their revenue stream from governments.
1. Sign code.
2. Deny and denounce the practice, promise to "fix the problem".
3. PROFIT.
4. Repeat.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Considering the recent escalations in state sponsored cyberwarfare I wouldn't be surprised if the NSA was involved in microsoft singing this stuff.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:3, Interesting)
The presenter said that these certificates had been signed by the CA that Microsoft delegated to these companies. Normally these CA servers stand in highly secured room, with no network connection whatsoever. The certificates still got leaked. Something similar must have happened here. These are highly sophisticated pieces of malware, with virtually no expense spared to build them (for the Stuxnet example, you had to have your own Siemens PLC, something huge and expensive and hard to come by). So it's not really surprising they could just pay a disgruntled employee, or hack into the building, or doing some James Bond stuff, or god knows what, to get their hands on these certificates.
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:2)
Normally these CA servers stand in highly secured room, with no network connection whatsoever. [...] So it's not really surprising they could just pay a disgruntled employee, or hack into the building, or doing some James Bond stuff, or god knows what, to get their hands on these certificates.
I'm a bit skeptical about the seriousness that the hardware vendors treat security. Depending on how rushed to market the product is, a lot of corners are cut in both hardware and software development -- and Realtek seems to be no exception in my experience. We see malware on fresh-from-the-factory hard drives and USB drives, tagging a ride on drivers, etc., all the time.
And the Stuxnet architects said it best: "It turns out there is always an idiot around who doesn't think much about the thumb drive in their hand." [nytimes.com]
Re:Surprised this isn't regulated more closely (Score:3)
Umm...Siemens PLCs are not that hard to acquire, sure, there are some safeguards that they don't sell you all the parts you need to make a centrifuge capable of enriching uranium from the same shop. But those S7-300's and their control/programming software is not hard to come by, an ebay search gets you everything you need to test your version of stuxnet on a real hardware for about a thousand dollars.
And if you work in any decent sized engineering company you can just "loan" the demo units.
In the case of Stuxnet Verisign was at fault - they somehow screwed up along the way - leaked the JMicron and Realtek signing certificates or actually someone at JMicron or at Realtek (or someone impersonating as employee wanting to sign code legitimately) got someone to sign something they should not have signed.
Not a first time, and won't be the last - if someone paid somebody is irrelevant, there seems to be several ways to hack the signing process socially.
Yay for security! (Score:5, Funny)
Proving once and for all that Microsoft's control of the bootloader key that is used everywhere will make all future computers more secure!
Re:Yay for security! (Score:4, Informative)
No, *MOTHERBOARD* manufacturers can add other keys. If you can't even boot to an alternative OS, there's no way in hell you could _CHANGE_ the damned keys, unless there was a vulnerability.
So please stop your FUD.
Re:Yay for security! (Score:2, Informative)
Wrong. On the x86_64 platform you will be able to boot into BIOS and add a new root key.
That is not true for ARM "Windows 8 Ready" platforms, but seriously who cares about ARM on the desktop?
Re:Yay for security! (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Yay for security! (Score:5, Insightful)
No, first they came for phones and tablets, and they can barely keep them in stock with people falling over themselves and risking stampedes to buy them.
http://www.macobserver.com/tmo/article/gartner_apple_turns_its_complete_inventory_every_5_days/ [macobserver.com]
But somehow it's fashionable only to slag Microsoft on here and ignore the elephant in the room with the lion's share of devices and profits.
Re:Yay for security! (Score:2)
Your article was about apple turning over product, tablets and what not, but you seem to be claiming that MS sells the "lion's share of devices and profits"
Overall I'm not a fan of either, but I can see both companies get bashed quite a bit here. I think it's mostly fan-boys making wild claims about how good their preferred company is while ignoring what drawbacks come with each, which leads the community to be generally cynical and disdainful of either.
I'm not a fan of MS being able to lock their operating system in to a machine. As the GP lead to, maybe they're not locking into everything at the moment, but this will make it difficult to install any other OS on a machine bought from a brick and mortar store and in the future this lock-in could be expanded to all hardware. Basically killing anyone's abilities to change to a Linux based OS if that's what they desire.
Re:Yay for security! (Score:2)
I don't see PCs being completely replaced by Windows RT tablets or ARM desktops even in the medium term future. If it's a Windows x86 device, you can install whatever you want in it, if you are willing to configure UEFI on your PC.
Re:Yay for security! (Score:3)
See comment by peppepz below, cludgy workarounds only available to geeks != freedom for the masses
Re:Yay for security! (Score:2)
Right now, ARM isn't that big, but there is a lot of talk about the jump to using ARM for servers and such because of the better MIPS per watt ratio it has over x86.
For things that are relatively lightweight in CPU, such as NTP servers, DNS, DHCP, and other basic services, ARM would excel. And MS demanding that only their key would ensure that every time ARM advanced in the enterprise, Windows would come with it.
Re:Yay for security! (Score:2)
And MS demanding that only their key would ensure that every time ARM advanced in the enterprise, Windows would come with it.
Except ARM machines are easy to build and most of them currently run Linux. Just because Windows tablets won't boot Linux doesn't mean that companies making ARM products would want to pay a Microsoft Tax on a $20 piece of hardware.
Re:Yay for security! (Score:5, Insightful)
That is not true for ARM "Windows 8 Ready" platforms, but seriously who cares about ARM on the desktop?
Maybe you are not creative enough to think of a reason to use ARM on a desktop? I can think of some:
There you go, some situations where an ARM desktop might make sense. Really though, this misses the more important point: why should a computer user ever be barred from installing the software they want to install? Allowing people to install new signing keys for their computer is not at all unreasonable; it could be as simple as pressing a button and inserting a thumb drive (enough effort to make social engineering harder, but not so much effort that an untrained person would not be able to handle it).
Re:Yay for security! (Score:3)
Why would anyone want a laptop with a 10 hour battery, that weighs almost nothing.. your right..
I would kill for one to come out, at a decent price point, to be my new Ubuntu powered laptop.
Re:Yay for security! (Score:2)
Who said our concerns are limited to the desktop?
Re:Yay for security! (Score:4, Interesting)
For x86 systems, there is absolutely a means to change or add keys.
So how will publishers of alternative operating systems be able to train home users in adding the key needed to install another operating system?
Re:Yay for security! (Score:3)
Re:Yay for security! (Score:2)
But now, the problem will involve getting the new operating system's key into the UEFI environment.
Yes, registering with MS for $99 (which goes entirely to Verisign) is an insurmountable problem.
If you support Verisign you support Norton (Score:3)
Yes, registering with MS for $99 (which goes entirely to Verisign) is an insurmountable problem.
If each end user has to do it, then yes, it is insurmountable in practice. It's especially hard for people who disagree with the principles of Norton software, which is sold by the same company that bought Verisign's certificate business.
Re:If you support Verisign you support Norton (Score:2)
If each end user has to do it, then yes, it is insurmountable in practice.
Where did you even get that idea??? We're talking about the producers of the software registering a key, once. It has nothing to do with the users.
Re:If you support Verisign you support Norton (Score:2)
We're talking about the producers of the software registering a key, once.
In that case, are you claiming that it is desirable that each operating system distributor must feed the Norton-Verisign racket?
Re:If you support Verisign you support Norton (Score:3)
Re:Yay for security! (Score:2)
. But now, the problem will involve getting the new operating system's key into the UEFI environment.
Maybe that's why red hat paid the $99 bucks to microsoft to get signed so that red hat users could use the windows key that is already in the UEFI environment, without having to get everyone to install new keys...
There was even an article on slashdot about it a few days ago.
Out of tree drivers (Score:2)
Re:Yay for security! (Score:5, Insightful)
The same way they train home users to install another OS?
Boot from CD and hit 'Install'?
Nope. Not going to work in the Glorious People's Secure Boot Dictatorship.
In fact, I presume you won't even be able to boot from CD without disabling 'Secure Boot' in the BIOS.
Re:Yay for security! (Score:5, Interesting)
Remember the Kernel Backdoor (Score:4, Interesting)
I think it was an SHS exploit or something in the Windows Kernel. Steve Gibson stepped through the Kernel and concluded that this vulnerability was an intentionally placed backdoor, perhaps by a Microsoft employee. It's in one of his earlier podcasts. Lots of people thought maybe he was crazy at the time, but in retrospect ... maybe not so much.
Re:Remember the Kernel Backdoor (Score:3)
Nice to know that even now, after Microsoft have been bitten so many times, it still hasn't occurred to them to do security auditing of at least the kernel API before they release it as a global product.
And this is the company and product most businesses choose to trust? wow. and will be the authority for the trustable bootloader key.. again, wow.
Re:Remember the Kernel Backdoor (Score:4, Interesting)
I don't think Gibson found a kernel backdoor.
He did should very loudly about an intentional backdoor in the windows metafile image handler, which would start executing native code when a callback command was included in the script. He made a large number of spurious arguments as to why this was clearly intentional, as the vuln could only be triggered in very exceptional circumstances.
He was completely wrong about almost everything he said. The vuln was trivial to trigger, except when it was the last instruction in the script (which was the only way Gibson was testing). From the fact that he had great difficulty triggering it, requiring multiple parameters to be set to nonsense values, he concluded that this was clearly a deliberate backdoor.
It later came out from a number of MS insiders (incl. Mark Russinovich) that metafiles were a feature of Win 3, and were intended to be fully-trusted OS components (for rapid image drawing, and therefore had privileged access to a variety of internal system calls - notably the ability to set callbacks). The functionality was greatly increased in Win95 and later, with the original x86 hand-written assembly being ported directly, rather than rewritten. In the mists of time, the assumption of full-trust got lost.
Re:Remember the Kernel Backdoor (Score:4, Interesting)
Since when is sheer unsourced FUD posted by Anonymous Coward starting with "I think that" moderated +5?
Summary of TFA . . . (Score:2)
Attackers broke an old form of security which has been relatively trivially patched. This is actually good for Microsoft, because (ideally) now they will review all of their old authorized keys and determine which would be easier to generate. So it's not like Microsoft included their Private Key in plaintext in some code somewhere, or anything like that.
Re:Summary of TFA . . . (Score:2)
They've stored their Private Key in plain text _somewhere_ even if that somewhere was an encrypted container that's locked away in Bill Gates' basement... :)
UEFI (Score:5, Insightful)
And this is how they plan to monopolize Secure Boot (UEFI) and get rid of Linux? why should I trust that ONE KEY that microsoft plans to install on all motherboards?
JP
Re:UEFI (Score:2, Informative)
First of all the Secure Boot in UEFI wasn't mandated by Microsoft, it a feature they they have decided to implement. A feature any OS is free to implement, including linux.
Secondly, motherboard manufacturers are able to add (or pre-add) any key (or none at all) if they choose.
Thirdly, there is nothing keeping users from being able to install their own key (or additional keys) through the UEFI boot process, assuming the UEFI manufacturer provides one.
Really, stop spreading your FUD.
Re:UEFI (Score:5, Informative)
First of all the Secure Boot in UEFI wasn't mandated by Microsoft
Except when it comes to Windows 8 on ARM systems. Then Microsoft does mandate secure boot.
A feature any OS is free to implement, including linux.
Secondly, motherboard manufacturers are able to add (or pre-add) any key (or none at all) if they choose.
This is a cop out; unless there is a simple way for users to install their own keys, this is something that will further restrict how people can use their computers. You can jailbreak your iPad if you want, but the majority of people have trouble doing so.
Thirdly, there is nothing keeping users from being able to install their own key (or additional keys) through the UEFI boot process, assuming the UEFI manufacturer provides one.
https://www.softwarefreedom.org/blog/2012/jan/12/microsoft-confirms-UEFI-fears-locks-down-ARM/ [softwarefreedom.org]
Really, stop spreading your FUD.
What FUD? We said years ago that iPad style lock-down is coming to desktops and laptops; now we have moved a step closer. There is a lot of money to be made from attacking computer users' freedom, and now that Apple has pulled in billions of dollars doing so, everyone else wants to join the party.
Re:UEFI (Score:4, Informative)
This is a cop out; unless there is a simple way for users to install their own keys, this is something that will further restrict how people can use their computers.
There is. UEFI isn't new, nor is secure boot. The only thing new is MS wanting to make it . There's a process for adding keys. Or the vendor can just pay $99 to Verisign like Fedora's doing. Even if you think that isn't "simple" enough, the feature can just be disabled on x86 machines.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
The only thing new is MS wanting to make it a prerequisite for Win 8.*
Re:UEFI (Score:5, Insightful)
the vendor can just pay $99
The fact that this is phrased in terms of "vendors" should indicate that this is an attack on user freedom. A fee to install your signing key creates obstacles for anyone who wants to fork a GNU/Linux distribution (happens all the time), anyone who wants to create their own distribution, and anyone who wants to try "Linux from Scratch" (and I know of a few people who have done so). It also creates an obstacle for anyone who wants to write their own kernel or OS; if Linus Torvalds had to pay $99, the Linux kernel itself may never have been created.
Even if you think that isn't "simple" enough
The fact that money is involved makes it a major barrier, and counts very strongly against the process being "simple" (it requires a payment to be processed, a third party to the new key, etc. -- you cannot even test a system without the fee; compare with TLS, where you can generate a usable test certificate without paying anyone).
the feature can just be disabled on x86 machines.
Only if the motherboard manufacturer allows it, and this is not allowed on ARM machines that will run Windows 8. Considering the inroads ARM has made into personal computing, I do not think it is unfair to say that the decisions made today about ARM computers will shape the reality of personal computing over the next decade. We are already seeing this happening; app stores are the norm, people are talking about trendy apps, etc.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Until NSA/MS Black Ops releases the exploits targeting non-secure boot machines...
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Linux is not an operating system, it is a kernel.
Actually, it is an operating system. It by itself is just a kernel, granted, but an operating system kernel is itself an operating system. I realize you were just trying to point out a triviality, but you are incorrect in your terminology. You may not use the term in that fashion, and you may prefer to call linux the kernel where as {flavor of the month} as the operating system so that you can try and draw a line to show the difference to people that aren't familiar with it, but that doesn't make it incorrect to label it as such. The linux kernel meets every requirement necessary to be called an operating system itself. If you can find a definition of Operating System by ANY relevant source, please provide it, because it meets every definition I've ever heard of.
What difference does it make if other OSes support secure boot, if you cannot install those OSes as a result of secure boot being used?
Then disable secure boot.For example, hold down shift while you turn on the computer to enter the UEFI. Select the "Security" section, then uncheck "secure boot enabled". Click OK. Reboot. Boy, that was hard.
This is a cop out; unless there is a simple way for users to install their own keys, this is something that will further restrict how people can use their computers. You can jailbreak your iPad if you want, but the majority of people have trouble doing so.
There is a simple way for users to install their own keys, or disable secure boot entirely if they want. And selecting a menu option is not quite the same thing as download this program from this site, connect your iDevice, sideband load this, hit these 20 keys while you reboot, then make sure you check the version of iOS you are running because this backdoor doesn't work in the versions x,y,z.
...which is something Microsoft pressures them not to do on ARM devices:
https://www.softwarefreedom.org/blog/2012/jan/12/microsoft-confirms-UEFI-fears-locks-down-ARM/ [softwarefreedom.org]
And you can't load an alternate OS on my refrigerator, my drier either, or my TV. While it's technically possible I suppose, people aren't demanding it, nor would I suspect a large amount of users want to buy an ARM based tablet with windows 8 and want to dual boot to another OS. There are plenty of devices out there that can run the OS of your choice.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Then disable secure boot.For example, hold down shift while you turn on the computer to enter the UEFI. Select the "Security" section, then uncheck "secure boot enabled". Click OK. Reboot. Boy, that was hard.
Except that you are not allowed to do so on ARM systems that run Windows 8, as per Microsoft's demands.
Re:UEFI (Score:4, Interesting)
But is Linux only able to join the party is it plays in the game Microsoft created? Do you have to be a multi-million dollar company to play? Can I write my own OS if I wanted to and have it boot "securely" on hardware that I own.
None of this seems answered right now. I know that the idiots in Washington DC think you have to be a company to make software, but when you implement that into the hardware it's total bullshit.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Also, it's a great way to get an OS labeled "insecure" by knownothings.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
That's because it IS "insecure".
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Sorry? As I read it only bios manufacturers can install those keys.
If I can install my own keys I have no problem with it, but if I can't I do.
Re:UEFI (Score:4, Interesting)
the Windows 8 Ready program requires manufacturers to make adding additional secure boot keys available to the end user. Secure Boot isn't some conspiracy to get rid of Linux, it's an attempt to try to get rid of physical access == owned.
Except it does nothing about that. Physical access still == owned unless you lock the bios/uefi and physically lock the machine. Otherwise the attacker can either take out the HDD or boot up a Linux live CD or other HDD by adding a new key. That's no different from the current state of affairs where we change the boot order, lock down the bios and lock the machine. That means the purpose for Secure Boot has to be something else... and easy money is on market dominance (even just joe-user home market dominance).
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Why? Couldn't you just encrypt the HDD?
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Why? Couldn't you just encrypt the HDD?
Not if it's a public workstation expected to be rebooted by end-users and subject to power outages. They're the most likely computers to have people get physical access.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Why? Couldn't you just encrypt the HDD?
Not if it's a public workstation expected to be rebooted by end-users and subject to power outages
Of course you can, that's the entire point of secure boot, to allow TPM and EUFI to confirm that the installed OS is in fact the one listed in the TPM keystore!
Then how does random joe user decrypt the HDD on the public workstation? Do the admins have to walk around typing in passwords all day, or does the EUFI store the encryption passphrase?
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
Except it does nothing about that. Physical access still == owned unless you lock the bios/uefi and physically lock the machine. Otherwise the attacker can either take out the HDD or boot up a Linux live CD or other HDD by adding a new key. That's no different from the current state of affairs where we change the boot order, lock down the bios and lock the machine. That means the purpose for Secure Boot has to be something else... and easy money is on market dominance (even just joe-user home market dominance).
It's also going to put an end to people being able to use Linux "Live" CDs as emergency recovery tools. I know of several instances where the only way to get data of a crapped out windows install was to boot off a live disk, then copy stuff to USB. Looks like going forward, if your windows install craps out, as it is wont to do more so than any other system I've seen, you're SOL unless you have backups.
That would be a good thing, but people are generally too stupid to have current backups.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
It's also going to put an end to people being able to use Linux "Live" CDs as emergency recovery tools.
MS would rather you use WinPE for recovery anyway. Of course I haven't checked into Secure Boot enough to know what it would do to WinPE or BartPE CDs.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
This is not a troll, saying that MS is trying to eliminate Linux through secure boot is a troll....
Yes. I'm sure that Microsoft never even considered that requiring a Microsoft key to boot your PC (or having to jump through hoops to disable 'Windows Boot' rather than just install from a CD) would harm the competition.
Re:UEFI (Score:2)
future of it all? bleak... (Score:2)
Re:future of it all? bleak... (Score:2)
I wonder how long will it take for the government(s) to decide they in fact own every computer (or at least it's processing capabilities) and issue some sort of mandatory backdoor.
What, you think this sort of thing has not already happened? Take a look at telecom equipment some time...
fake certificates, or sold certificates? (Score:4, Interesting)
Considering that microsoft sold the possibility to sign ssl certificates for any domain to the late Tunisian government, why wouldn't they sell the same thing to the makers of that virus, if it really comes from a government?
source: http://arabcrunch.com/2011/09/wikileaks-microsoft-accused-in-helping-bin-ali-monitor-tunisians-corruption-stifling-open-source.html [arabcrunch.com]
Re:fake certificates, or sold certificates? (Score:2)
I think you misunderstood the article. They did not give the government a possibility to "sign ssl certificates for any domain" - whatever that means. (private keys are used to sign things, and public certificates are issued to ensure that the private key used earlier was valid - as long as you trust the CA). Microsoft has no such power. But IE, like all current browsers maintains a simple list of trust worthy CAs and they allowed the Tunisian government's CA to be included in the list of 'safe' CAs. This by itself is not a problem - its only a problem because the government is repressive and could use this power to do much evil. This means that in theory the Tunisian government could conduct man in the middle attacks and the end user would not notice (only if using IE). I believe they were safe on other browsers. Ofcource but they could repackage firefox with their own CA and do the same to firefox users.
Really? (Score:5, Interesting)
Secure systems (Score:2)
Today's Lesson (Score:5, Insightful)
So... what did we learn today?
1. Signed code is not safe code.
2. An insecure operating system that only runs signed code is still an insecure operating system.
Not buying what Microsoft is selling (Score:3)
Why are there two certificates with the exact same label? It takes a special kind of idiot.
"Microsoft Enforced Licensing Intermediate PCA"
Why does a certificate valid from 2002 to 2010 matter in 2012.. oh yea thats right code signing certificates are based on the timestamp of the code and so when you compromise a signing cert 100 years from now and take that impossibly difficult extra step of forging a valid timestamp it will still be valid. All code signing certs should have an indefinate expiration because effectivly thats what they really are. Any other label is grossly misleading.
The security week and MS article talks about forging keys using what I assume are insecure for signature algorithms.. I assume they mean MD5..but hey look at this:
The signature algorithm for Microsoft Enforced Licensing Registration Authority CA (SHA1) is sha1 this is currently what EVERYONE is using. Was this cert also compromised in the same way? Why is it here?
Re:Nice Headline (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Nice Headline (Score:2)
Re:Nice Headline (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Nice Headline (Score:5, Informative)
The certs issues from the Terminal Server Licensing Service were intended to be used only for connections and not code signing. This is Microsoft's blunder. They weren't actually licensing malicious certificates but they were giving people tools to issue what appeared to be valid certs coming from MS.
The fixes are going to be changing TSLS so that its certs can no longer be used to sign code and revoking the intermediate CA certs that are affected.
http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2012/06/03/microsoft-releases-security-advisory-2718704.aspx [technet.com]
Re:Nice Headline (Score:2)
The TSLS was a confused deputy.
Re:Nice Headline (Score:2)
I don't know exactly how MS's certs work, but doesn't this mean that they can tell exactly which cert did the signing of the malware? That might be an interesting piece of information, even if it just leads to a dead end.
Re:Nice Headline (Score:2)
... this "interesting piece of information" will never be published.
I agree with the sentiment, but if the cert is in the virus code then it's available to everyone who has a copy. Stuxnet is fairly widely distributed, and I'm sure every black hat organization that wants it has a copy. The U.S. Government may be able to strong-arm Kapersky and Norton, but I doubt they have much leverage over the Cult of the Dead Cow (or whoever the big player is this week). The U.S. Government may be able to strong arm Rupert Murdoch and the other modern-day Charles Foster Kanes, but there are plenty of bloggers looking to make a name for themselves, never mind all the foreign journalists for agencies like Al Jazeera.
As much as anyone in power may want to suppress this information, it's got literally the same problem as DRM on movie disks - the virus is intentionally broadcasting itself to the world, and needs to have the cert attached to work properly. If it can be analyzed to find incriminating information, and there is anyone motivated and skilled enough to do the analysis, I am sure they will have access to both the virus itself and the means to publish.
Re:Nice Headline (Score:3)
And that purpose was Plausible Deniability.
Re:That's gotta hurt the bottomline... (Score:2)
Why would THEY be "paranoid" when business and government in the US are one?
"Dictabuntu" does have a nice ring to it.
Re:New users only? (Score:2)
Never trust anyone whose ID begins with a 4.
Re:How/why are iranians running windows anyways? (Score:2)
Pffft, so you think they are not technologically advanced enough to download a pirated copy?