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Open Source The Media Privacy Security

The New Yorker Launches 'Strongbox' For Secure Anonymous Leaks 94

Today The New Yorker unveiled a project called Strongbox, which aims to let sources share tips and leaks with the news organization in a secure manner. It makes use of the TOR network and encrypts file uploads with PGP. Once the files are uploaded, they're transferred via thumb-drive to a laptop that isn't connected to the internet, which is erased every time it is powered on and booted with a live CD. The publication won't record any details about your visit, so even a government request to look at their records will fail to find any useful information. "There’s a growing technology gap: phone records, e-mail, computer forensics, and outright hacking are valuable weapons for anyone looking to identify a journalist’s source. With some exceptions, the press has done little to keep pace: our information-security efforts tend to gravitate toward the parts of our infrastructure that accept credit cards." Strongbox is actually just The New Yorker's version of a secure information-sharing platform called DeadDrop, built by Aaron Swartz shortly before his death. DeadDrop is free software.
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The New Yorker Launches 'Strongbox' For Secure Anonymous Leaks

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  • They Screwed It Up (Score:5, Informative)

    by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday May 15, 2013 @04:36PM (#43734945)

    Good intentions, but it appears that they have no idea what they're doing.

    The New Yorker's Strongbox page says it won't record IP addresses or track you or set cookies - while it's setting cookies for newyorker.com, crwdcntrl.net, demdex.net, and omtrdc.net. If they want people who care about this stuff to take their commitment to anonymity seriously, they can't embed tags in their Strongbox main page that causes browsers to go do GETs on other domains' URLs because that reveals the visit to Strongbox to those third parties.

    Now all the FBI has to do is subpeona Adobe's AudienceManager's web logs. Advice to journalists with good intentions: Do this right or don't do it at all.

    Now, even if I knew anything, I could never submit it to Strongbox because the New Yorker has already compromised my anonymity to those third parties.

  • Re:Oh great ... (Score:4, Informative)

    by Fnord666 ( 889225 ) on Wednesday May 15, 2013 @09:20PM (#43737117) Journal

    I think this whole snooping on the reporters thing has them deciding to fight back and send a big "F you".

    Double plus good on this then. The media has been too damn cozy with both corporations and governments for a while now. Their relationship should be adversarial rather than cooperative.

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