Please create an account to participate in the Slashdot moderation system

 



Forgot your password?
typodupeerror
×
News

Hacking Wireless 802.11b Nets 126

John Higgins writes "The Wall Street Journal has a great article on my greatest worries about setting up a wireless network in my home. White hatter Peter Shipley and Matt Peterson of, among other things, the Bay Area Wireless User Group, drove the reporter around the valley with some rudimentary equipment to find how many corporate networks they could "see" from the street or parking lot. (Sun Micro, check your encryption!) Call me a techie lightweight, but it looks like HPNA2 for me!"
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.

Hacking Wireless 802.11b Nets

Comments Filter:
  • by Anonymous Coward
    Why are people scared of it? That's not scary! that's nice of the companies to give free bandwidth! That's what the Inter is really all about, isn't it?
  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:28PM (#260912)
    I did notice this, too.

    And guess what? Today, i got 5 mod points, used 'em up (careful not to overrate crap, since i noticed all the +5's), and then i got 5 more points!

    Maybe the number of mod points was increased. By someone, or something.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:33PM (#260913)
    Anonymous Coward
    [ Preferences ]

    You have moderator access
    and 49,523 points. Welcome
    to the those of you just
    joining: please read the
    moderator guidelines for
    instructions.

    (updated 9.9!)

    Don't make me -5 your ass
  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday April 27, 2001 @01:52PM (#260914)
    Hello. I might be considered an "insider" in this field. I work at a semi-large ISP where we provide wireless connectivity using BreezeCom network equiptment. Employing large (from 9-24 inch) antennas, and uni-and omni-directional antennas mounted on prominent structures, we are able to send up to 3Mb/s to hosts.

    The security here is terrible. We use no authentication via radius or any other method. Anyone with a 802.11 network card, and a sufficient antenna could steal connectivity, and we could not currently tell.

    There exists ways to detect this, by monitering the MAC addresses connecting to the APs on the towers, but this is not employed. Neither is each radio catalogued, and IPs, for the most part, are assigned by the DHCP server with no logging.

    I do not know if this is typical of most wireless companies, but if it is, then things should be ripe for the taking. I'm posting anonymously, because my company has a history of firing and suing for less.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:31PM (#260915)
    If this was at Sun's Santa Clara campus, this was definitely not testing. There are several rogue wireless stations there. These are connected to the iPlanet network rather than Sun's main network, though.

    Still, Sun's network is extrememly insecure in so many ways, especially internally. Getting to be an internal user is simple, with wireless and DHCP.

    The SA's are pretty much powerless to secure the network, as well. Sun's red tape binds their hands. Get fired for securing the network? You bet! Go Sun!
  • by DeadBeef ( 15 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:33PM (#260916) Homepage
    I have been in a situation with an aironet network where I have flushed the SSID and wep key of the card, and noticed while flicking bettween consoles that there was traffic from another network floating past. This is with a little ( quite directional ) parabolic grid antennae facing about half way bettween two of our own sites.

    As these cards get cheaper and more people use them, the fixed set of frequency's that the frequency hopping cards use are going to become more and more useless with high gain aerials.

    Even without the security implications, each site within 'earshot' are going to end up sharing the realistic 500k/s or so that the 11 megabit cards provide.
  • by jbrw ( 520 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @05:29PM (#260917) Homepage
    free2air has a long article [free2air.org] on this, with lots of links, technical information, source code, and other good stuff.

    And the fact that they've found 150 open hosts in London's Docklands.

    And for you 802.11b geeks, you may be vaguely interested to know that newsfilter.co.uk (below) is served wirelessly. Yehaw!

    ...j
  • by tzanger ( 1575 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @06:02PM (#260918) Homepage

    Knowing what I know, I would treat every wireless network as if ALL the traffic was being transmitted over a hostile network.

    Exactly. Which is why our access point is outside the firewall and wireless guys need to use the VPN to get into the network just like the telecommuters. There is no such thing as wired equivalency.

  • by iabervon ( 1971 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @01:55PM (#260919) Homepage Journal
    What looks like a quick paint program scrawl of the words "secure me".
  • I mod'ed this up to plus 5, as "informative", and within 30 seconds someone else had mod'ed it back down as "off-topic"

    Somebody is sure running their agenda, that's for sure...

    t_t_b
    --
    I think not; therefore I ain't®

  • One of the simplest security practices is to turn off SSID identification broadcast at the base station. Then the wireless user has to know the name of the network in order to connect.

    Yep, I do this on my home AirPort.. Pretty easy.

    Unfortunately, this quickly becomes a gigantic pain in the ass for the admins of the network, because who wants to go through and change the SSID every time you add a new wireless base? It's really practical only for small organizations.

    Changing it when adding wireless bases? Sheeit, that's easy. Changing it everytime you have layoffs, now THAT is sucks....

    Your Working Boy,
    - Otis (GAIM: OtisWild)
  • I think the logical defense here is: These radio waves are passing through my body. I think I have a right to analize them as I see fit.
  • by zaf ( 5944 ) <slashdot@NospAm.penguinmonster.com> on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:16PM (#260923) Homepage
    That solves half of the problem. The other half, is that wireless networks have much less bandwidth available, and anyone joining the network can take advantage of that bandwidth for their own gain. eg. using the company's internet connection, or just utilizing the access points for your own point-to-point pleasure.

  • Yikes...Thanks for the heads-up, I'll make sure to keep mine on ice. :-)
  • I use an Apple Airport on my Linux/Windows network at home. It cost about $300 direct from Apple [apple.com], and I configure it with the Java-based Airport Configurator [drexel.edu] from either OS. Works great, really cheap, and has support for modem or Ethernet. I use the Ethernet at home, and it's small enough I can take it with me places and use the modem. I use it at my fiance's apartment so both of us can share the modem, and I've used it on consulting jobs before where easy mobility of my laptop is convenient.

    The vast majority of the security issues (including the one in this article) are simply that the network wasn't configured securely. I haven't seen any real-world attacks against networks that run WEP; the few I have seen have been brute-force decryption of packets. I haven't seen or heard of any attacks where packets were tunneled via a VPN over the wireless network.

    As long as you're willing to read up on the security issues and take the time to configure your wireless stuff securely, you should be OK.

  • It's really not that hard to turn on WEP, even for your non-31337 mom. You go to the configurator software, select to password-protect the network, go to the client, type in the password. Pretty straightforward. Your bank account is secured by a PIN, your Internet mail account is secured by a password, same concept. It would be interesting, though, to sell hardware bundles with pre-configured WEP keys, so that people who didn't want to go to the trouble could spend a few extra bucks and have some security.

    The biggest hurdle is poor key-management. WEP only supports a fixed key, that the base station and all clients need to know. That means that if you have to change the key on the base station and all of the clients at the same time. It also means that if somebody visits your office and wants to use the wireless network, you have to give them the WEP key. In a large organization, it can be pretty difficult to distribute a new key to dozens, hundreds, or thousands of users.

    WEP has some workarounds for some of this, like letting the base station accept several keys simultaneously, but key management is still difficult.
  • The only way in the past to keep a network from acquiring devices like rouge computers or routers was to only allow certain mac addresses... university I went to did this, and my cablemodem provider does it now.

    Of course that method is quite useless now, as the LinkSys Cable Router I bought has built-in mac address spoofing.

    It's damn hard to keep a wireless access point off your network. I'd say at any company a user bringing one in should be fired.
  • I worked with Shipley about 3 years ago and then he was doing essentially the same thing with modems... he had a continuous "wardialing" project that just automatically went through all phone numbers looking for answering modems and then obvious methods to log in.

    He found lots.

    --jurgen@botz.org

  • Twid wrote:
    This isn't a perfect solution, people still get free bandwidth if they want...

    I would consider this a benefit... it's an excellent convenience to guests. How many "uninvited" users are going to be within your transmission radius?

    --jurgen@botz.org
  • by jurgen ( 14843 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @09:51PM (#260930)
    Forget WEP.

    Make a wireless network, but don't put it on your private network... instead just make it an independent network that's directly connected to the Internet (with or without NAT) completely "outside" your organizational firewall. TREAT it as the Internet... wireless PUBLIC Internet access. No security. No WEP. Because there is not need.

    Simple. All the laptops that want to use it are already set up for accessing the essential services their users want via the Internet anyway! Who has a laptop at work that doesn't need to access services on their work network when they are off-site, be it via modem or home DSL or riccochet or whatever? And is the laptop on a secure network any of these? No. So what do people do in those cases?

    Some use VPNs, some just use Web and mail via SSL, some use Ssh, whatever. The point is, it already works.

    So make all wireless networks "public internet access", you get the added benefit that visitors will be able to use it without hassle. At worst you're giving free access to some people in the suite next door or across the street.

    --jurgen@botz.org
  • by Chris_Pugrud ( 16615 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @03:12PM (#260931)
    The hurdle that prevents people from using encryption and good security is time and knowledge. It took a lot of effort to get WEP turned on where I work because an understaffed IT department had to do it.

    The funny part is we use 3DES hardware VPN devices for PTP T1 lines, but that is done by another department that has the time and materials to implement strong security. And they wonder why we don't trust the corporate network?

    Tapping unencrypted lines is easy, one of our security people was trained in tapping fiber cables by DOD in '83. Ask how many people think that their private fiber links are truly secure?

    Rather than patching together PGP/GPG, SSL, and SSH, I would strongly recommend you spend your efforts implementing IPSEC instead.

    Chris
  • by leperjuice ( 18261 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:09PM (#260932)
    I've been hunting around for a while for a good access point for a home wireless lan (preferably one integrated into my gateway a la the ZyXEL [zyxel.com] Prestiege 316 [zyxel.com], D-Link [dlink.com] DI711 [dlink.com], SMC [smc.com] Barricade [smc.com] or MaxGate [maxgate.net] Ugate 3300 [maxgate.net].

    While a Cisco Aironet [cisco.com] would be nice, $1400 is a bit steep.

    The issue is, with all these current 802.11b security issues and the probable introduction of new security features, what are good products to use and steps take? It's one thing to point out the flaws in the system; another entirely to show how to fix (or at least avoid) them.

    I detect an "Ask Slashdot" here....

  • They are accessing resources on a network (even just to probe to see if they are there) that they *know* they do not have authorization to use. They suspect that these networks are configured with loose security, so they check it out. Under US Law, I'd bet that's not legal.

    If it's just radio waves.. why are cellular phone scanners illegal in the US? (As opposed to Canada, where radio transmissions *are* public)
  • by mindstrm ( 20013 ) on Saturday April 28, 2001 @12:54PM (#260934)
    As of 10 or 15 years ago or so (I think) scanners in the us (yes, commonly called police scanners) are not permitted to scan cellular frequencies.
    There are professional models you can buy, I'm sure, that may let you, but they are generally for use in labs, and cost a fortune. Of course you can modify your ratshack scanner.....

    IF you look at a cool product like the winradio (www.winradio.com) you will notice that the US version has several bands blocked; the euro & Canadian versions don't.
    Canada, and many other places, receiving any transmission is legal.

    Decryption of private communications may be a different matter.

  • The article (at least the one in the dead tree version of the WSJ) makes it pretty clear that Shipley was being very careful not to actually look at any emails, data, etc. - just notice that; "Oh, look, there's an online printer, yup, there goes an email ...", just enumerating what he COULD have done.

    He's pretty damn sharp, I'm sure he knows more about the legality of it than I do. And *I'm* sure that his chances of getting sued are close to zero.

    And it's pretty hard to claim he's stealing resources when all he's doing is sucking up free electrons.
  • coolness. score one for common sense.

    not that a condone dangerous speeding, but it is a good precedent for more reasonable activities


    Lord Pixel - The cat who walks through walls
  • In the UK it would be illegal even to stand in range and see if you can connect. You don't have to actively probe anything to break the law.

    It is illegal to receive any radio broadcast that was not intended for your use

    Probably originally introduced to make police or army radio scanners illegal, but has also been used to criminalise all radar detectors (think speed traps) and things like intercepting satellite transmissions (think watching shows not intended for the UK market.

    In other words, like all overly broad laws, whatever its original intent was it has been twisted to shut down anything anyone with enough power doesn't like.


    Lord Pixel - The cat who walks through walls
  • I usually read at +3. I used to see about 10% of the articles. Now it is 25-30%.

    This is worse than the grade inflation in US schools. If you can spell your own name, you will get a B or +3.
  • Of course, this opens up the problem of a stolen laptop compromising the network...

    Remote detonate.

  • While it is true that even 128 bit WEP isn't sufficiently secure to be /secure/ it is still quite good. (It requires a real effort from the attacker at least. Not something you do willy-nilly while waiting in traffic.)

    The problem is that although WEP is rather simple to use the people don't. Using "your" memorystick etc solution it would require even more of an effort. I.e. not gonna happen.

    What is needed isn't more tech. What's needed is to make admins, and users aware of the problem.
  • I agree with you completely in spirit, but the US court system probablly doesn't.

    International law doesn't really exist, so there's no law to break regarding China.
  • by MarcoAtWork ( 28889 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:06PM (#260942)
    It seems that the valley is full of companies in which the 'engineers' are 'testing' wireless networks, and that these 'tests' coincidentally were supposed to stop around the day an article is published about them.

    yeah, right, if it wasn't for all this control, my head would be spinning right out of my neck...
  • And what would the company and judge say to that?

    Company: "It was no equipment of ours that set up a napster like server and put in all those beetle songs. We were hacked."

    Judge: "So we will have to make all wireless bordcasting of data illegal"

  • I must of just broke it :)

    I also got 5 points used 2 and suddenly got all 5 again (weird) but then my karma been frozen for months now. must have been a unlucky 13 point karma bug. (who know?)

  • by schon ( 31600 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:35PM (#260945)
    Require SSH2 tunnels

    Augh! NO! NO!

    SSH is a good protocol for secure terminal sessions, but you should never, never use it for tunneling, unless you're fond of session-timeouts and stalled connections.

    SSH uses TCP, which means it's the worst protocol you can use for a tunnel... TCP guarantees the reliability of the connection - so a dropped packet can wreak havok.. the tunnel will stop and re-transmit the packet - so every other TCP connection will stall - and guess what? These stalled connections think their packets have been lost, so they retransmit their 'lost' packets - resulting in LOTS of duplicat packets.. (and if the 'original' packet was lost due to congestion, you can guess that you're gonna start flooding the tunnel - a cascade failure.)

    A more technical description is available at
    http://sites.inka.de/sites/bigred/devel/tcp-tcp.ht ml [sites.inka.de]

    Unless you can guarantee that your network will never drop a packet, you need to use an unreliable protocol for the tunnel (think GRE - that's what it was designed for - but even UDP would be a better choice.)
  • Go find exactly where on Apple's page it says that they want you to use AirPort for your secure internal company communication, and perhaps I'll find the post "funny."
    40bit encryption, you can hide the networks from broadcasting themselves, allow only specific MAC addresses, and require a password to join the AirPort network.
    But no where does it state that they intend for you to trust all of your data to it.


    Page 4 of the AirPort Fact Sheet:
    Security
    AirPort offers password protection and encryption capabilities to deliver a level of security
    comparable to that offered by traditional cabled networks. Users can be required to enter a
    password to log on to the wireless network. When transmitting information, AirPort uses 40-bit
    encryption to scramble data. In addition, access control and closed network features can be
    employed.
    A similar comment can be found on page 4 of the AirPort FAQ [akamai.net]. The most important thing is the omission of any sort of notice that there could be a security problem.

    Of course, the whole encryption thing was a semi-trollish joke anyway. Half a year of burning off my excess karma has started to make me prone to them lately. Looks like I caught someone!

    The real problem in the article was that these companies were using open network, where you don't have to name the network befoe seeing access to it, and they weren't using any sort of encryption at all. Even AirPort's weak 40-bit encryption, combined with a closed network feature and with filtering MACs would have prevented these people from tuning in from their car.

    AirPort actually makes all this configuration a no-brainer.

    Microsoft, on the other hand, would be saying that it, just like Windows 2000, is totally secure and safe to use on any corporate LAN. *snort*

    Straw man. Check my user profile.

    Actually, if you configure the damn thing properly, especially by using centralized MAC filters, Airport's security would be safe enough. I'm hoping Mac OS X's UNIX underpinning would make doing this a little easier.
  • by Valdrax ( 32670 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:06PM (#260947)
    What, you mean people aren't using Apple's Airport with it's robust, secure 40-bit encryption scheme to protect all their traffic? Darn PC users.

    (Burn, karma, burn...)
  • by Raetsel ( 34442 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:00PM (#260948)
    Nice idea, but there's one small problem...

    The authorized devices using the network are broadcasting their MAC addresses!!

    This so very much reminds me of the well-known 'trick' of cloning a cell phone... sit somewhere where there are LOTS of targets, and just record the ESN/SID (or, in the case of 802.11b, the MAC address), program your own device, and off you go!

    I still like the idea of VPN tunneling over the wireless segment. Yes, use the hardware safeguards, but don't trust them. Require SSH2 tunnels, perhaps using PGP-style public/private keysets to make things 'easier.' Of course, this opens up the problem of a stolen laptop compromising the network... but I never said this was a perfect world.

  • I guess I'm a righteous 'l33t haxor when I turn on my scanner and listen to the neighbor's cordless phone.

    Unless I missed something here, this does not involve any 802.11b security issues. Some people didn't encrypt their wireless net, some other people could read their packets. BFD.
  • I've seen SEVERAL stories on MSNBC really getting on Microsoft. I was surprised to see them, since I figured they'd be very biased. But I've seen numerous BIG EMAIL VIRUS!!! type stories on there. They don't seem to be holding many punches back.
  • Has anyone ever seen a test done with someone sitting in a parking lot attacking the 802.11b encryption? We've had several articles here on /. talking about how insecure the encryption MAY be, but no one has done any real tests yet.

    Now for this article. Duh. These admins should be fired. I run 802.11b at my house with full encryption and other security features on. I wouldn't let an access point in this building without securing it first. This isn't a technology problem, it's a human problem. These are probably the same people that don't patch up to the security holes and wonder why they get hacked two years later.

    To make it easier, there needs to be a good key exchange mechanism. People that don't put much thought in to security don't want the "hassle" of manually entering keys on everyone's notebooks. I wonder how long before there are web pages with key listings for companies and longitude/latitude locations....
  • by Milican ( 58140 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @04:36PM (#260952) Journal
    Well the mod points are kinda sporadic. I haven't had any in forever... Now all of a sudden I have mod points and I think.. use it or loose it.. so I use it, but I still use it somewhat wisely. I bet alot of others are thinking the same. If I knew I would get mod points on a regular basis, like an allowance I would be much more frugal. However, if they are given out and taken away at random I tend to be more of an easy sleazy moderator.. ;)

    JOhn
  • Well, I am a Nortel employee and I use Contivity (Nortel's VPN client...)

  • I belive that many of the attacks require modified hardware/firmware. Not because they are intrinsically difficult, but because the encryption is done in hardware, and the card "automatically" drops encrypted packets when it isn't in crypto mode.

    Conceptually, this is the same as only selling ethernet cards that don't support promiscious mode and claiming that makes ethernet "secure". It isn't a big hack to make a scanner yourself, and if the card has a programmable microcontroller it can likely be done with a firmware update.
  • The good news is, there are so many completely unsecured networks out there, that if yours isn't actively encouraging eavesdroppers, you are probably far enough ahead of the curve to be "safe" (at least from script kiddie types. If someone is out to get your, you are sunk).

    Not something to rely upon in the long run, more of a sad comment on the current state of wireless privacy.
  • by Twid ( 67847 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @06:24PM (#260956) Homepage
    Where I work, we have the whole building in San Jose set up for wireless. The way we approach security is that the wireless network is on the public internet outside the internal firewall (not on the DMZ, the wireless are completely outside).

    So, in order to get to internal data while on wireless you must start up a VPN client or go through our portal. This isn't a perfect solution, people still get free bandwidth if they want, but at least they can't get to internal data.

    Also, we have most of the wireless access points in public conference rooms, and a couple of them have been stolen!

    - Twid
  • by taniwha ( 70410 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @01:52PM (#260957) Homepage Journal
    Of course people could start guessing MAC

    Umm --- a sniffer will give you these pretty easily .....

  • This isn't even "non-damaging probes on networks". This is networks broadcasting information to anyone in the vicinity with a laptop and a wireless network card. If you are shouting on a street corner, is it a crime for me to hear you?

  • by 0xA ( 71424 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:23PM (#260959)
    For a network running Microsoft software, taking common steps such as ensuring Guest access is disabled and that passwords are required for all resources will do the job.

    Password protecting resorces isn't going to do any good at all. If you read the article it is clear that these guys are running some king of packet sniffer.

    "There -- someone just turned on an NT machine and is getting mail."

    There is no way to know this unless you have are collecting and looking at packets on the network. Unless all traffic on the wireless segment is encrypted you will have NO security on that segment.
  • International air space. If we had faster planes we could get better privacy because you could scan from further away because it would take less time for air forces to respond.
  • by Greyfox ( 87712 )
    As the whole SDMI issue demonstrates, corporations would rather stick their heads in the sand and pretend the problems don't exist rather than actually address and correct the problems. I guess it's more profitable to sue your problems out of existance. A whitehat walking in to any company and demonstrating that he can get all that company's data is very likely to be sued, and the security issues never addressed.

    Ironically you'd have much better luck as a blackhat, compromising the company's network, stealing their data and selling it to their competition. I'm not advocating this, mind you, but you're a lot less likely to face any legal reprocussions choosing this path. The company you cracked will never be any the wiser, that's for sure.

    Likewise notifying a company that they've got a problem as an employee of that company has never (in my experience) got a problem fixed. They keep on doing what they're doing come hell or high water. Companies collectively are damn stupid and I don't see this changing anytime soon. It means plenty of income for the black hats, I suppose. *sigh*

  • by _Bunny ( 90075 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @03:43PM (#260962) Homepage
    I'll bet those sysadmins would be very surprised to discover that the 802.1b access points were even on their networks. This stuff is too cheap and bone-head easy to install. Apparently a lot of consultants of various types like to pack them around with their laptops so they don't have to futz with network cables whereever they happen to be working that day.

    Exactly.

    What we're seeing is only the dawn of what most likely will become a very large problem... the cost of wireless Ethernet is around a few hundered bucks, and is affordable by the clueless.

    I run a 1,200 node network, and never thought about this until today. This is an issue we're going to have to address in the future...

    If an employee wants to run a wireless LAN, that might be okay, but they really should check with us first to make sure they "do it right"...
  • by BierGuzzl ( 92635 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @01:55PM (#260963)
    Well, considering the amount of success those Russians had holding credit cards randsom (before the fbi nabbed them) maybe there's a market to be tapped here. Simply collect masses of information and sell it to competitors, publish it on the net, or blackmail the owners, all from a hilltop above the silicon valley.

    The benefits of this would be manyfold:

    • You'd make money and become famous
    • Evil corporations would get what they deserve
    • Patent secrets would be exposed
    • Evidence of corporate corruption could be collected (See how the
    • honeynet [honeynet.org] project is able to collect info without a search warrant)

    Naturally you can't do all of these things at the same time or even have all of these things done by the same person, seeing as the explanation for what the hell you were doing listening in on the traffic in the first place might range from dubious to illegal.

  • Anything that runs over a non-secure medium, like the air, is unsecure. Even with encryption and the like, someone can grab all the data, and decrypt later. There are also some other little tricks you can play with just to mess up someones data. This is a technology that can be used for simple things when it is needed, but for the most part, wireless is for tech nuts that would buy the new Backstreet Boys DVD, because it is totaly interactive, OOH - AAH. Lets be a little realistic about what is possible and what is not.
  • it doesn't matter if you have a good wiring strategy. Most buildings have a pretty thick chicken wire that coats the walls, so wireless radiation will not travel far. You could probably have a few "uninvited" guests in the parking lot, but who cares? Nobody is going to sit in some parking lot just for some internet access since they're not going to be able to peek into the internal lan anyway.
  • Hrm what network are YOU on? Sun's fierwall blocks just about everything I've ever tried to do from inside to outside Sun, let alone vice versa. Now if people are installing rogue wireless bridges that would compromise securty--- and they should get severely reprimanded if not outright fired.
  • I wish you'ld shwo me to me. I havent seen anything without a MS spin to it.

    My favorite was their headline when they lost the anti-trust suit...

    MICROSOFT DECLARED "MONOPOLY" (the quotees were theirs). The article spent most of its time talking about how MS wasn't going to be effected and was going to apeal.

    I am really amazed you haven't ntoiced their slant.

  • by catseye_95051 ( 102231 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:13PM (#260968)
    Have you ever noticed what stories they "indepndantly" choose to run?

    Hackers hacking Sun (can you say MS-massive-security-breah-damage-control?)

    Any whiff of PS2 trouble.

    Pro MS anti=truat case articles.

    And so on and so forth.

    NBC should be ashamed they have their name associated with what is clearly just another MS publicity arm.
  • Radar detectors are not illegal in the U.K. following a ruling on March 30th 1998 in the High Court by Lord Justice Brown.

    In the past a few prosecutions have been brought by claiming the use of radar detectors was contrary to section 5(b)(i) of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 as amended by section 3 of the Post Office Act 1969. However the Acts refer to the interception of wireless communications for the purpose of obtaining information as to the content, sender or addressee of any message. The Court concluded that the radar transmission was not communicating a 'message' and therefore equipment designed to detect the presence of the transmission could not decode any such message. It was further stated that section 1(1) of the Act, which requires a licence for the reception of radio signals, has been superseded by the Wireless Telegraphy Apparatus (Receivers)(Exemption) Regulations (SI 1989 No123) which exempts radar detectors and similar equipment from the need for such licenses.
    thanks to the speedtrap bible [geocities.com] for the info.
    ----
  • by Saidin ( 105994 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @03:00PM (#260970)
    There is no such thing as a "Patent Secret"
    The whole point of the patent is that to get one, you have to reveal everything you know about it :)
  • by mljames ( 107636 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @04:32PM (#260971)
    I remember sitting in my friends apartment in Seattle and being able to connect to 3 different wireless networks by simply setting the default network name to any.. The same trick worked at the airport for network access I was supposed to be paying for..My wirelss client software was complaining about the lack of encryption but it still connected and gave me an ip address..I used napster to benchmark my speed and it was good...Perhaps we should only distribute this information to a smaller group of folks..so those in the "know" can take advantage of a rouge wireless network to get free internet access, and use napster while sitting in a terminal waiting for a flight..
  • Patent secrets would be exposed

    uh, you do know that all patents are on file at the patent office and available for all to see, right? There are trade secrets, but a patent is no secret at all.

  • by sigwinch ( 115375 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @04:33PM (#260973) Homepage
    You are right for conventional PPP-over-SSH-over-TCP tunneling, but there is still hope for tunneling over TCP.

    If the tunneled connections don't do retransmission themselves, you can just carefully design the tunneling protocol to be very nonagressive about retransmissions. E.g., ask "did you get that" instead of retransmitting the whole packet, and using a steeper-than-TCP exponentional delay function.

    And if you have to tunnel TCP over TCP, the tunneler could inspect packets, detect when the tunneled TCP is retransmitting, and simply drop the retransmission on the floor. This is just a tiny step beyond NAT. Of course, if you're tunneling arbitrary reliable protocols, you're screwed. (Although I suppose you could blindy bandwidth limit the tunneled protocol by dropping packets. If you did this agressively enough, the tunneled protocol could be convinced to sufficiently rate limit itself.)

    Incidentally, I've been thinking about this because sometimes you don't have a choice about what kind of connection to use. Sometimes you are provided with an arbitrary stream-oriented, possibly reliable, connection and have to make do.

    BTW, thanks for the link to the TCP-TCP web page. I can point people at that instead of explaining...

  • by morpheus_ ( 124308 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:15PM (#260974)
    I also work at a service provider that has opted to use 802.11b to link customers with us. However, from the beginning I realized that it was a Bad Idea (tm) not to use every single security feature available to me. As a result, we only use Gold cards (128 WEP vs. 56 WEP) on installations, and MAC-lock all the access points, so only the base stations I authorize can connect to our network. I know that probably the weakest link then becomes the password authentication on the access points themselves, which could probably be brute-forced, but at least it eliminates the more casual dangers. I'm totally aware that if a determined 31337 h4x0r wanted to get on our network, he probably could manage. btw, we keep getting all those reports about the encryption being cracked and all, but exactly how vulnerable is 128 WEP? As in, if I took every precaution available, how long (average) would it take between the initial attempt at the hack and the actual hack made?
  • Anyone else notice that in the last two days the number of posts moderated to +5 in each story has (approximately) tripled? What's up?

    Like many people (I suspect), I read Slashdot mainly for the posts. Some of the most informative pieces are those in which one of Slashdot's editors have made a factual error, and the community summarily slams him/her (are there any "hers"?) for lack of journalistic integrity. We get 3-6 +5 posts that seem to be written by experts in the field and are very informative to neophytes like me.

    But if we suddenly have like 25 +5 posts per thread, the signal/noise ratio goes WAY down. Come on, 59 +5 posts in the SDMI story [slashdot.org]? WTF!?!?! They really weren't all that good.

    Did Slashdot get cracked? Did they change the moderation system? SOMEBODY CHANGE IT BACK!!!

    Thanks for listening.


    If you're not wasted, the day is.

  • The hurdles are stupidity and laziness.
  • Well, when you think about it, setting up a wireless network that is mildly insecure is basically the same as having cat-5 ports on the outside wall of your office building.

    Unfortunately, very few administrators stop to think of the implications of wireless before doing a mass deployment.

    This recently happened at my school, as is talked about in this paper I wrote [wh3rd.net], which gives a breakdown on some of the vulnerabilities present in my, and many others', schools.

  • by fleener ( 140714 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:06PM (#260978)
    Huh, and this is different from flying an EP-3 surveillance plane off the coast of China how?

    If you're spewing stray radio waves all over the place, whose fault is that? Is it your job to control your communications or our job to keep our ears shut?

  • My guess is that Sun's comment was true. It really was somekind of WLAN test setup. Unfortunately it was not correctly configured or was connected to the corporate intranet. These WLAN access points and network access cards are so easy to install that without being security concious you are _bound_ to make mistakes - no encryption, no security, connected to intranet/Internet etc. The current business environment also encourages to do everything as fast as possible. Setting up a closed test network for a single project could be just another extra cost. Fortunately all the test WLANs at our office are connected to an isolated test domain - yes, the data moves but there are no Secrets available.
  • I hate to be the one to point this out, but that is not a Wall Street Journal link.

    But besides that.. I read the article earlier today, now I'm finding myself looking down to the parking lot looking for people with laptops in their car..

    And I will reiterate the point.. I will stop being paranoid when you all stop following me.
  • by thrillbert ( 146343 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:07PM (#260981) Homepage
    Being the network admin, I've been researching this same issue. And I agree with you regarding the VPN solution. I recently found a link to a company called Colubris [colubris.com] who has a really nice AP.

    I sent them an email yesterday but have not heard back. I would like to know if I can tie the VPN to authenticate from our LDAP server to allow users worldwide mobility without having the local admins create them an account.

    As for the stolen laptop, if you use SecureID tokens, this would help in a case like that, which is the reason I prefer this method over digital certificates.
  • ... that this would fall under the "unauthorized access to computer systems" clause of numerous anti-hacking laws, whether any physical access was made or not.

    Now, prosecuting, or even getting the feds to listen to your sob story is another thing, considering no damage was done. The FBI quotes (IIRC) a $5k minimum on damages before they'll even talk to you, but in reality, you'd have to approach $100k or so, and be willing to air your company's lackluster security in the court of law, and of public opinion.

  • My company uses a Nortel VPN solution as well. Just seizing the opportunity to poke fun. :-p
  • A mile or so away from Sun, the men find a small network at a building belonging to Nortel Networks Corp., which, among other things, sells VPN software. They can spot the network from the street; when they pull into the Nortel parking lot, Mr. Peterson was able to sit in the car and surf the Web, courtesy of Nortel's network. (Nortel wouldn't comment.)

    When a VPN vendor doesn't even use it's own software, it looks like it's time to pick a new VPN vendor... ;-)

  • Sadly, Sun is very low on technically competent people, at least where I worked (central). There's a lot of managers and support people, and many of these are tasked doing things they aren't really qualified for, and pressured into doing a shoddy job.

    Honestly, I didn't meet that many people I disliked. But most of the people I worked with were really out of their depth working with Sun machines, and even the ones that wanted to learn had no time to do it, or weren't allowed to by their bosses.

    I wouldn't be surprised if most of the executives use Windows, because they have enough clout to get out of using the standard system put in place for the less than fully clued.

    --

  • Forgot to mention:

    Sun has no way of connecting back in to work from home. Sun.Net [sun.net] is a sad joke, providing only access to mail and calendar and such. The servers are (or at least they were) quite unreliable.

    There is a terminal app, written in Java, but instead of using something normal and usable [mindbright.se], they used some bizarre thing which interfaced with the security cards. I can understand the need for that, but the only way to use the system was through an extremely slow and unreliable applet, or by telneting to localhost and going through several gateways (each of which had a nasty habit of hanging right in the middle of working) to finally telnet (?!) to one's office workstation. X11 was, of course, unavailable, unless you wanted to go in through the modem pool, which was limited to 28.8kb/s.

    When the only way to get in and maybe fix the emergency brewing at the office is that pathetic, it's a given that there will be unauthorized tunnels in use. I experimented with a few SSH-based things myself (made extremely painful due to the temperamental SOCKS proxy), but had the good sense and courtesy to be even more anal about security than is my wont.

    Oh yeah. People liked to share passwords. Within earshot, or over unencrypted voice lines.

    Somebody at Sun please work on fixing this. It hurts to remember.

    --

  • by vsync64 ( 155958 ) <vsync@quadium.net> on Friday April 27, 2001 @04:45PM (#260987) Homepage
    I worked at Sun fairly recently, and I have to say that their security is nothing short of pathetic. I don't want to seriously jeopardize their operations (although it's sadly obvious that they don't need me to do that), so I won't go into much detail, but:

    • There is no NAT. Any connections to the outside world go through application-based proxy servers, and if one is lucky and the server is up, SOCKS. This is not in itself a problem (except for the system's hopeless obsolescence and inconvenience), but it encourages (I would almost say forces) employees to find less than official means of getting to the outside world in order to do their jobs.
    • No one I met had even heard of SSH. No one. All internal connexions take place over RPC, and most people have .rhosts file with at least "+ <user>" in it.
    • Everyone leaves their X server wide open. xhost + is everyone's first action ("xauth? what?"), and I was shocked to see a security manual put out by Sun say "In order to start this GUI security tool, you will need to run the command xhost +.".
    • Servers were always going down, badly enough that I moved my home directory, mail, and all related files and services to my local machine. Even in instances where a proper security policy might exist, I have doubts that it would last for long.

    There are other gaping holes which I feel it would be completely unfair to post in any level of detail, but suffice it to say SWAN is riddled with holes waiting to be exploited, and I hope someone decides to do something about it before a h4x0r realizes how easy it would be to own all of it.

    --

  • by proxima ( 165692 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @01:52PM (#260988)
    These guys in the end are doing these companies a service by exposing blatant security holes and embarrassing them. However, they're also itching for a lawsuit. I know most people on /. don't see anything wrong with non-damaging probes on networks, but a law doesn't even have to be violated to win a lawsuit. Any one of these companies (especially the bigger ones) could perhaps win a lawsuit against these guys for using (stealing) their network resources without permission.

    However, I believe three major things will keep most companies from prosecuting these guys.

    1.) They are embarrassed enough already, and a court case will only embarrass a computer company more (Sun with an insecure network, that looks real good).

    2. A lot of Silicon Valley comapnies are running out of cash.

    3. The only thing the companies have to gain is deterring others from pulling the same stunt (and tattling about it later).

  • by zfractal ( 170078 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @09:03PM (#260989)
    So I'm in LA and have a clear LOS to Hollywood and the Westside (plus I'm pretty high up, so no major obstacles). Anyone interested in an OpenNAP server hosted by BMG?
  • by RuneB ( 170521 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:01PM (#260990)
    Why do people find it difficult to use encryption over the networks they use? A person should assume that any un-encrypted traffic over any network could be easily monitored by someone with the right equipment, and relying on the security of every machine along a route is dangerous.

    IMHO, saying that encrypting traffic is too much effort is no longer a valid excuse, now that tools such as ssh, PGP/GPG, and SSL are in wide use. In fact, OpenSSH now supports dynamic port forwarding with socks support; which can allow transparent encryption of traffic.

    So, what is the hurdle that prevents people from using the tools available to encrypt their traffic?

  • The main campus of my university hard wires mac addresses into their dhcp servers on the wireless LAN. The only problem is they charge $300 to lease a wireless card under the argument that your paying for service. Of course you can just plug in good old RJ-45 into one of the many ports located in classrooms and student areas. Being the battery on my laptop was broke it never bothered me.
  • Read the article title and credits--

    Often unguarded wireless networks can be eavesdroppers' gold mine


    It is easy to make a wireless network secure

    By Lee Gomes
    THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

    See?

  • ...fixes the job. For a network running Microsoft software, taking common steps such as ensuring Guest access is disabled and that passwords are required for all resources will do the job.

    I can see their point though about networks behind a firewall, but even inside a firewall I'd think companies would be proactive in securing their networks. I just think there's more "scare" than bite in this story-- the technology is secure, it's the networks the technology is run on that needs to be worked with (and this could easily be Linux or Windows systems). It could happen to more than just 802.11b based networks, this could happen to any company that has their network connected to the internet, or any home user that has DSL and a permanent IP address..

  • "War driving", huh? I've done that a couple of times myself just to see what I'd find, and while I saw more than few SSIDs (including a couple on the same residential street where the SSID names indicated AirPort users), I think I only ever found one that was truly wide-open.

    These guys in the article only mention getting into maybe two or three networks, but they see a lot more. A visible SSID isn't necessarily bad security by itself, and it's a hell of a lot better than a wide-open 802.11b that lets you surf the web from somebody else's parking lot!

    Not much better is a building with live DHCP'ed 100-base-T ports in every room. I've found at least one university building like this. I wonder how long until people hiding base stations (not advertising SSIDs, of course) in the ceiling spaces of buildings gets to be a real problem.

  • by ackthpt ( 218170 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:02PM (#260997) Homepage Journal
    "This looks like a good place to work, oh, wait, was that a layoff list I just saw go over to HR?"

    --

  • After reading the article, it sounds to me like they're cruising around, looking for wireless LAN's that identify themselves.

    By default, a wireless base station will broadcast the SSID of the wireless network of which it is part, and wireless LAN cards can join the network without already knowing the SSID of the network.

    One of the simplest security practices is to turn off SSID identification broadcast at the base station. Then the wireless user has to know the name of the network in order to connect. Unfortunately, this quickly becomes a gigantic pain in the ass for the admins of the network, because who wants to go through and change the SSID every time you add a new wireless base? It's really practical only for small organizations.

    Mind you, I'm sure this could be fairly easily intercepted from traffic between a user and a base station, but it's a start down the road towards hiding your wireless LAN.

    WEP encryption has been proven to be an easily circumvented technology (as reported on /. once upon a time), as has this lack of SSID broadcast, but it's a start. The best bet for true security is to implement a VPN over your wireless LAN, or just treat your wireless zone as a DMZ.

  • I am currently using 802.11b a good bit, and have come up with a solution that I am happy with. I setup filtering to disallow any access from the 802.11 interface except to ssh. I then use ppp over ssh to connect. I have setup my laptop to do this when it brings the interface up. I would like to do IPsec, but I have not spent enough time to get it working.
  • I've now worked with wireless network equipment from Cisco, Motorola, and Nortel Networks. I've found that none perform particularly well when using the Wired Equivelency Protocol (WEP) for security, although there aren't a whole lot of other options out there at preasant. Many companies rely simply on the uniqueness of the SSID used within their wireless lan. Some restrict access by MAC address. None of these methods are particularly secure. The only one that suggests making an effort at security is use of WEP.

    There was a previous discussion on Slashdot [slashdot.org] about issues with the security of WEP. The articles out there on security holes in WEP are too numerous to list here.

    What scares me most is the sheer lack of concern expressed by many network engineers, with regard to wireless. I've heard many times now, variants on "It's a wireless network. It's insecure by definition so why even make an attempt to secure it." Scary.

    --CTH

    ---
  • Here's the berkeley study on WEP security:
    http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.htm l [berkeley.edu]
    ---
  • by Ndog ( 230982 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @07:02PM (#261004)

    No, you can keep wireless access from happening -- it's just a pain in the ass. Most switches these days support secure ports. With the Cisco switches I use at work, you can set port security so it not only allows just one specific MAC to use the port, but if anybody unplugs the cable to plug something else in, the port is automatically disabled (although there are other settings to choose from besides automatically disabling the port). This keeps people from spoofing the MAC, because nothing will work until an admin resets the port. For more information, check out this article [sans.org].

    Like a lot of security, it's a pain in the ass, but you can prevent people from plugging in unauthorized devices, wireless or otherwise. Of course, no security is unbeatable.

  • Well, you need a subscription to get to the Wall Street Journal itself. Unless you happen to know the the WSJ has a relationship with MSNBC and puts some of their better articles up there for free. If you would prefer that I link to an article on a paid-subscription site, I can refile... Higgins
  • I haven't audited the 802.11b protocol, so I can't say whether I think the basis is secure or not, but I have noticed one potential security problem for networks based on a certain brand of local access point hardware (name withheld for now)...

    This particular manufacturer stated the hardware was compatible with up to 128-bit encryption, and I did set my remote interface to 128-bit with no problems. The base unit, on the other hand, had no such setting; encryption could either be turned on or left off.

    This leads to two potential exploits:

    1. Brute force: trying to connect using all 2^40 keys until you are able to access the network. This is probably unworkable, but worth noting.

    2. For a network with a large number of remote connections, one or more might have been set to 40-bit instead of 128-bit. Traffic from these nodes could be sniffed and analyzed, and the passphrase hash recovered.

    Since I'm administering all of the remote points on my network, I've taken steps to keep this from happening; but for a large corporate net where users tend to fiddle with things, this could definitely cause a problem.
  • Now for this article. Duh. These admins should be fired. I run 802.11b at my house with full encryption and other security features on. I wouldn't let an access point in this building without securing it first. This isn't a technology problem, it's a human problem. These are probably the same people that don't patch up to the security holes and wonder why they get hacked two years later.

    I'll bet those sysadmins would be very surprised to discover that the 802.1b access points were even on their networks. This stuff is too cheap and bone-head easy to install. Apparently a lot of consultants of various types like to pack them around with their laptops so they don't have to futz with network cables whereever they happen to be working that day.

    ... and to think of it another way, if you were a bad guy this is a pretty awesome way to put a tap on someone's entire network without their knowledge. Sometimes it seems to me that wireless LANs were invented by either law enforcement agencies or spies. Or both -- maybe they're in cahoots.

    This isn't merely a clue problem. There is a control problem as well.

  • by Zeinfeld ( 263942 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:12PM (#261011) Homepage
    The security in 802.11b is worse than useless, it claims a degree of security it does not provide. That is why most large corporations deploying 802.11b don't rely on WEP, they use IPSEC or PTPP to add security that was not broken at birth. Go to Redmond washington and every MSFT conference room has IEEE802.11b, but they don't use WEP.

    Driving arround town there are a lot of 802.11b networks that are left open on purpose. I could care less about someone sending bits over my broadband pipe. Media one might mind but that is a different matter.

    If it wasn't for the fact that if I did leave the access point open someone like the author of the article would be bound to post the fact on the net as 'security expert hacked' I would have no problems leaving it open. My internal systems are all behind a firewall in any case.

  • by deran9ed ( 300694 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:26PM (#261012) Homepage
    This is old news [zdnet.com] (Wireless Insecurities) and I think on every single wireless article I seen posted here, I kind of trolled about it before.

    There's slight temporary fixes for the Wireless problems dealing with security, I think someone has PKI certs for them (almost sure they have them) but PKI is not really a fix [antioffline.com] at all now is it?

    I'm hoping Pat Calhoun and the folks over at Diameter [diameter.org] get on the mark soon with their protocol, since it seems RADIUS is now a dinosaur of sorts. Well for those interested in Wireless security, check out this thesis on it. "Security in Public Access Wireless Networks [antioffline.com]"

    #define crypto [antioffline.com]

  • It is a matter of Federal Law that you're allowed to receive any radio waves you want. Unfortunately, that doesn't necessarily give you the right to listen to them... Gotta love the law.

    Such a lawsuit would be an interesting hodgepodge. There would probably be cases of Satellite-TV piracy referred to, along with some of the new industrial-strength anti-hacking laws (do the old "wire" laws apply to wireless networks?) Maybe copyright violations?

  • by JohnnyKnoxville ( 311956 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @01:57PM (#261015)
    A company as large and as technically inclined as Sun Microsystems might investigate this type of thing before going ahead and implementing this type of network.
  • by ByTor-2112 ( 313205 ) on Friday April 27, 2001 @02:51PM (#261017)
    You really need to read the papers on the attacks. 128-bit encrpytion and 56-bit encryption are both just as susceptible to attacking. MAC addresses are NOT encrypted IIRC and I can steal one of those when your client is down. One potential attack is to send a packet of known content from the Internet TO your network. Then I grab the encrypted packet, and I can XOR out a piece of the cipher stream and (because the way this 802.11b works) I am able to identify future packets that use this piece of the stream and decrpyt them. Other statistical attacks allow me to, over time, build up a database that will allow me to decrypt everything on your network. The more traffic you send, the faster this happens. Knowing what I know, I would treat every wireless network as if ALL the traffic was being transmitted over a hostile network.
  • and how did that asshole larry that sits next to me get accidentally onto the end of that list? Hey.. wow, somehow my pink slip turned into an 85k bonus... weird.. hey HR just posted two open secretarial positions for the new CIO (wow that's me).. qualifications include 34c-24-36.. weird but who am I to complain? corporate policy...
  • Of course, this is a problem with networks in general. People put insecure machines on the internet without thinking it over.
    GDH
    ---
    "No violence, gentlemen -- no violence, I beg of you! Consider the furniture!"
    -- Sherlock Holmes

Genetics explains why you look like your father, and if you don't, why you should.

Working...