Managing Information Security Risks 67
| Managing Information Security Risks: The OCTAVE Approach | |
| author | Christopher Alberts and Audrey Dorofee. |
| pages | 471 |
| publisher | Addison-Wesley Longman |
| rating | 5 |
| reviewer | Jose Nazario |
| ISBN | 0321118863 |
| summary | An introduction to information security risk management using the OCTAVE method |
Authors Alberts and Dorofee are the principal developers of OCTAVE and are staff members at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), where CERT has offices. As such, they're the right people to describe OCTAVE. The CERT OCTAVE website area explains the process in more detail. Needless to say, OCTAVE is a very large, complex, heavy process for an organization to go through, with some arguable benefits. Very few organizations have done so to the best of my knowledge -- most of them are scared off by the complexity of the whole undertaking.
This brings up a very important point. It's important to state the difference between a critique of the OCTAVE method and the book itself. OCTAVE is interesting in that it's an attempt to formalize the complex process of information security evaluations. Despite its shortcomings and turnoffs, it has a purpose, and I wont dispute it for the most part. The book, instead, covers an abbreviated format of OCTAVE. It's important to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the book and not the topic.
The books is organized into three main parts. Part 1 (covering chapters 1 and 2) is an introduction to the principles being discussed in the book. The method itself, and therefore these chapters, focus on a formal evaluation of information security risks and how to manage them. The principles focus on enumeration of assets, their threats and vulnerabilities, and then remediation of the threats to minimize the risk. The section introduces the core concepts to this philosophy.
Part 2 of the book, covering chapters 3 through 11, server two main purposes, preparation and then execution of the method. Chapter 3 introduces the fundamentals of the OCTAVE method, specifically how the three phases (asset-based threat profiles, vulnerability identification, and security strategy planning) fit together. The inputs of the method and its outputs are then described; you'll be using them in later chapters. Chapter 4 helps you prepare for the approach in your organization, including how important it is to get management buy-in, who will participate, and how to organize the evaluation. Project managers will adore this chapter.
The next few chapters cover the meat of the OCTAVE method. Chapter 5 covers processes 1 to 3, where assets are enumerated and the current state of the security profile is captured, as well. This step is crucial for building a baseline and knowing what you'll have to cover. Chapter 6 leads you through the threat profile, where you examine assets that you've identified as critical and the security requirements for them. And finally, in Chapter 7, the basic identification steps are done as you identify critical infrastructure components to examine later on. This is done so that you can work efficiently, as opposed to studying every asset in depth. By studying classes of assets you can (hopefully) achieve the same coverage without spending valuable time repeating the process.
Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the commonly understood parts, the actual vulnerability and risk analysis. Chapter 8 discusses vulnerability assessment tools and some basic questions to ask about them, but leaves the actual evaluation of those tools up to another text. Chapter 9 then helps you undertake the actual risk analysis, such as the impact of any threat being realized or the probability that one would be encountered. This is what most people think of when they think of an information security audit.
This gets to what is perhaps my biggest complaint about the book. It doesn't teach you how to think creatively about threats to information security. Instead, you're told to enumerate assets and threats against them via brainstorming, as though you'll somehow "get it" the first time (or every time). For someone new to the field, this can be hard, because not all assets are obvious -- and not all threats are understood. It's a hard skillset to teach, but it should have been attempted with more gusto.
Chapters 10 and 11 close the big circle of an information security audit, by developing an information security protection strategy. It's basically a series of outlines of meetings and their agendas as you present the findings of the evaluation but are (obviously) vague in the absence of any concrete findings.
This is probably a good time to raise another objection to this book. My second biggest complaint is that the authors never cut to the heart of what the OCTAVE method is trying to do. Sure, the book covers a stripped-down version of OCTAVE, but it doesn't ever get at how you can really adapt this to your organization. Instead, it's a series of rigid steps in the OCTAVE method. If you attempt to do something different for whatever reason, you're on your own. Again, an attempt to work in some flexibility beyond what is present in Chapter 12 (An Introduction to Tailoring OCTAVE, the start of part 3) would have been welcome. This chapter just keeps you inside the narrow confines of the OCTAVE approach.
Chapter 13 attempts to bring this home by discussing the practical applications for an organization. They attempt to discuss how a small company would utilize OCTAVE, but to be honest it's so heavy and time-consuming it's hard to see how they would employ anything but the barest of concepts to their workflow. Three other examples are given: a very large distributed organization, an integrated Web portal service provider (which faces unique threats), and large and small organizations. Again, while this chapter attempts to show how to tailor OCTAVE to anything but the largest and most diligently staffed of organizations, it falls to get to the salient points of the method. Instead, it tries to foist the process on them.
Finally, chapter 14 tries to bring it all home and discuss the information security life cycle of analysis, monitoring, control, and implementation (not in that order). They hope that OCTAVE has become a part of this process and show how it complements and matures this process. Instead, I wonder if an organization will think about the effort they just expended and be reluctant to do this again. The appendices are piles of worksheets, charts and workflows to go through with OCTAVE. You can make photocopies and use them if you implement the OCTAVE approach. It's very hard to take consider these methods strong enough when you read about the report card government agencies received for information security. While they may have not been following OCTAVE, it's hard to see how a book that so superficially treats the subject matter can help anyone do better. Almost everything is just a high-level line-item risk-and-mitigation strategy. Things like "Our organization cannot deliver effective or efficient health care without PIDS" and an impact of "High" are, to put it mildly, interesting in their superficiality. So many things are simply glossed over, yet so many worksheets remain. On the other hand, if a fair treatment of threats, assets, and the like were fully discussed the book would be many more volumes, a significantly more tedious tome, and too sensitive to the shifting sands of time.
Overall the book does a decent job of covering OCTAVE's core premises, but doesn't really provide much beyond that. It's a complex process that doesn't work well for a number of organizations. Instead of helping organizations see how to use it, the authors simply keep presenting OCTAVE for what it is, which makes me question the value of this book beyond someone who has already decided to implement OCTAVE. It doesn't seem like it has a lot to offer anyone who doesn't have a large body of knowledge in information security management and a staff to deploy with worksheets in hand. The book simply fails to contribute greatly beyond the very narrow specifics of OCTAVE.
You can purchase Managing Information Security Risks: The OCTAVE Approach from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Re:Title Correction (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Title Correction (Score:1)
Don't fear the penguin! Embrace it! Love the penguin! Love the...aw, screw it.
FORMAT C:\
Reliance on intelligent users (was Re: Title corre (Score:1)
Bruce's comment is directed to everyone that has or aspires to have any influence on form and function of systems
Reviewer == didn't understand the book (Score:4, Insightful)
the authors simply keep presenting OCTAVE for what it is, which makes me question the value of this book beyond someone who has already decided to implement OCTAVE
Title of the book:
Managing Information Security Risks: The OCTAVE Approach
So, like, duh...
Re:Reviewer == didn't understand the book (Score:3, Informative)
99% of information theft can be summed up thusly: (Score:5, Insightful)
Strictly partitioning information access on a organizational basis costs money and increases friction within an organization, which is traditionally (in addition to a certain lesser-faire attitude towards other people's information) why such measures have been opposed. The pressure to outsource and a greater degree of connectivity has only increased this risk.
The problems would clear up overnight if the companies involved had a greater degree of legal liability for their actions. Look at HIPA.
Re:99% of information theft can be summed up thusl (Score:3, Insightful)
That's laissez-faire...
Re:99% of information theft can be summed up thusl (Score:2)
Re:99% of information theft can be summed up thusl (Score:3, Funny)
DON'T GET CAUGHT
Re:99% of information theft can be summed up thusl (Score:4, Interesting)
I'm hired and paid to make the company money.
Read that again.
Now my talents are in computer programing, and it is a waste of everyone's time if I spend more than a few moments balancing my companies accounts. An accountant can do that better and faster. However it is also a waste for me to call an accountant when I need a USB cable or some such. It is a better use of everyone's time if I just order the cable and enter it into the books. (Best Buy is just around the corner, I can be back before the purchasing guy reads my request) The accountant will check the math latter, but the data is there.
However to give me that ability means the books need to be open to me. I should not have access to accounting data, but it is easier for everyone if I have full access.
Even in the small 10 person company I work for I don't get to know how much money my co-workers make. It means that the books are closed, so I can't enter my USB cable myself, I have to get someone else to enter it. (and in fact someone else ends up buying it)
Don't forget the other big downside. If the company officers are keeping two sets of books I don't know that. Therefore I can't blow the whistle on them. (If there is fraud and you are an officer in the company this is good, to the investors which might include my retirement account this is bad) I also have no clue if my stock options (I wish...) that seem high today will pull and Enron before they vest.
Re:99% of information theft can be summed up thusl (Score:2)
Re:99% of information theft can be summed up thusl (Score:3, Interesting)
Read that agian.
Regulators, auditors are not concerned with real risk. What they want is a stack of documentation they can point to as an example of how they are doing what they need to do.
Senior Mgmt only cares that the regulators and auditors are happy. Who cares if it's dragging the company under.
I'm working under CFR 21 Part 11. This piece of crap does nothing to protect my company. The things it asks for are basic IT functions wrapped up in a layer of paperwork. It costs my compan
Re:99% of information theft can be summed up thusl (Score:1)
I routinely work with MAS 90; for a basic system such as you describe, I think it would run you a one-time cost in the low five digits, plus a small percentage of that amount annually for updates and support. There may be cheaper programs that also offer modular data access (though I don't know any off the top of my head, and they probably have less feature
Re:99% of information theft can be summed up thusl (Score:1)
Do U.S. companies not do this? Have £50 or so in small notes and change locked in a drawer somewhere, you swap the receipt for your doodad with money from the petty cash box. Maybe you sign a paper ledger and someone types that in whenever they're sorting the accounts out. Seems like a better system than letting people potentially mess your whole company's payroll up by accident. In fact, I'd much rather keep vital stuff like accounts on a computer not connected to the network at all, not
It's called an "Expense Report" (Score:2)
And I use them all the time for buying doohickies under $100 or so. Everything else requires a purchase request in order to maintain a documented chain of purchasing authority and to deliberately slow the process down so that one can consider "Is This Thing Really Necessary?".
I set up my company that way, and I'm bound by it myself.
And it works really, really, really well.
The beginning of this mentions SOX.... (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:The beginning of this mentions SOX.... (Score:2, Informative)
Re:The beginning of this mentions SOX.... (Score:4, Informative)
Re:The beginning of this mentions SOX.... (Score:2)
Read from that what you will.
Re:The beginning of this mentions SOX.... (Score:3, Funny)
Section 404 talks about protecting the "integrity" of financial data.
Indeed, if I got a 404 error while doing my online banking I'd be worried!
EricAnd there I was... (Score:2)
Re:And there I was... (Score:2)
Re:And there I was... (Score:2)
I would break down security into several layers. First, there's an "outer layer", which covers authentication, validation, encryption, etc. Basically, is the person/computer/process connecting who they say they are? Are the incoming packets really from them, not forged or modified in transit? Is it possible to intercept enough inform
Re:And there I was... (Score:2)
There is one thing missing from your security model. Most exploits come from people who are allowed access to information who misuse it. So the fact that you have a (in your parlance) a 5/5/5 system is neither here nor there - the compenents in the system performed in the correct and secure manner, but the user is the rogue component.
The missing thing, of course, is auditing - not only failures (sort of goes without saying) but successes. You should be able to take, say, a file, and produce a h
Re:The beginning of this mentions SOX.... (Score:2, Informative)
In the financial world, you *may* have better luck with GLB. However, GLB leaves a great deal to interpretation when it comes to requiring *appropriate* controls.
If you can make a tie in with HIPPA, then you have a bit more t
Re:The beginning of this mentions SOX.... (Score:1)
What this amounts to is that, especially in a large company with a lot of employees, people want very fine grained access controls on everything with detailed audit logs fo a minimum of 7 years. Enter IT...
To get an idea of the minutia involved, imagine having to make it so t
a few thoughts (Score:5, Insightful)
However, if I was paying for security (like all stakeholders are), that is not what is important. The assets are what is important. I was involved in this process for a major hospital chain. Of course, we wanted to scan networks and probe for vulns (we did), but it was interesting hearing the "lusers" talk about the voice system. Having the other non-technical types helps you really understand which assets do the day-to-day work, and which assets were developed to put on someone's resume.
In conlcusion, you are correct that a lot of the OCTAVE methodology is aimed at generating paperwork. However, I suggest you strip it down to Threat-Asset-Vulnerability (the TAV in OC-TAV-E) and run with that for a while.
Re:a few thoughts (Score:2, Interesting)
OCTAVE meetings are loooooong. (coming from someone who skips meals if the code is especially beautiful) If you are more interested in reviewing logs, staying up to date on the latests cracks and vulnerabilities, and being a good geek, It's not too interesting.
If your security jobs involve scanning the TPS reports for possible disclosure info, well then this is hot shit
Re:a few thoughts (Score:2)
The "OC" doesn't *really* stand for Obsessive-Compulsive, you know.
TOC? (Score:1)
we're running out of names, I suppose... (Score:2, Informative)
GNU Octave [octave.org] is a high-level language, primarily intended for numerical computations.
Re:we're running out of names, I suppose... (Score:1, Funny)
Re:we're running out of names, I suppose... (Score:2)
Re:we're running out of names, I suppose... (Score:2)
Re:we're running out of names, I suppose... (Score:2)
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation
99% of infosec RA's are still bullcrap (Score:5, Insightful)
One thing this book doesn't do a good job of is explaining the deficiencies in current risk assessment methodologies, be it OCTAVE, NIST, whatever....
the numerical data presented is crap.
Too many times some CISSP (either inhouse or outsourced) who sees possibility and confuses it with probability sticks his finger in the air and delcares that there's "high" risk today. There's no common taxonomy amoung Infosec professionals, there's no common rating system, and there's not enough data to drive probability analysis.
Subsequently, run off with your Risk Assessment data to line of business management outside of IT, and they're laughing at infosec - and the credit card processing system remains a Tandem machine, the assembly line remains on the same segment as the rest of the network and the contingency plans remain "pen and paper".
Don't get me wrong, the methodology in OCTAVE (and this book) are fine. Great places to start. But Infosec itself will remain in its infancy until there's a probabilistic means to express risk outside of IT.
So in the meantime, you can run and do OCTAVE or NSA/NIST all you want, your CFO is still going to rely on the morons in the PWC/E&Y/DT&T infosec practice because they have some percieved authority to express risk (and they're getting their quantification the same place you are, from their behinds).
Re:99% of infosec RA's are still bullcrap (Score:2)
Re:99% of infosec RA's are still bullcrap (Score:1, Insightful)
What part of "If you use IE and allow Internet access your Windows PCS you're gonnae get infected with all kinds of crap and reduce the value of what you've paid for down to crap" don't they understand? 100% probabilty. That's as quantitative as it gets.
Re:99% of infosec RA's are still bullcrap (Score:1)
Furthermore, the system (IT) and the conditions (threat scenario) do change.
Most consultants just cook the numbers to get the results managers want from them.
I usually say that mixing estimating figures with math
Re:99% of infosec RA's are still bullcrap (Score:2)
That's what Operational Risk systems do. Basel II (the 'capital accord' for financial organizations, a much more comprehensive SOX, if you like), expects three years data collection from which you can start to make quantatitive risk assessments. Basel II kicks in end of 2006 (by which time, you are supposed to have already collected 3 years data if I remem
I'd be scared too... (Score:2)
It seems like there should be something with less red tape that gets the job done... any suggestions ?
Re:I'd be scared too... (Score:1)
Outsource it to someone who knows the laws and how to implement them and/or educate yourself on the laws that apply to your company.
Tough Problem (Score:5, Informative)
You can argue whether these things actually improve or get in the way of effective software development. I found the process time-consuming and fairly tedious, but it did force me to do things I might rationalize away otherwise... so I did a better job. Even so, I think gaining the desired level of certainty about a complex application requires an end-to-end effort to achieve, and that it's a difficult task under the best of circumstances.
Are the Applications and Desktop SecureABLE? (Score:5, Insightful)
Microsoft's desktop security issues stem from its continued reliance on the Antivirus industries "Infect-Scan-Remove" approach. Even Garner analyst Neil MacDonald has finally realized [com.com] "Microsoft's overriding goal should be to eliminate the need for (antivirus) and (anti-spyware) products, not simply to enter the market with look-alike products at lower prices,". In comparison, right from the outset, open source desktop platforms and applications have relied almost wholly on closing the infectable vectors, the exploited vulnerabilities used by malware, as quickly as possible. The result is that both the KDE and GNOME desktop environments are a lot more secure and even more secureABLE [slashdot.org].
HIPPA, HIPPA, HIPPA . . . (Score:3, Interesting)
For example, one of the tenants is that people have access to only what they need to do their job. While it sounds easy to manage, there's huge issues with tracking temps, contractors, and people shifting job responsibilities when tens of thousands of people have access to your systems.
Then there's the auditing piece, making sure that people are using their security appropriately. I'm in the process of building a database that pulls in the 2 million records each day of people looking at patient information. Another group of people audit the information, making sure that people aren't looking up coworkers, friends, or family inappropriately.
We're also drafting new policies that cover everything from sending patient information in e-mail (only if encrypted) to protecting physical access to computers, backups, PDA's and so on.
Basically, it's a lot of work but it's been effective getting people thinking more seriously about these issues.
Re:HIPPA, HIPPA, HIPPA . . . (Score:1, Informative)
If you're only building the database now, I think you're behind. IIRC, there's an April deadline.
Re:HIPPA, HIPPA, HIPPA . . . (Score:2)
Re:HIPPA, HIPPA, HIPPA . . . (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:HIPPA, HIPPA, HIPPA . . . (Score:2)
Re:HIPPA, HIPPA, HIPPA . . . (Score:1, Informative)
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act)
An enlightening read (Score:1)
Re:An enlightening read (Score:2)