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Airbus Is Pulling Ahead as Boeing's Troubles Mount (nytimes.com) 104

Airbus cemented its position last week as the world's biggest plane maker for the fifth straight year, announcing that it had delivered more aircraft and secured more orders than Boeing in 2023. At the same time, Boeing was trying to put out a huge public-relations and safety crisis caused by a harrowing near disaster involving its 737 Max line of airliners. In the long-running duel between the two aviation rivals, Airbus has pulled far ahead. The New York Times: "What used to be a duopoly has become two-thirds Airbus, one-third Boeing," said Richard Aboulafia, the managing director of AeroDynamic Advisory in Washington, D.C. "A lot of people, whether investors, financiers or customers, are looking at Airbus and seeing a company run by competent people," he said. "The contrast with Boeing is fairly profound."

The incident involving the 737 Max 9, in which a hole blew open in the fuselage of an Alaska Airlines flight in midair, was the latest in a string of safety lapses in Boeing's workhorse aircraft -- including two fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019 -- that are indirectly helping propel the fortunes of the European aerospace giant. As the Federal Aviation Administration widens its scrutiny of Max 9 production, Airbus's edge is likely to sharpen. Airlines are embarking on massive expansions of their fleets to meet a postpandemic surge in the demand for global air travel, and are considering which company to turn to.

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Airbus Is Pulling Ahead as Boeing's Troubles Mount

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  • Two thirds Airbus (Score:5, Interesting)

    by dunkelfalke ( 91624 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @10:33AM (#64172565)

    The main reason Boeing is able to sell their 737 Max to more airlines than Ryanair and Southwest is that Airbus is unable to fulfill the demand for single aisle airplanes. The A321 Neo is selling like hot cakes and time between and order and the waiting list has become so long that the delivery time for new orders is three years or so.

    • For Southwest they have only used the 737. Adding another model would be a major task for them. Maybe it is time given all of Boeing's problems.
      • by boxless ( 35756 )

        Every now and then, a firm should fire a customer. Listening to Southwest’s desire for 737’s may have been a good idea 20 years ago, but now, it is death. And Boeing still has no plans to develop a new single aisle jet until at least the next decade. The ceo and others say it with such conviction, it’s almost like they are proud of it.

        • It is not "not wanting to develop a new single aisle jet", it is "not being able to even if they tried really hard".

          Nobody is say why, and I don't either, but please look at how many companies still exist that make the most reliable aircraft to date. We had several companies in the 70s and 80s that did, but many went under after a downturn, a crash or because their aircraft weren't competitive anymore. This is continuing. Our current restrictions for reliability, regulations, economy, ecology and competency

          • A car sold new in 1970 would probable be legal to sell new in 1980, and maybe even in 1990 with slight corrections for safety and emissions.

            You do know safety standards have changed in 50 years right? That's why a car built in 1970 will not pass safety tests. Remember that cars in the 1970s were designed to survive certain scenarios as required in the 1970s. They were not design to ensure the passengers survive the scenarios tested in the 1990s much less today.

            For aircraft, this is no different, because the public has been convinced that these are huge environmental blunders to exist and operate at all, and since no one has an aircraft in their driveway, there's little backlash in pork barrel and regime politics that "make aircraft safer and more environmentally friendly", which, according to published documents by WEF itself is "zero air travel for Plebs beyond 2030, at all, ever". (and it's still a conspiracy theory to point out to the official documents of this organization that operates as some de-facto global government for at least the Western nations.)

            You do know the airplanes regulations have been updated due to safety changes, right? For example MPET blankets were used in airplanes as thermal and acoustic insulation. A fire on an ai

      • Ironically, Southwest was a main reason Boeing went with MCAS on the MAX, to avoid the issue of a sub-fleet of aircraft which brings all the issues of scheduling pilots etc

    • Re:Two thirds Airbus (Score:4, Informative)

      by Richard_at_work ( 517087 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @03:07PM (#64173533)

      Just to show how lopsided it is, the A321NEO variant on its own has outsold the entire MAX range.

    • by mjwx ( 966435 )

      The main reason Boeing is able to sell their 737 Max to more airlines than Ryanair and Southwest is that Airbus is unable to fulfill the demand for single aisle airplanes. The A321 Neo is selling like hot cakes and time between and order and the waiting list has become so long that the delivery time for new orders is three years or so.

      Other airlines operate an all Airbus fleet, like Easyjet who operates 370+ A320s and JetBlue who operate 200+ (and some A220s). The thing we're looking out for are companies operating multiple types, typically your full service and legacy airlines who are willing to switch vendors, they'll also be the airlines operating widebodies. Airbus has played an absolute blinder in recent years in keeping training and certification costs down. An A330/340 pilot can transition to an A350 with minimal extra training, t

  • by jacks smirking reven ( 909048 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @10:36AM (#64172571)

    Someone on twitter put it this way:

    Airbus is staffed by Europeans for whom being an engineer at Airbus is one of the best jobs you can get. Boeing is staffed by Americans for whom working at Boeing is something you do because you can’t get a better paying job with a tech company.

    Airbus is 25% state owned by Germany, France and Spain. I still put forward the idea that when 25% of your shareholders aren't prioritizing share prices but safe, consistent products it has an effect on the culture of an organization as a whole. Airbus is a source of pride for an entire continent. Even their worst "failure" the A380 is an engineering marvel with an excellent safety record it just was just a market miscalculation.

    As am American Boeing's failures feels like America's failures but hey, the shareholders of the past 20 years got theirs and that's what's important in America right?

    • I still put forward the idea that when 25% of your shareholders aren't prioritizing share prices but safe, consistent products it has an effect on the culture of an organization as a whole.

      But that's socialism, and we can't have that [marketwatch.com].

      “We need to stop this now. We are beyond the point where the private sector can solve the problem and are in the hands of our government and regulators. Tick-tock.”

      • I still put forward the idea that when 25% of your shareholders aren't prioritizing share prices but safe, consistent products it has an effect on the culture of an organization as a whole.

        But that's socialism, and we can't have that [marketwatch.com].

        “We need to stop this now. We are beyond the point where the private sector can solve the problem and are in the hands of our government and regulators. Tick-tock.”

        Interesting article. Are those original thoughts from Bill Ackman or did he and/or his wife plagiarize [businessinsider.com] them from someone else? (I heard he hates that -- from other people anyway.)

    • by HBI ( 10338492 )

      Boeing's issues should be extended to the whole MIC, rather than just being Boeing's. Drawing the correct conclusion will indicate how hollow the US now is. Would anyone have an ambition to work for any of the big names in the MIC, really?

      Didn't think so.

    • by XXongo ( 3986865 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @10:43AM (#64172595) Homepage
      It's been suggested that Boeing's problems all stem from the fact that when they merged with McDonnell-Douglas, they moved their headquarters from Seattle (where the aircraft manufacturing, and the engineers, were) to a brand-new headquarters in Chicago. This was touted as being a move to put the headquarters at neither the site of Boeing, nor the site of McDonnell-Douglas, in order to show no favoritism to one or the other of the merged companies. But the upshot was a headquarters far from the manufacturing, and far from any engineers right out on the factory floor. The headquarters was now just the bean-counters and the top executives, moved two steps insulated from actual engineering or production.
      • by HBI ( 10338492 )

        It wouldn't have mattered, the MIC is completely divested from actual production everywhere you go and has been at least since the supposed 'peace dividend'. I wasn't around before that, so I don't know, but i'm sure it was creeping in even before that.

        These vendors are bereft of any special powers. They are just conglomerates with contracts.

        • In the case of the 737 Max, Boeing outsourced some of the production to other companies like Spirit Aerosystems which has plants in typically non-union states to reduce labor costs. However it appears that outsourcing has reduced quality and since Boeing themselves laid off many inspectors, it is not surprising there are more problems with their planes when it comes to quality control.
          • by HBI ( 10338492 )

            Pretty much what I meant by 'divested'.

            First thing a MIC vendor does when planning out a prime contract is line up subcontractors for their team. The ones who do the actual work. If this sounds like it would be less than optimal, well, you're right. It implies the subs are commodotized. That word should imply that they are lowest cost, meaning their staff sucks, and their process sucks.

            • Also outsourcing incentivizes the outside company to make things as cheaply as possible using any means. In many cases the outside company only makes a component and their name is not on the final product so they do not suffer any reputation harm should the product has terrible quality.
            • when planning out a prime contract is
              Seems I'm getting paranoid, first glance I read it as crime contract.

            • First thing a MIC vendor does when planning out a prime contract is line up subcontractors for their team.

              Plus, they find the states that have a representative/senator on the appropriate Armed Services committees, then go to the states who have other powerful congresscritters. Sprinkle some "free speech" into campaign coffers, talk about the jobs for their districts, etc., and they have a much better chance of getting those big contracts.

          • Spirit Aerosystems is really Boeing's Wichita division, which they divested in 2005, but not really. The pretend arm's length relationship makes for good theater and smokescreens.

            • by boxless ( 35756 )

              It was once the Wichita division. You speak of it like it still is, but just with a different name. Heck, there was a pe firm involved, and then an ipo. After those shenanigans played out over a decade, do you honestly believe there was anything Boeing-like left?

              • Yes, still joined at the hip. Don't have a lot of experience with corporate culture, hmm? Two words: baby bells.

        • by jythie ( 914043 )
          If it did 'not matter' then all the other contractors within the MIC would be encountering the same problems.. they are not. Only the company taken over from within by McDonnell-Douglas are showing signs of the same problems that caused MD to go under.
          • by HBI ( 10338492 )

            I can confirm GD has the same issues and mostly from the same causes. A bunch of unrelated businesses being rolled together under one banner.

            Lockheed/Martin and the rest are a little different; they have virtually no core engineering and just weave together subs to fulfill contracts.

      • by ljw1004 ( 764174 )

        It's been suggested that Boeing's problems all stem from the fact that when they merged with McDonnell-Douglas, they moved their headquarters from Seattle (where the aircraft manufacturing, and the engineers, were) to a brand-new headquarters in Chicago...

        The merger happened in 1997, and the move happened in 2001. The Boeing Dreamliner was started in 2003, and was an major engineering success, and has ended up a commercial success too.

        I wonder how to explain the success of the Dreamliner? Maybe because there was still enough Boeing mindset to make it that predated the merger+move? Or because the merger+move are poor explainers for Boeing's fate, and other factors (or randomness) are more significant?

        • by XXongo ( 3986865 )

          It's been suggested that Boeing's problems all stem from the fact that when they merged with McDonnell-Douglas, they moved their headquarters from Seattle (where the aircraft manufacturing, and the engineers, were) to a brand-new headquarters in Chicago...

          The merger happened in 1997, and the move happened in 2001. The Boeing Dreamliner was started in 2003, and was an major engineering success, and has ended up a commercial success too.

          OK, fair point.

          Of course, the Dreamliner was not without problems of its own, but at least they were problems solved with no airplanes crashed.

        • While I agree that the 787 as a final product is a good one, its development was a disaster.

          Rolling out an empty shell held together by temporary fasteners that were not aviation grade, just to hit a 7/8/7 date. That alone put first flight back by many months.

          Then the subsequent fastener problems, multiple times.

          Then the side of body engineering issue.

          Then the battery issues.

          Because of the huge issues in those first 20 airframes, Boeing had to write off its development airframes - this is something it had

          • And just to add o this, the 787 has seen more than 1,100 aircraft delivered and Boeing is still yet to see a profit from it - as of the middle of 2023, Boeing is still $12Billion underwater on the 787 development costs.

            A normal aircraft launch will see the development back in the green by the time 300 or so aircraft have been delivered.

            The 787 wont be back in the green by the time its current order book of another 800 planes is delivered.

            • by ljw1004 ( 764174 )

              And just to add o this, the 787 has seen more than 1,100 aircraft delivered and Boeing is still yet to see a profit from it - as of the middle of 2023, Boeing is still $12Billion underwater on the 787 development costs. A normal aircraft launch will see the development back in the green by the time 300 or so aircraft have been delivered.

              Would you put this down to management failures (as a consequence of the merger)?

              I put it down to the fact that the 787 had a whole slew of innovative technologies all at once, i.e. pioneering engineering thing, and I think that most pioneering engineering things cost more than anyone either expects, or can plausibly sell to a board of directors. It feels to me like 787 was a case of engineer spirit leading the company direction, rather than cost-cutting-management spirit.

              • by Richard_at_work ( 517087 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @04:06PM (#64173779)

                None of the big issues the 787 saw was due to the technology used.

                Every issue the 787 saw was because of a management or failure of engineering decision.

                It was a management decision to hit 7/8/7 at all cost.

                It was a management decision to use Home Depot fasteners.

                Lax QA was the cause of the subsequent fastener drilling issues. Lax QA is a management issue.

                There are very very few issues with the 787 hat can be traced back to the tech used - CFRP had been widely used in the industry up to that point, and Boeing only had a few issues with their new CFRP barrel fuselage design and construction, the bulk of the issues were caused by management decisions.

                • Well, some of rhe difficulties have been caused by the technogy - Boeing bet the farm on the 787 and integrated a lot of new and unproven stuff at the same time, like carbon fuselage and wings or bleedless engines. They had serious difficulties aligning the composite fuselage tubes for a while. Airbus has taken a more conservative approach designing the A350 and it nevertheless resulted in an excellent airplane despite the comparatively short design time.

                  • Well, yes they did have some issues with the barrels, but it never resulted in a delay - that was already covered because of the issues with the fasteners.

                    I keep mentioning it in this thread, but its hard to overstate how much of a disaster for the 787 the decision to use non-aviation grade fasteners was. It led to massive rework, and later on it led to cracking and improperly replaced fasteners that had to be rectified. Larger replacement fasteners had to be used which meant more weight

                    Boeing also wasnt

                    • IIRC the sonic cruiser never left the drawing board and the 777 is a pretty conventional airliner in regard to composites.

                    • The Sonic Cruiser was never progressed to a launch, but they did build several test CFRP fuselage barrels to test the concept out, and subjected them to a lot of tests.

                      And the 777 includes a lot of composites, it just doesnt have a composite fuselage or wing.

                      So both of those projects brought a lot of composite experience to Boeing before the 787 project.

                      Add to that some of the research done for the 747-500 project which I forgot to mention

        • by jythie ( 914043 )
          The cultural change was not evenly distributed, some sites and divisions kept more of their management than others.
      • That is an interesting point. And has certainly some grains of truth in it.
        We had a similar situation when two of the biggest German Electricity companies merged. Bottom line it was actually more than two as one of them already a conglomerate of several companies.
        They could not decide where to move the head quarter.
        But they could decide to cut half of the mid and upper management.
        So they cut half in each old main office.
        And the remaining managers had to run teams distributed over to bases.

        After ten years th

      • On some website I was reading everybody was insisting that remote work was just as good if not better than being in person... let me think, where was that
        • Don't be a dick man. Remote is just fine if you click on a mouse all day, but if you need to physically walk into an airplane as its being built then yeah, you need your execs on the ground and not 4000 miles away.

          Having said that, even the execs dont need to be walking on plane wings 5 days a week, so have them in the same city as the plant and they can wander in occasionally when required.

    • by UnknowingFool ( 672806 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @11:10AM (#64172675)
      I think one of the problems with Boeing is that as a publicly traded company there is always pressure for more profit every quarter, every year. The main two ways of getting more profit is more sales or cutting costs. Selling more planes is not an easy thing when they cost hundreds of millions each. So an emphasis has to be on cutting costs too. One way Boeing has decided to cut cost: Outsource some of their production to other companies that will do it cheaper than they used to do it. These companies generally will be in states where the union is weak so labor will be cheaper; however, quality may go down (as we have seen recently) because there is a reason why they can do the same job cheaper.
      • As I'm sure you well understand, that only works if you can maintain quality while cutting costs. We're seeing now what happens when you cut quality as well, and now the stockholders are going to start losing money. And because they're not stupid, they can see that Boeing is going to have to increase costs and be less profitable for a while on TOP of the reduced sales from making bad planes, so they'll be pulling money out until all this is settled. Boeing is probably in for a bad few years and some executi

    • I'm not sure that 25% of shareholders are prioritizing safe products. Rather, they are prioritizing market share in a competition with America. If safe products are prioritized, it's the middle level managers and bottom workers who are doing it.

    • Ok, that's quite a bit of hyperbole there.

      First of all, Boeing's safety record historically is top notch. Not only has their engineering been rock solid for decades, but their production quality has been incredible. It's the last few years with the 737-Max and some issues with Li-Ion batteries where they've taken a hit, but that can usually be chalked up to poor management, and is often fixed with better, new management. And quite honestly, Boeing has been kicking Airbus' butt for so long that they g

      • by jacks smirking reven ( 909048 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @01:15PM (#64173111)

        Airbus' safety record is just as good as Boeing's, air travel overall is safer than ever and both companies take a part in that but also 80 years of learned regulation and lessons also play a part. I would call that factor a wash.

        Airbus has almost 60% of the single aisle market and 65% of the order backlog. That's a pretty big change from a space Boeing one dominated.

        So by it's own share structure, it must accept some level of inefficiency instead of the most optimal work.

        That might be true in theory but on paper it doesn't really pan out. Airbus has lot's of demand, lot's of customers, competes with Boeing on both price and features, number of deliveries and the company is overall profitable. By what metric is Airbus less efficient? The idea that Airbus due to it's disparate supply chain is less efficient but that ignores that even Boeing's best recent success, the 787 was also their most outsourced and subcontracted plane with parts being built all over the US and the world.

        Also which company is currently having the management problems, the one with 25% state control or the one without? Which one would have a better chance of reforming it's management if needed? It's coming up on 4 years since the 737-MAX grounding and crashes, how is Boeing's management problems doing?

        It's not the 1980's anymore, Boeing has not been "kicking Airbus' ass" for like 15-20 years.

      • The hub-and-spoke model has nothing at all to do with airplanes.

        It is air fare laws which press that on airlines.

          • Meh.

            Despite the 787s success, hubs arent decreasing and the size of widebodies being purchased is increasing - for example, the 787-10 is a huge seller, the 777X is larger than the 777, the A350XWB is larger than both the A330 and 787.

            The issue is a lot more complicated than hub-vs-spoke.

          • The hub and sproke model is how airlines are FORCED to work by law.
            It is completely idiotic but it is how it is.
            That is why so many airlines own so many sub airlines. So they can have more hubs.
            And that is basically why Air Oman, Emirates, etc. exist.
            They have their hub there and can reach any point on the planet from their hubs.
            But they can not offer a direct flight from Paris to Bangkok. Because every flight they serve, has to start or end at their hub. Has absolutely nothing to do with the distance.
            So: I

            • I think you might be misunderstanding the hub and spoke model. Yes, what you're describing is due to laws dictating how foreign operators can fly between third-party countries, and in some cases is simply due to logistics (i.e., even if Air Oman could fry from CDG to BKK, they likely don't have the necessary support facilities in either location). But in general, CDG and BKK would generally both be considered hubs, regardless of which airline is operating the route.

              However, hub and spoke is less about which

              • I understand the model.
                I just described it with different words.

                Obviously CDG, is a hub. But; for Air France and few other airlines only.
                Obviously Suvanaboumi is a hub, for Thai Airlines mostly only.

                Sure Air Oman can technically fly directly from CDG to BKK and vice versa: but they have to by the license for a certain amount of slots. As they have their own hub in Muscat, and that is funnily only a small detour, they do not bother to try to get direct flights. Same for Emirates.

                And for both it is convenient

    • by dfm3 ( 830843 )

      Even their worst "failure" the A380 is an engineering marvel with an excellent safety record it just was just a market miscalculation.

      From conversations I've had with people who are much more "in the know" than me, it sounds like the miscalculation was on the part of Emirates and several other airlines moreso than it was marketing by Airbus. The way I've heard it described to me, Emirates wanted something massive and glamorous to replace the spectacle of Boeing's aging 747 and pushed for A380 to be built, and Airbus said fine, if that's what you are willing to pay for we'll build them. But once the reality of the economics of it caught up

      • Yeah Megaprojects on Youtube had an excellent video on this that I watched a few weeks back

        The Airbus A380: The Incredible Plane that No One Wants [youtube.com]

        Emirates for sure played a part and they are also the largest owner I believe and they even have an interview in the video where they talk about how it's such a great plane for them, they expect to use them for a long time. Quantas as well is the other large customer and it fits their model very well.

        Based on that it seems like Airbus took a "build it they will c

        • by dfm3 ( 830843 )
          Airports and ground crews hate them, by the way. Not just the infrastructure changes like you mentioned, but the logistics of handling all the crowds when one (or more!) show up at the terminal.

          I think Emirates has at least 100 of them? Never flown that airline so I don't know much about them. It's certainly on my bucket list to travel in one some day, though.
      • The problem for the A380 was not the quality of the plane. The problem is that the airline industry changed, and the A380 services the old model of hub and spoke better. Emirates uses hub and spoke due to the location and size of their country in that most of their flights are international and long haul which the A380 was better suited. In my opinion, the A380 is the best direct replacement for the 747. The problem is that many airlines were looking to replace the 747 with something different as they switc
        • by dfm3 ( 830843 )
          Personally I think the 777 or the A350 would be a better replacement for the 747, But the A380 came along early enough in that replacement cycle and was appealing to the proponents hub-and-spoke model (that's the economics I was referring to). That model is outdated in places like North America or Europe, and coincidentally many carriers relied on the 747 to fill that role even for cross country flights (it used to be common to see a 747 on routes between the east coast and California, for example).
    • their worst "failure" the A380 is an engineering marvel with an excellent safety record

      Their manufacture failure was the crash of an A400M military cargo in 2015 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... [wikipedia.org] during a test flight before delivery. The issue was botched update of the engine firmware. It erased calibration data and ultimately caused the engines to stop responding to commands. The existing A400M were grounded for a 1-2 months in the different Air forces until the cause was ascertained.
      Senior executives: "either a weakness in the test procedure of planes before they fly, or a problem that resu

    • Boeing is a prime example of the health of the USA. It looks big and power and good, but when tested, it fails spectacularly (kinetic landing) and the doors fall off.

      This is what happens when money is the overriding goal.

      The overriding goal should be reliability so you don't have to keep fucking with the damn thing. Then you start making money, probably lots of it... just not quite as much right now if you cut corners though.

  • At this time, Boeing is, at best, an imposter that pretends they know how to make airplanes. Nobody sane will order from them.

    • by jythie ( 914043 )
      When you listen to execs, they do not even call Boeing an aircraft manufacturer.. they are an integrator!
  • by 0xG ( 712423 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @10:50AM (#64172617)

    From the first time I flew in an original 737, I've hated that
    thing. In fact, it's only raison on d'etre seems to be that
    airlines don't have to retrain their older qualified pilots.

    Boeing makes some nice planes, but the 737 - in any form -
    should be shitcanned. It's the root of their current problems.

    • Agreed (Score:5, Interesting)

      by Viol8 ( 599362 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @11:34AM (#64172751) Homepage

      The 737 should have been put out to pasture long ago along with the 707 and 727.

      Unfortunately Boeing didn't want to spend the money on developing new single aisle airliner , cheaper and easier to bolt on unsuitable mods (eg engines so big they have to be mounted in front of the wing and require software - MCAS - to counteract the rotational torque that gives rise to) to a tired old 1960s airframe.

      Meanwhile Airbus realised that investing now leads to a better product and more profits in the future. Boeing is now your typical short termist US Corp.

      • Re:Agreed (Score:5, Insightful)

        by Richard_at_work ( 517087 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @03:36PM (#64173653)

        Its not that Boeing wont.

        Its that they cant.

        Without ceding the narrowbody market pretty much entirely to Airbus for a decade.

        The main component of an aircraft’s efficiency these days is the engine, it makes up the most efficiency savings when a new model is launched - hence the NEO and MAX, both with minimal changes but both with a new engine.

        So Boeing decides to do a cleansheet 737 replacement - thats $20Billion committed.

        Problem is, Airbus can use the same engine, or at least engine generation, on the A320 family for a development cost of only $2Billion.

        The 737-replacement might be, excluding the engine, 3% or 4% more efficient than the A320, but Airbus only has to recoup 10% of the costs Boeing would have to, so Airbus sells the plane for cheaper and still takes most of the market at a profit.

        If Airbus needs more, the A320 hasnt had a new wing since the 1980s, theres scope for a new wing to bring efficiency savings there as well. Now we are up to $10Billion and the aircraft are pretty much on par. Airbus still sells their aircraft cheaper and still takes the market at a profit.

        Boeings problem with the 737 isnt that its an old design, its that its a design with limitations that needs to be worked around. The MCAS issue is entirely based around the issue of putting a large engine under a low wing - Boeing looked into raising the height of the undercarriage to fit the engine more conventionally but it cost too much in comparison to the A320NEO.

        Airbus meanwhile still has massive development potential in the A320 design - so until Airbus pulls the trigger on a cleansheet replacement, Boeing cant either, because Boeing will lose if they do.

        • Oh but the issues are indeed because it is an old design. Back when the 737 was originally designed it used turbojet engines. These had really small diameter. The A320 was designed many decades later and it used turbofan engines for the get go.

        • Its not that Boeing wont.

          Its that they cant.

          Ummm... do it right or don't do it at all. People are dying from this shit. What the fuck? I don't care how exigent the circumstances are, you should give up your cushy job if you know that you can't engineer a reliable aircraft. Gambling with people's lives is absolutely unacceptable in this instance. I should probably add a 'fuck you' for you because of your enablement of these mealy mouthed excuses, but I will assume you are just being ignorant rather than malicious.

          • Congratulations, you have absolutely no comprehension of what is actually going on.

            The post I am responding to is not about whether Boeing can deliver a dangerous aircraft or not, its about whether they retire the 737 design. Thats an entirely separate discussion to whether they deliver a dangerous aircraft or not.

            The current 737 design isn't inherently dangerous. It can be modernised safely - but it was decisions within Boeing that made the modernisation they decided to do unsafe.

            But if Boeing was to ret

      • Boeing was once run by engineers. Now decisions are made by Lines Go Up guys.
      • by Striek ( 1811980 )

        The 737 is not a bad design. The issue is that Boeing wants to turn the plane into something it isn't.

        It was designed low to the ground so it wouldn't need a jetway to board, which opens up a LOT of smaller airports and remote locations. It can land on skis, and has a relatively short takeoff distance. It is fantastic as a combi (passenger and cargo) aircraft. It's great for regional and vacation flights. And as far as jetliners go, it's relatively easy to fly so pilot training is cheap. Used for what it wa

  • by quonset ( 4839537 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @10:50AM (#64172621)

    Another Boeing plane with a serious issue [newsweek.com].

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said a plane that caught on fire when flying over Miami, Florida, had a "softball size hole" above its engine.

    A Boeing 747 plane departing from Miami, Florida, experienced engine failure and had to return to make a landing. After inspecting the plane, the FAA found a hole above the engine that failed.

  • .. the free market is deciding.
  • Shocking... (Score:5, Informative)

    by Junta ( 36770 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @11:25AM (#64172719)

    Back in the 90s McDonnell Douglas had run itself into the ground.

    So Boeing decided to acquire them and put those decision makers in charge of Boeing.

    Predictable results ensue.

    • Re:Shocking... (Score:5, Interesting)

      by bkmoore ( 1910118 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @01:34PM (#64173169)

      Back in the 90s McDonnell Douglas had run itself into the ground.....

      First off, don't blame me. I was a lowly 23-year-old engineer at McDonnell Douglas in the '90s when this happened. I worked on the C-17 Military Transport Aircraft in the forward-fuselage group, and then in the avionics integration group, working on systems such as the warning-and caution computer, flight management system, cockpit displays, etc... What happened in the 1990s was the government told the defense industry they had to merge or die. This was right at the end of the Cold War, and the Clinton administration was talking about the "peace dividend" and going back to a peace-time military posture. For whatever reason, they believed fewer defense contractors would be more efficient and save money. We know how that turned out... So Lockheed merged with Martin. Northrop merged with Grumman. And there were other mergers, too many to count. McDonnell Douglas was a defense contractor that happened to make a few airliners, but our McDonnell Douglas airliners weren't competitive against Boeing or Airbus in most market segments. The MD-11 was an excellent freighter, but the MD-80 and MD-90 had fallen behind both the 737 and A-320 in the narrow-body short-haul market.

      Boeing was a manufacturer of airliners that hadn't had much success in defense contracting since the B-52 and KC-135 days. They competed for and lost the Military-Transport Aircraft MTA contract in the 1970s, which became the C-17. In the 1980s, Boeing competed for various fighter contracts, such as a super Phantom (hugely upgraded and remanufactured F-4), losing all of them. Boeing at the time was competing for the Air Force tanker contract, proposing a tanker based on the 767 airframe. Northrop was proposing a similar tanker based on the Airbus A-330 airframe. Additionally, Boeing was competing against Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas for the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft to replace the Navy's P-3 Orion. This eventually became the P-8 Poseidon, based on the 737 NG airframe. The government basically told Boeing if they wanted to be a prime contractor on either of those contracts, or any future defense contracts, they would have to merge with another company. Imho, that was the real reason for the merger.

      Now time for opinions. I'm not trying to make a political statement, but the Clinton administration pursued some very bad policies in the 1990s. They "encouraged" consolidation in the defense contracting industry, deregulated Wall Street by repealing Glass-Steagall, which basically put Wall Street in the drivers seat in managing companies. Lastly, they passed NAFTA and other free trade agreements. Overnight, we went from a national economy that was managed by companies, to a global economy that was managed by Wall Street. This in my opinion created a perfect storm for Boeing and many other companies. It reduced competition in the defense industry, so the incentives were wrong. The tanker contract from the mid- '90s only entered service in 2019, almost 20 years too late, and some people literally went to jail. It also led to a fixation on short-term profits over long-term competitiveness, quality control, and safety. NAFTA encouraged Boeing to outsource most of their production to other parts of the nation and ultimately other parts of the world. Prior to the 1990s, 90% of the 737 was manufactured in Renton, WA. It was easy to control the quality. Now days, 90% is outsourced and the airplane is only assembled in Renton. Boeing is learning a hard lesson that you can outsource parts, but you cannot outsource quality assurance, because the incentives aren't aligned. In a perfect market economy, Boeing would be afraid of losing market share, and ensure safety and quality. But since we have no real competition within the USA, Boeing considers themselves to be "too big to fail" and manages their operations accordingly. Again, this is only my opinion based on having been there. I think it's become group think to simply blame McDonnell Douglas, and pe

  • Gain: cost cutting -> more profit -> higher share price -> bigger returns for investors and bonuses for C-suite

    Pain: cost cutting in safety critical products will only end one way and we've seen it more than once with Boeing. Seems they don't learn.

  • by quantaman ( 517394 ) on Friday January 19, 2024 @11:36AM (#64172759)

    Outside of their terrible safety record they're a bunch of crony capitalists who rely on the US government to kill small competitors for them [wikipedia.org].

  • ... divest itself of the commercial aircraft division. Before they are allowed to acquire one more little widget-maker or enter into any more alliances or partnerships. Boeing commercial is going to whither and die just like Douglas Aircraft did when the McDonnell clan conquered them.

    There's "too big to fail". Why not "too big to grow"? There are no more holes in your belt, fatso.

    • Because their space and military arms are going so well right now?

      • by PPH ( 736903 )

        Not My Problem. They shouldn't be propping up the balance sheet of one failing enterprise with revenue from another.

        • My point is, the issue at Boeing is at Boeing, not the individual divisions. Divesting one division aint going to fix jack shit.

          • by PPH ( 736903 )

            the issue at Boeing is at Boeing

            That's exactly the problem. Dave Calhoun has other things to think about. Why haven't we heard more from Stan Deal, president of the Commercial Aircraft Company? And arguably more in touch with what goes on in the aircraft plants. If I want to know how business is at See's Candies, I'd rather hear from CEO Pat Egan than Warren Buffett.

            If Calhoun can't butt out, he needs to spin that division off.

            Divesting one division aint going to fix jack shit.

            It will at the commercial division. As far as the rest of Boeing, who cares?

  • ...banners on the sides of all Boeing's planes so that people are moved to "buy American"? Or maybe include motivation & wellness programmes for Boeing's employees to improve safety & QA?

    Just trying to help! >:-D
    • That would certainly simplify matters for the 95% of the world who are not American, and who have at some recent time been threatened by the Americans.

      Big boost for Airbus Inc. And Embraer and Tupolev (if Putin ever returns to the international market.

  • a harrowing near disaster involving its 737 Max line of airliners

    The door plug fell out - for whatever reason (since it had handles for passengers to operate, and passengers are human, I'd suspect the passengers - on this or an earlier flight). The airframe stopped any cracks from propagating - as they're designed to do.

    The only people at risk were the ones too stupid to be seated their seatbelts attached, and possibly some whose cardio-pulmonary health was borderline for being allowed to fly, or fart har

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