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Security Books Media Book Reviews

Web Hacking: Attacks and Defense 126

zenomorph writes: "I first heard of this book on amazon.com on a Monday morning, and read the reviews of people who had purchased this book. I noticed that there were no reviews from any person in the web security community had commented on it, either on Amazon or anywhere else (with the exception of two brief comments on the back of the book, of which one was written by the person who wrote the book's foreword). So I decided to pick it up on Friday after I left work and see what it had to offer. After picking up the book I noticed it was co-authored by three people who all work for Foundstone, a very large security company that deals with everything (including web security). This review will cover some of the topics covered in this book, along with things that could or should have been covered in greater detail." Read on for the rest of zenomorph's review.
Web Hacking: Attacks and defense
author Stuart McClure, Saumil Shah, and Shreeraj Sha
pages 492
publisher Addison-Wesley
rating 8
reviewer zenomorph
ISBN 0201761769
summary Web Application Hacking

Target audience:

This book is geared more towards beginners and intermediate users, with a few things the more advanced people will enjoy. It explains concepts and practical examples in an easy to understand manner.

Pros:

One portion of the book covered a topic which is rarely mentioned and almost never documented in security texts, which is ASP (Active Server Pages). This primarily covered security involving databases handling and login information. Another rarely documented subject this book covered was ISAPI application security. Additional good points below:

  • Good examples of the types of commands an attacker will execute when remote command execution is possible. Also had a nice little attack fingerprint reference in the back. (Appendix D Page 462)

  • General Tips and tricks for fingerprinting a web server, and database versions. (pages 182-194) Provides this information based on error messages and URL structure.

  • Chapter 12 covers remote command execution threats with Java and Java servers. Definably a book highlight. Not too much documentation currently exists on this ever-growing web technology.

  • Chapter 14 covers buffer overflows in a very easy to understand manner; something not easily accomplished for the less tech-savvy. It also walks through a complete example of bad code, to writing and executing the exploit.
  • One nice section is the "Cheat Sheet" towards the back of the book which provides the most common improperly used functions in ASP, PHP, Java, and Perl. I did notice it left out the ever popular fopen() function in PHP, which is very popular for attackers to exploit when improperly used (Code inclusion attacks).

  • Shows good practical examples of attackers using search engines to help further probe a site.

  • Covers SQL and Oracle security. (Direct, and Injection based attacks)

  • Web Application server security was covered with examples on BEA Weblogic, and Websphere.

  • Provides good examples of using tools such as Netcat, Sam Spade, Teleport Pro, Black Widow, Webcracker, Brutus, Achilles, Cookie Pal, etc.

  • Coveres the threats of Internet worms,including the effect on the Internet of Nimda, and Code Red. Gave details of what exactly they did, and how they could spread.

  • Chapter 17 is a treat. Covers how attackers avoid IDS systems through the use of SSL, and URL encoding (such as Unicode, 2-byte, 3-Byte, and double encoding.) Also covers how to set up an IDS on SSL via reverse proxies.

Cons:

This book was released in August of 2002, but I couldn't find any reference to cross-site scripting. Cross-site scripting isn't a new type of attack. In fact, it has been around since the late 1990's. More gripes below:

  • The authors have a tendency to include snippets from IRC conversations. While it's explaining how hackers communicate during attacks I found it a little lame. I'd rather they had mentioned some "hacker" channels, or something along those lines.

  • Neither cookie theft nor poisoning is mentioned, while cookie modification is.

  • I went to the back of the book hoping to gather some good references for further reading and only got a small links section showing 6 links, none of which where technical documents but instead general web links.

  • Web application abuse and spamming aren't covered at all, which is something very important and an ever-growing option for spammers.

  • No references to XML-RPC or SOAP were found but the athors do briefly mention Microsoft's .NET technology without providing any code examples.

  • Lack of web application wrappers and security. CGIWrap and Suexec aren't mentioned anywhere. Nothing about chrooting webservers, or applications for additional security were found.

  • Apache's "Tomcat" server isn't mentioned anywhere, with the exception of an exploit mentioned in Appendix D. (Source Code, File, and Directory Disclosure Cheat sheet)

  • Not a big complaint but it would have been nice if Python or TCL were covered.

Closing:

On a scale of one to ten I give this book an eight. This review was written to give you an idea of the contents, or lack thereof. Perhaps this will help you to decide if this book is what you're looking for, or a waste of time.


You can purchase Web Hacking: Attacks and Defense from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.

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Web Hacking: Attacks and Defense

Comments Filter:
  • FUD (Score:5, Interesting)

    by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:04AM (#4373566)
    There are, within the "security
    industry" (whatever that means) people who-- intentionally or
    unintentionally-- sell their customers short. The people create a false
    aura of security wherever they pass, and are unwilling or incapable of
    expanding their capabilities.

    Scanning a network doesn't make it secure, but we've all run into people
    who think it does-- including people who should know better.

    I've long advocated (and tried to design) systems (not just hardware,
    but software and business practices) that *fail well*. Systems designed
    not to be unbreakable-- a fool's pursuit, to be sure-- but to contain
    the inevitable breach. Systems that fail in known modes, so that the
    consequences of an intrusion are known ahead of time, and steps can be
    taken based on that knowledge. Systems that don't eliminate risk, but
    manage risk.

    Unfortunately, most customers aren't interested because systems like
    this are expensive. They're hard to design, hard to build, hard to
    maintain, and require profound knowledge of the components and the
    activities that use them. It's a hard sell, especially when those less
    educated self-labeled experts (and vendors) are pushing silver bullets
    in the form of yet another certification, yet another scanner, yet
    another training course.

    I could be wrong, but I see the current upwelling of vitriol directed at
    these people. They are truly living off the labor of others, and
    providing little of use to anyone, including their customers. But
    they're not everyone.
    • Re:FUD (Score:5, Insightful)

      by extagboy ( 60672 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:11AM (#4373629) Homepage
      Scanning a network doesn't make it secure, but we've all run into people
      who think it does-- including people who should know better.


      I agree that scanning a network doesn't make it secure but rather it is the first step in identifying where it is insecure. It's an important step that should not be overlooked. As far as the book goes, anything to help people realize that security is important is a good thing.
      • Re:FUD (Score:1, Insightful)

        by Anonymous Coward
        but rather it is the first step in identifying where it is insecure.

        no shit. it's like walking around your building and noting where the weak points are. thinking you know something (such as what is/isnt running on your network) is different than actually looking. i might think there is only one door into the server room snce thats what the architects told me, but unless i go and look, how do i know for sure?

        now if i gather that information and dont use it, i'm a DUMBASS. but i use the info i gather, so im not a dumbass (well, for that reason at least).

        while scanning by itself doesn't make a network more secure, not scanning is foolish.

      • Re:FUD (Score:4, Insightful)

        by RagManX ( 258563 ) <ragmanx.gamerdemos@com> on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @01:23PM (#4375216) Homepage Journal
        I agree that scanning a network doesn't make it secure but rather it is the first step in identifying where it is insecure.

        Well, actually, it isn't a first step. The first step is reviewing policies. If no policies are in place, knowing what is secure or insecure is almost irrelevent. Once you've analyzed the policies, go over what is missing, clarify what is unclear, ensure that what is required is sensible, and work through everything to make sure the policy is clear and enforced.

        Now, once you know what is and isn't allowed, you might want to scan and see what's there. Remember, just because something is a potential vulnerability doesn't mean it has to be changed. A cost/risks analysis may have been done with the determination that a given "hole" has sufficient reward to justify the risk. But until you've gone over the policies and reviewed the business reasons for any given service, you can't determine if it is a hole or not.

        RagManX
      • Re:FUD (Score:3, Informative)

        by Zeinfeld ( 263942 )
        I agree that scanning a network doesn't make it secure but rather it is the first step in identifying where it is insecure. It's an important step that should not be overlooked. As far as the book goes, anything to help people realize that security is important is a good thing.

        Every categorical statement about computer security is wrong.

        If you talk to anyone in the top rank of information security, whether someone with a public profile like Bruce Schneier or Ross Anderderson or people like Jeff Schiller, Butler Lampson, Steve Bellovin or myself who are well known in the industry but may not pop up in print as often you will get a fairly consistent reply on the value of various strategies but in every case you will be told that what is meant 'secure' depends on your particular needs.

        What you will not get is computer security boiled down to a simple set of rules. You might get 'Security is risk control, not risk elimination' which has been arround for several decades before Bruce recently claimed it.

        What security is not is the set of ideological slogans that tend to infest slashdot. For example 'security through obscurity' is regularly brought out to attack what are actually valid security strategies. It took several years to get the unix community to undersand that shadow passwords are not a form of security through obscurity. Many folk on slashdot think that unix has always had them.

        Before looking at site policy or anything else suggested so far as the 'first step' ask yourself what assets do I have and what damage would be caused if they were disclosed, erased or otherwise damaged?. This is actually quite a hard question and many people will miss out their most important assets. For example the CIA and NSA failled to consider their reputation as an asset when they outsourced the running of their Web sites with embarassing results when they were hacked. The Whitehouse did not make that mistake. Before the site ever went online they realised that the Web site was potentially a reputation asset. The first target of a coup is always the television station since the coup plotters can often get people to comply with the revolution just by announcing that it has taken place. Also they had been bitten during the 1992 election campaign when an NRA supporter sent out a fake press release promissing an imminent gun grabbing. Ironically the response to the fake release suggested that gun grabbing was popular, so know you know who you have to blame.

        As for the book, it sounds to me that this is a very 'down in the trenches' type of book. I don't worry about a lot of the attacks described because I would never go near certain technologies. Client side Java, Javascript and other 'winky-blinky' technology would have been much better if never invented. However when you come to build systems you can still have problems because even though you may not use javascript a weakness in javascript could compromise a mechanism you relly on such as session cookies.

        I just gor Ross Anderson's book 'Security Engineering'. I have not read it yet but his monograph 'why security protocols fail' is the one that Bruce, Ron Rivest or myself all refer to if we want to quickly install some clues into someone designing a protocol with inadequate security...

    • Re:FUD (Score:1, Insightful)

      by yatest5 ( 455123 )
      The problem I have with these reviews and those that are found on Amazon, is that there is no context for the review. Specifically, what's great to you might suck to me. We have no knowledge of the reviewers skill level or experience.

      It would be far better if the reviewers would give a little background information about themselves, along with the review.

      What is Zenomorph's skill level? How long have they worked in this field? What related hardware and software are they proficient with? What other books on the subject has this person read and what was their opinion of those books? Without this information the review carries no more weight than one from Jon Katz.

      I have spoken.
    • Unfortunately, most customers aren't interested because systems like this are expensive.

      And becasue some customers might really not need them for their particular circumstances. A failure or security breach isn't necessarily the end of the world. If your window gets shattered once a year by a thrown stone you can spend a bunch on unbreakable glass or metal shutters, or just keep of stock of replacement panes around. So it is with securityt; they may believe that it's cheaper, easier, and more practical to just fix things when they inevitably get broken. Sure, sometimes that's false economy based on bad estimates and wishful thinking, but sometimes it might be valid.
      • And becasue some customers might really not need them for their particular circumstances. A failure or security breach isn't necessarily the end of the world...[simile snipped]...Sure, sometimes that's false economy based on bad estimates and wishful thinking, but sometimes it might be valid.

        I'm still amazed at how may PHB's I've met who are so "concerned about security" that they insist on spending thousands to "secure" a static marketing website that contains nothing anyone would want to look at, yet still use their dog's name as the password to secure the HR files on their intranet.

        I guess since the Web seems "out there" [gesturing genericly towards the horizon], a lot of people worry that their website will get "hacked" and altered by someone (though when you ask who would do that, or why, they get very vague), whereas the actual security risk, confidential info stored on an office computer, seems so mundane that nobody cares about it.

  • Get ... (Score:5, Funny)

    by NWT ( 540003 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:08AM (#4373595) Homepage
    ... THIS [amazon.com]!
  • by dAzED1 ( 33635 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:09AM (#4373602) Journal
    "So I decided to pick it up on Friday after I left work and see what it had to offer...This review will cover some of the topics covered in this book, along with things that could or should have been covered in greater detail"
    Ok, so its a 492 page technical resource, and you just *bought* the book 5 days ago?
    Is it possible that maybe you missed some things?
    I mean, I can read a good 500 page novel in a day or two, but I don't think I'd give a review on a technical book I just bought 5 days ago. Maybe that's just me.
    • by Anonymous Coward
      5 day review of a 500 page book. Would be a full time job.
    • by Pac ( 9516 ) <paulo...candido@@@gmail...com> on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:49AM (#4373870)
      So you haven't yet managed the modern learning techiques available? How do you expect to find or keep your job if you can't extract all useful content from a book by perusing the index and reading two or three careful selected pages plus the command reference table at Apendix A? I am really concerned about your future, mister, really concerned. Clearly you wouldn't have survived for a day during the dot.com boom. What if the economy becomes irrationaly exuberant again? What will you do when they discover you can't learn Magic Bullet v10.3 in two hours and have a presentation for marketing to give the client by the end of the day?
    • "I took a speed-reading course and read War and Peace in twenty minutes. It involves Russia." - Woody Allen
    • I don't want to belabor the point, but often it's not necessary to read a technical book from start to finish to review it. A good part of technical reviewing involves just reporting what the book does and doesn't have. Sometimes a book's quality can be determined simply how well it is organized (for a reference book, for instance), or on the quality and depth of its learning activities. Sometimes, there may be very good reasons for writing a review/preview/response without reading a book in its entirety. I once had a rather frivolous dialogue with Jeffrey Dean [idiotprogrammer.com] about the merits and drawbacks of writing reviews for books you haven't read completely. I'm not defending the practice of reviewing books you haven't read. Nor am I defending the value that comes with "living with a book" for several weeks or months. But the value of early reporting of a book sometimes outweigh the decision not to read the book entirely. Other Idiotprogrammer Book Reviews [idiotprogrammer.com]
      • I don't want to belabor the point, but often it's not necessary to read a technical book from start to finish to review it. A good part of technical reviewing involves just reporting what the book does and doesn't have

        Sure you can report about some things that the book has before reading it entirely, but how do you know what the book doesn't have unless you've read the whole thing?
    • by angst_ridden_hipster ( 23104 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @01:21PM (#4375189) Homepage Journal
      I've spent a lot of time and a lot of money on technical books. In order to save time and money, I've developed a rough analysis approach that will assess the quality of a technical book without having to read the whole thing before buying.

      In general, if you go into one of the large, corporate McBooks outlets, and scan the technical titles, the following analysis will vet a 95% or better evaluation rate:

      1. Font size. Inversely proportional to quality of the text.

      2. Screen shots. Quality of the text is inversely proportional to the total area dedicated to screen shots. Windows dialog boxes count as double their physical area.

      3. Quick Reference Icons. Sometimes the author feels necessary to come up with special icons which will be placed on a page to show you what's important. The quality of the book is inversely proportional to the number of these icons multiplied by the size of the icons.

      4. Index. The quality of the book is proportional to the number of serious entries in the index. If there are less than five humorous entries, these humorous entries may be included in the above count. If there are more than ten humorous entries in the index, each should be considered as reducing the "serious" count by 10%.

      5. Included stuff from the 'net. The quality score for the book is reduced for each appendix which merely includes reprints of stuff that's readily available online. Extra points off for reprinting publically available APIs. If I was going to code in an offline environment, I might want this, but I'm not going to code without a net connection.

      Follow this system, and you won't be ripped off again!
    • by karb ( 66692 )
      Probably if you already understand what the book is explaining, you can probably skim it looking for errors.

      Typically, unless you're a book reviewer you probably wouldn't read a technical book that only explains things you already understand :)

  • by Anonymous Coward
    A.) Put this under book reviews, where it belongs

    B.) Its a Xenomorph, not a Zenomorph. Jesus.

    • by Anonymous Coward
      This story DOES NOT belong in the Reviews section.

      The book got an "8." All books in the Reviews section get a "9." Therefore it does not belong.
    • Its a Xenomorph, not a Zenomorph
      really? How do you know? Because the word you're thinking when you pronounce his id is spelled "xenomorph"? Perhaps it's about taking a shape dictated by Zen? If somebody tells you to put things in the "to box", do you correct him, telling him it's the "two boxes", when he might well mean the box that is not the "from" box?
      No wonder you post AC.
    • B.) Its a Xenomorph, not a Zenomorph.
      >>>>

      Zenomorph has been a friend of mine on CyberArmy.com for ages; that's his name, like it or not. Yes, things did get confusing for a while with two similar names, but now that everyone & their dog has an alias named '[xz]eno.*' ... They've even knocked off my once trademark smiley :]

      Sorry for this minor, OT rant. We now return to your regularly scheduled program...
  • Heh... (Score:5, Funny)

    by $0 31337 ( 225572 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:10AM (#4373616) Homepage
    The authors have a tendency to include snippets from IRC conversations. While it's explaining how hackers communicate during attacks I found it a little lame. I'd rather they had mentioned some "hacker" channels, or something along those lines.

    I didn't realize that hacker communication was that interesting, even during an attack. Heh... It could be kind of funny I suppose if the "hackers" were script kiddies.

    Hacker #1: D00Zs! I just hax0red this windoze box!
    Hacker #2: No way! Fuckin' Awesome guy!
    Hacker #1: YeAh, I woulda Hax0red more but mom made me go to bed
    Hacker #2: Damn, That be harsh.
  • "Security" books (Score:3, Interesting)

    by borgesian ( 545392 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:11AM (#4373618)
    My guess is that script kiddies salivate over this type of information. Having read similar books, they are basically how-to tutorials, a capable System Administrator will likely know about this issues or learn them elsewhere. Oh well, since it makes the Authors some good bucks....I guess thats Security for them.
    • by slutdot ( 207042 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:45AM (#4373822)
      Hiding the information from the general public doesn't do any good either. You know how everyone keeps bashing MS for not disclosing holes, it's the same thing with not wanting to publish info on how to hack a system. A capable system administrator will take this info and secure their boxes against the holes published in these books. They are just too busy to be looking for such obscure information as finding holes in software. These books provide valuable insight from people who are working in the field and as a security administrator for a rather large company, I place high value in these books.
      • Re:"Security" books (Score:3, Interesting)

        by larien ( 5608 )
        Yup, I agree with the above. You've also got to bear in mind that it's not the skript kiddies you have to worry about; it's the real hackers who know how to write script kiddie tools.

        It's fairly simple to defend against script kiddies by following good practice; defending against "real" hackers takes a lot of work and knowledge.

    • How does one become a capable System Administrator? By learning which involves, amongst many other things, reading books on the subject.
  • by Anonymous Coward

    It's a simple fact that 95% of "attacks" are quite harmless game-playing by "script kiddies", against which there's no need to defend.

    Virtually all of the remaining five percent are the work of honorable hackers (hackers in the correct sense: Brilliant geeks who like to explore and experiment) motivated solely by intellectual curiosity. As we all know, such true hackers are unable to do harm because their value system precludes it. For a true hacker to do harm is a logical impossibility, a meaningless paradox.

    The hysteria about "security" is mostly an attempt to discredit the hacker community, to misrepresent curious and brilliant techies -- us, in short -- as demons in human form. It's bigotry, pure and simple.

    I'm not surprised when CNN or MSNBC spews out this kind of propaganda, but for a geek site like Slashdot to be propagating the "security" myth is rather discouraging.

    • by Second_Derivative ( 257815 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:17AM (#4373669)
      It's a simple fact that 95% of "attacks" are quite harmless game-playing by "script kiddies", against which there's no need to defend.

      Last I checked having some HTML file written in FrontPage saying "j00 h4v3 b33n 0wnz0r3d" in red on black where your index page is supposed to be doesn't do wonders for your company's reputation.
    • The bandwidth consumption, system overhead, and problems resulting from Code Red, Nimbda, Slapper, etc. are quite real. Ask anyone who's either been hit directly or felt the side effects. So there are real threats out there.

      That said, I quite often don't follow the hype. I will occasionally visit a vulnerability site just to make sure nothing truly new, clever, and dangerous is on the loose. A decent admin will have most bases covered.

      For example, when all those SSH/OpenSSH hack came through early this year (and late last year), I wasn't overly concerned, even though I manage a ton of OpenSSH servers. Why? Because I'm smart enough to use tcp_wrappers to keep the l33t AOL and AT&T Broadband hackers from messing with my systems and I turned off protocol 1 suport long ago.

      Sure, I went out and upgraded OpenSSL/OpenSSH on the vulnerable machines. Who wouldn't? But I didn't need to make a mad dash to upgrade because I had devices in place to keep things in check.

      I don't believe that the industry is trying to discredit "hackers". Like it or not "hackers" is pretty much a negative term these days. No, the industry uses this kind of hype and hysteria to... make money!

    • It's a simple fact that 95% of "attacks" are quite harmless game-playing by "script kiddies", against which there's no need to defend.

      Virtually all of the remaining five percent are the work of honorable hackers


      Kindly provide us with the statistics that support this simple fact, so that the rest of the world can dispense with its bigotry.

      The "I love you" and "melissa" viruses were written by little more than a script kiddies. Are you telling me there is no reason to defend against this ? Are you saying there's no reason for concern ?

      And while you're at it, please provide statistics about the dollar-value of damage conducted by the people who DON'T fall into your schema. It'd be great to know that a few million dollars lost here or some credit card numbers stolen there don't merit real concern.

      Could anyone have done more damage to your oh-so-discriminated-against community then a posterboy like Kevin Mitnick, by undermining the trust that people have in these systems ?
    • While you may be correct in your percentages, that is only because of the huge number of "script kiddies".

      When I was in the .com industry we outsourced some web-application dev work out to a russian design firm. They did excellent work for a great price, literally pennies on the dollar compared to what it would have cost to do the same thing in the states. We also outsourced some work to Israel and India, and saw the same value and competence. In summation, these were not 14 year old script kiddies.

      On top of application development, they offered us an interesting growth plan. For 500 USD a day they would take any of our competition off the net completely. That's their website, AND main office. For more money they would corrupt their server-side applications to the point of unusability.

      THIS is what you need security for. Because there are offices FULL of Russian, Israeli, Indian, (wherever) programmers who are willing to do whatever work they can, whether that be hacking or development, just to bring a paycheck home. In many cases they are protected either actively or passively by their government, and in some may even work for the government.

      You're correct, script kiddies and curious hackers aren't much of a problem. The malevolent black hat hacker out to cause destruction and mayhem in your network for the sheer joy of it is almost entirely a media creation. But industrial espionage is alive and well, and to make matters worse it's cheap.
      • we had a similar experience with outsourcing some web work to India -- we didn't take them up on it. It was a real eye opener, so we had them look at our product (which included a web application component) for security and they found several BIG holes that had made it through our "security" audit.
    • It doesn't matter if damage is done out of malice or incompetence, it still takes time and effort to recover a compromised server. I make the effort to secure my systems at work and at home for the same reason I keep the kitchen knives away from my children.

      It's not demonizing curious children, it's called childproofing.

      Just think of security as childproofing your network.

      Much of what's been done to discredit "hacking" (in the original sense) has been done by clueless vandals who imagine that breaking into someone elses computer made them some kind of "brilliant techie" or "3733t hax0r d00d".
    • If you did - or bought something from an online retailer, or stored sensitive or valuable information stored on a computer that is connected to the internet....

      There's definitely a lot of FUD sown by the "security" industry. I also agree that the media don't always treat the subject responsibly - events involving any kind of computer usually get cloaked in semi-accurate buzzwords implying the use of magical incantations and mysterious underground organisations, when usually it's a bored teenager trying to hack into a porn site.

      On the other hand, there are serious security breaches every day - and script kiddies can do as much damage as a responsible hacker - more, because they often don't understand their tools very well. If nothing else, you need to protect your system against them.

      If you write software that can be used by total strangers across the internet, you need to assume that some of them will have unpleasant motives and will attempt to cause your software harm. It doesn't matter if this applies to 0.001% - if you are dealing with sensitive data, providing a public service or rely on your income from your online application, if just one script kiddy brings your site down, you've lost the ball game.

      I think anyone who is involved with online application development should at least look at books like this, and if you're the technical lead you should make sure you understand exactly what your application is going to be up against. The numbers don't matter - just one visitor is enough to do irreparable harm to your site.
  • by FreeLinux ( 555387 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:14AM (#4373648)
    The problem I have with these reviews and those that are found on Amazon, is that there is no context for the review. Specifically, what's great to you might suck to me. We have no knowledge of the reviewers skill level or experience.

    It would be far better if the reviewers would give a little background information about themselves, along with the review.

    What is Zenomorph's skill level? How long have they worked in this field? What related hardware and software are they proficient with? What other books on the subject has this person read and what was their opinion of those books? Without this information the review carries no more weight than one from Jon Katz.
    • by Anonymous Coward
      He is the administrator of cgisecurity.com, a web security news site. He's written a few papers and advisories. Check out the site.

    • The problem I have with these reviews and those that are found on Amazon, is that there is no context for the review. Specifically, what's great to you might suck to me. We have no knowledge of the reviewers skill level or experience.

      Even worse, you don't know if the have some relationship to the author! A contractor working for me was sharing a cubicle with a "business analyst". This guy boasted about how he had published several books and got great ratings on Amazon because he (through secondary accounts) and his buddies would write reviews about how great the book was and then would use other accounts to recommend the reviews. Sad. Let the buyer beware.

      Milalwi
    • Really,

      There is nothing wrong with this review or anything intrinsically wrong with reviews in general! and you don't need to know his 5Kyllz lev3l either (alhtough i get this sense that he is strangely powerful, like Goku, maybe a 5 thousand !!!!). You have to make up your own mind, oh god, no! this is what we do when we think before making a decision. HOWEVER, a REVIEW is GREAT because it lets us know whether something interests us or not. We don't call them DECISIONS-MADE-WHILE-YOU-WAIT for a reason. Of course you have to check it out yourself, thumb thru it, maybe even buy it and read it before you really know its super-fantastic.

      gripe about something important. like socks.

    • Let's look at your post from how you would feel if someone aimed this at you -- I think you'll find it a bit harsh.

      "The problem I have with posts on Slashdot making personal attacks, is that there is no context for the attack. Specifically, blah blah blah. We have no knowledge of the posters skill level or experience.

      It would be far better if the poster would give a little background information about themselves, along with the post.

      What is FreeLinux's skill level? How long has he worked in this field? What related hardware and software is he proficient with? What other books on the subject has this person read and what was their opinion of one of those books? Without this information the post carries no more weight than one from Jon Katz."
  • by dr_dank ( 472072 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:17AM (#4373668) Homepage Journal
    I noticed that there were no reviews from any person in the web security community had commented on it

    See? Those web hackers are pretty good, no?
  • whisker (Score:5, Informative)

    by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:28AM (#4373733)
    "Chapter 17 is a treat. Covers how attackers avoid IDS systems through the use of SSL, and URL encoding (such as Unicode, 2-byte, 3-Byte, and double encoding.) Also covers how to set up an IDS on SSL via reverse proxies."

    Ummm... here is a free version of that information [wiretrip.net]. Very thorough, and it is by RFP the writer of whisker.
    • The link is VERY interesting and thank you, but just to let others know, it only covers HTTP URL encoding. It does not cover setting up IDS on SSL via reverse proxies, nor does it cover avoiding IDS by using SSL. (but that should be somewhat obvious to anyone who cares to think about it a little.)
  • The problem that arises with books like this is that they become obsolete quickly. More generic hackerish books just describe generalisms and may discuss buffer overflows in general rather than specific buffer overflows in specific programs.

    There is a need for both types of books, but one like this will not be good reading 10 years from now (nor should they be).
  • by mav[LAG] ( 31387 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:40AM (#4373798)
    Hudson Is this going to be a standup job sir, or just another bug-hunt?

    Gorman: All we know is there's still no contact with the colony's Web server. In the meantime I want you all to look at this book on Web security. It's just been reviewed by zenomorph.

    Apone: Excuse me sir - who?

    Gorman: zenomorph.

    Hicks (aside to Hudson) It's a bug hunt.
  • Nothing like a book full of FUD to further obscure the real "web site hackers".

    This is just too complicated a subject to wrap it all up in a generi-book. Of course its aimed at beginners... they don't know any better!

    • So, if someone actually IS a beginner, why is this bad? Why call it a book full of FUD when it exposes potential beginners to some of the issues that are out there?

      Certainly almost any IT subject is too complex to put into a single book. But that doesn't mean people would be unable to get a leg up from such a tome. Right?
  • by viper21 ( 16860 ) <scott@NOspaM.iqfoundry.com> on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:53AM (#4373901) Homepage
    I find it quite interesting that you assume that any people of note should bother submitting a review to Amazon.com if they have something to say about a book. If I were going to take the time to write a professional review of a book, I'm sure that I would have it published somewhere that I would get good exposure and receive compensation for my time.

    Maybe you would like to take a look at Web Security, Privacy & Commerce, 2nd Edition [unixreview.com] from OReilly (I have no connection w/ this link or this book).

    Or maybe you could figure out where the Web Security zealots hang out. I bet they've talked about the book there, if it has any merit of note.

    If you expect anything besides rehashes of the books TOC on the Amazon.com review system, you're going to be disappointed most of the time.

    -S
  • by El Volio ( 40489 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @10:58AM (#4373945) Homepage
    I took the Foundstone "Ultimate Hacking" course a few months ago, and some of these guys were on the team who taught it. While I can't speak to the book itself, not having read it, the authors themselves were very knowledgeable and authoritative in their fields. I expect that the information in this book should (hopefully) be of the same caliber.
    • Humor me if you will, but why the heck would any self-respecting "hacker"-wannabe take an "Ultimate hacking" course? Isn't that somewhat like watching a documentary on hiking in order to learn hiking?

      'Hacking' is learnt by doing. Maybe I'm from the old school and I don't know any better.

      • I thought I knew a bit about hacking. I have secured large (million hits a day) web sites, configured corporate firewalls, written security evaluations.

        I've taken a course at Uni on cryptography, and at one stage understood DES, RSA and key exchange.

        Without saying anything that might incriminate myself, I thought I knew a bit. So when my company sent me on a similar hacking course I didn't think I was going to get much out of it, but I was looking to get something on my CV that said I know about security.

        What scared me was not how much they taught me in the course, but how little. The first day on information gathering was interesting, but I knew most of the social engineering and technical hacking bits.

        What scared me was how easily they could put together everything I had already known, and systematically apply with frightening success. I haven't had an experience like it. It must be something like the karate-kid (the first one). Knowing all the bits, (wax on, wax off) then seeing them fall into place.

        Be very sure of yourself before you say a course like this is irrelevant. You may know all the "facts" already, but there is a world of difference between learning off the "security community" on the web and applying it in a systematic, professional manner. As well, the contacts you make at the course and extremely valuable.

        Just don't do what my co-worker did. He was trying to VNC to a NT server at the same time as another team, and he was having trouble with the mouse moving in two directions at once. This other team are from the "defence department", so he decides to crash their PC. Again, and again, and again. Later the course instructor tells me by doing this he's guaranteed a tax audit for at least the next five years.
      • Sometimes you just have to go to a class because the boss wants it -- makes a nice bullet point on presentations to prospective customers, executives, etc. Plus, it never hurts to learn a few new things and have an appropriate environment in which to play.

        That, and it beats being in the office for a week.

  • by Anonymous Coward
    Foundstone is essentially a Microsoft subsidiary now, so getting consistently useful information from them is somewhat in question for me. Now, maybe there are still a few people there who haven't compromised their integrity to get a cushy paycheck from MS.. but I'm a skeptic.

    Essentially MS and Symantec have both bought out fairly prominent security "experts" who are taking their knowledge of exploits and hoarding that information.

    And of course Foundstone is one of the "founding" members of OIS, the security through obscurity security notification group. No time limits for public disclosure of vulnerabilities, no documentation of vulnerabilities (.gif "viruses" anyone), and no public discourse unless the vendor is happy with what you're saying.

  • Foundstone (Score:3, Informative)

    by j_kenpo ( 571930 ) on Wednesday October 02, 2002 @11:36AM (#4374204)
    Considering that the book is written by the team at Foundstone, guys who have written other books on security such as Hacking Exposed, Hacking Linux Exposed, and Hacking Windows 2000 Exposed, teach courses in network security, such as Ultimate Hacking and Ultimate IDS, and have been doing this for countless years, Id have to say itd probally be a pretty good book on the subject. While not all topics are covered, as the reviewer pointed out the book is geared towards novices to intermediate users.. so dont expect everything. Not knowing the reviewers skill level, Ill trust that the Foundstone guys wrote a fairly decent book and expect that a few things are either held back due to relevence or space. And chances are I will probally pick it up myself in one of my future book runs. If someone who reads the book is all that interested in the security field after reading it, it will at least give them a starting point to start looking and discover some of the missing elements mentioned in the review...
  • Anybody else think it's kinda funny that Amazon.com is selling a book on web security? [com.com]

    Weaselmancer

  • "Distributed DOS attacks"

    Post link to target site on slashdot front page. Wait a couple minutes.

    The End.
  • by Anonymous Coward
    Another book by the Foundstone crew is Hacking Web Applications Exposed [amazon.com]. I found this book to a lot better than Web Hacking: Attacks and Defense. I know a bunch of the guys over at Foundstone and personally, I find Shema's book to be a lot better than Shah's.

    Just a little insight.
  • "Never judge a book by its Amazon review"
  • Don't click on slashdots link to buy the book from Barnes and Noble. It is listed there at $39.99. Amazon [amazon.com] has the same book [amazon.com] for $34.99.

    Save yourself some money.
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