Alaska Airlines Plane Appears To Have Left Boeing Factory Without Critical Bolts (wsj.com) 89
Regulators put limits on Boeing 737 MAX production; grounded MAX 9 jets have resumed flying after required inspections. From a report: Bolts needed to secure part of an Alaska Airlines jet that blew off in midair appear to have been missing when the plane left Boeing's factory. Boeing and other industry officials increasingly believe the plane maker's employees failed to put back the bolts when they reinstalled a 737 MAX 9 plug door after opening or removing it during production, according to people familiar with the matter. The increasingly likely scenario, according to some of these people, is based partly on an apparent absence of markings on the Alaska door plug itself that would suggest bolts were in place when it blew off the jet around 16,000 feet over Oregon on Jan. 5.
They also pointed to paperwork and process lapses at Boeing's Renton, Wash., factory related to the company's work on the plug door. The National Transportation Safety Board has been conducting metallurgical analysis of the plug door but hasn't released the results of the testing. Laboratory tests might show whether the bolts were in place or not there at all. An update in the NTSB probe is expected as soon as this week. New evidence could later emerge before accident investigators reach final conclusions. It couldn't be determined how many people were involved with work on the plug door at Boeing's 737 factory. Supplier Spirit AeroSystems delivered the 737 fuselage to Boeing's factory with the door plug installed. The plug door itself was constructed in Spirit's Malaysian factory, while the fuselage was assembled in Wichita, Kan. Boeing opened or removed the door plug after the 737 MAX 9 jet's fuselage arrived at the plane maker's Renton, Wash., factory for final assembly, The Wall Street Journal and other news outlets have reported.
They also pointed to paperwork and process lapses at Boeing's Renton, Wash., factory related to the company's work on the plug door. The National Transportation Safety Board has been conducting metallurgical analysis of the plug door but hasn't released the results of the testing. Laboratory tests might show whether the bolts were in place or not there at all. An update in the NTSB probe is expected as soon as this week. New evidence could later emerge before accident investigators reach final conclusions. It couldn't be determined how many people were involved with work on the plug door at Boeing's 737 factory. Supplier Spirit AeroSystems delivered the 737 fuselage to Boeing's factory with the door plug installed. The plug door itself was constructed in Spirit's Malaysian factory, while the fuselage was assembled in Wichita, Kan. Boeing opened or removed the door plug after the 737 MAX 9 jet's fuselage arrived at the plane maker's Renton, Wash., factory for final assembly, The Wall Street Journal and other news outlets have reported.
Re:This is an assumption (Score:5, Informative)
You can prove this. Boeing I think you should secure the bolts with Loctite.
AFAIK, these use castle nuts/bolts. That means the nuts have bumps on one edge through which a cotter pin slips, and the cotter pin then proceeds to go through a hole in the bolt, out the other side, and through more notches on the nut. This design makes it almost physically impossible for the nut to unscrew under pretty much any circumstances that don't involve someone removing the cotter pin or hitting it sideways with enough force to somehow shear off the cotter pin.
It is safe to say that the only way this could have happened would be if the cotter pins were missing, and from there, it's not a very big logical leap to assume that the bolts and nuts themselves were also probably missing, as a castle nut without a cotter pin through it would likely stand out as obviously wrong during any inspection, as would a bolt without a nut.
hungover + sloppy QA (Score:2)
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Never buy anything done on a Monday. [x.com]
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Gee, a Beatles hater if I've ever seen one.
AI Frankensteins Needed Neck Bolts. (Score:1)
Priorities man!
Okay ... (Score:4, Interesting)
Assuming this is accurate, how does a worker install this door plug, that requires several bolts to secure, and fail to also install the bolts? Smoke break? Shift change? If you're going to start a procedure, finish the procedure or leave a clear indication that it hasn't been finished, like a BIG red tag. On the other hand, kudos to the door plug design for staying on as long as it did w/o any bolts.
Re: Okay ... (Score:2, Troll)
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Why are you so scared of people that aren't white men?
Why do you think skin color or genitals have anything to do with properly installing some bolts properly, per the documented procedures?
If you can't answer the above questions without sounding like a bigger racist or mysogynist, then the problem isn't with diversity. The problem is with your own brain worms.
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You close the door when you're done using it because it doesn't seem like a good idea to leave it hanging open, but you don't bolt it because you expect the next shift to need to use it. The next shift manages with the regular door only, and nobody remembers the door wasn't properly reinstalled.
It's highly unlikely it was a mistake as dumb as wandering off and forgetting to install the bolts. Much more likely it was a subtle failure in the process somewhere.
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You close the door when you're done using it because it doesn't seem like a good idea to leave it hanging open, but you don't bolt it because you expect the next shift to need to use it. The next shift manages with the regular door only, and nobody remembers the door wasn't properly reinstalled.
It's highly unlikely it was a mistake as dumb as wandering off and forgetting to install the bolts. Much more likely it was a subtle failure in the process somewhere.
I can see that logic, though I don't think this "plug" is something that opens/closes like a regular door. It seems to be something that bolts on where a (emergency) door could be, but isn't for this particular configuration. If so, it's something that is either in place or not. In this case it seems it was in place but not bolted down.
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FALSE.
There are no hinges, no latch. It's literally a plug that bolts in place where an optional emergency exit door can be fitted based on how many seats are installed.
If it "simply opened and closed" then it would just be an emergency exit, and not a "door plug."
There's been mountains of shit written about this in the last month. I have no idea why you would post what you did.
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The hinges are indeed on the bottom. Not sure what you mean by saying "There are no hinges".
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There are definitely hinges. No latch, no, that is removed when turning the emergency door into a plug. That's the ONLY CHANGE done to the actual door. Everything else remains the same.
And then there are non load bearing bolts added to ensure it doesn't slide open, because the latch is removed.
Yes, lots has been written, most of it completely clueless, like this comment by you.
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It absolutely does not open like a normal aircraft door, because IT ISN'T A NORMAL AIRCRAFT DOOR.
Stop saying false things, this is the second time you've said the same fucking bullshit.
Just to really drive it home:
Door plugs are commonly used on U.S. commercial carriers to seal up optional extra doors when airlines choose to carry fewer passenger seats than the aircraft can hold. The plugs are supposed to be held in place by secure bolts and stop fittings. The plugs are lighter than an emergency door, can't be opened or closed, and don't have to be maintained or have an escape slide attached.
To sum up, the door cannot be opened without dismantling the interior around it to un-fasten the locking bolts that hold it in place, and when those locking bolts aren't present, the "hinges" are on the bottom and the panel is lighter and doesn't include any latching hardware, or anything to actua
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It is a perfectly normal aircraft door, for use in emergencies only. The ONLY THING that is altered when turning it into a plug is removing the handle and placing non load bearing bolts which keep it from sliding open.
You're saying the exact same thing I am, but for some reason you're all worked up about it. No idea why.
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The door does not open like a normal aircraft door. Not sure where you would have heard that it does.
It is an emergency exit, converted into a plug when the aircraft has the 189-seat configuration instead of the 220+ seats such as Lion flies.
To convert into a plug, the emergency handle is removed, and bolts are applied, two at top, two at bottom. As said above, the top bolts (and I think the bottom) have cotter pins.
The bottom hinges remain in place.
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If you remove the bolts, it opens like it would when used as an emergency door. No difference. The hinges are still in place. Only the handle is removed.
There are no other hinges than the bottom hinges.
Re:Okay ... (Score:5, Insightful)
The door plug can be removed in the factory in order to give another opening for loading and installing cabin equipment like seats, overhead bins, etc.
I could easily see them taking them out in the factory in order to have as much access to the interior as possible for personnel and material. And I could just as easily see that someone put the plug back in place to get it out of the way, and then a shift change happens and someone else doesn't realize the bolts aren't there because there wasn't a super obvious visual indicator applied (like a big red tag on the bolt holes, for example) and re-assembles the interior over the bolt-less plug.
It's a miracle that thing didn't blow out until it did if the bolts just weren't present and the inspections were just not performed.
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It's got hinges on the bottom.
I don't know how those hinges work, and I don't know whether Boeing's assembly procedures involve removing the door entirely or just opening it, but it's a possibility. Even if it were removed entirely, it's quite possible that some procedure involves it being reinstalled temporarily.
There was speculation originally that Spirit temporarily installed the doors for transport and then Boeing ended up not needing to remove them. That seems not to be the case, but the same sort of t
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Boeing apparently reduced the number of their QC inspectors in favour of more automated systems. There are rumours that they have documentation showing the bolts being removed, but never added. That would suggest that their electronic QC system was lacking a check.
Would a human inspector have caught it? Maybe. Human inspectors still have to be assigned to inspect things, so procedural oversights can compromise them too.
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Many assembly lines use computer vision to verify quality control as a product moves between stations.
This can be facilitated with color coding. For instance, the bolts can have orange heads, so the CV cameras can identify them more reliably.
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Many assembly lines use computer vision to verify quality control as a product moves between stations.
This can be facilitated with color coding. For instance, the bolts can have orange heads, so the CV cameras can identify them more reliably.
Sure, but some actual person must have known he/she hadn't installed the bolts.
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Sure, but some actual person must have known he/she hadn't installed the bolts.
Expecting humans to perform perfectly without any quality control is not an acceptable practice in aircraft assembly.
There should never be a single point of failure.
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Sure, but some actual person must have known he/she hadn't installed the bolts.
Expecting humans to perform perfectly without any quality control is not an acceptable practice in aircraft assembly.
There should never be a single point of failure.
Agreed, just noting that regardless of any subsequent QA, an actual person was in the loop somewhere and didn't install the bolts.
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But at the same time, there should have been a SECOND person to verify work was done properly.
Part of the huge cost of one of these airliners is the knowledge that there is proper testing and inspection at all phases. This is not Bob's Discount Airplanes! If it is not acceptable for a bicycle manufacturer to have these flaws then it should go without saying that it is not acceptable for the manufacture of a product that costs 100 million USD.
An example is on Toyota assembly lines, when any worker can pull t
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But at the same time, there should have been a SECOND person to verify work was done properly.
So... Turtles all the way down [wikipedia.org]. :-)
Re: Okay ... (Score:2)
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1.the bolts were not installed.
2. The bolts weren't checked.
I started being pedantic to razz paul_engr, but then realized maybe Boeing needs to be notified of this.
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This is a minimum of THREE failures.
1. The bolts were not installed.
2. The bolts weren't checked.
3. The process to sign off on delivering the plane did not discover the bolts weren't checked.
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Also, us humans have world class object detection sensors built in.
The wetware sensors only work when we're paying attention and obviously failed in this case.
Cameras don't get distracted.
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Re:Okay ... (Score:5, Informative)
I've worked tangentially to some of these sort of critical installation processes, and in all cases Ive been exposed to, the job uses "installation packages" for all consumables.
In other words, your task is "install door plug", you go grab the package for that task - that package comes with all the nuts, bolts, wires and other things involved in that specific single job. Sometimes even tools. You start with the right amount of items, and by the end of it you should be left with a defined quantity of specific things - and its all laid out in a tray. You sign the tray out, and you sign it back in.
If the task goes over a shift change, then theres a process for transferring the tray and its contents.
I know that this process is used in some aspects of aircraft manufacture, so if its being used here then it should be obvious to whomever is taking over that the job is incomplete - and an audit of the trays at the end of the day or completion of the airframe should show if the tray is missing or has additional items.
So the only way in which this can really screw up is through deliberate action.
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Thanks, that was interesting and informative about the (presumed) process. The last bit about "deliberative" was what was getting at ...
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You're right, and I know for a fact it was deliberate sabotage, and I know Satanism was involved, and I know this because cult members gloated about it to me directly, years in advance of this actual incident.
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(They also watch Slashdot to make sure I don't warn anyone.)
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I've worked tangentially to some of these sort of critical installation processes, and in all cases Ive been exposed to, the job uses "installation packages" for all consumables.
In other words, your task is "install door plug", you go grab the package for that task - that package comes with all the nuts, bolts, wires and other things involved in that specific single job. Sometimes even tools. You start with the right amount of items, and by the end of it you should be left with a defined quantity of specific things - and its all laid out in a tray. You sign the tray out, and you sign it back in.
If the task goes over a shift change, then theres a process for transferring the tray and its contents.
I know that this process is used in some aspects of aircraft manufacture, so if its being used here then it should be obvious to whomever is taking over that the job is incomplete - and an audit of the trays at the end of the day or completion of the airframe should show if the tray is missing or has additional items.
So the only way in which this can really screw up is through deliberate action.
This, as part of your job you're also meant to check if you've all the right parts in the correct quantities before starting the job.
However whilst procedures will be clear on how to avoid simple mistakes, I think the issue at Boeing is that procedure isn't being followed. Pressure from management to get more product out the door often leads to corners being cut, especially if management aren't connected to the manufacturing and/or simply don't care how it's done as long as it'd done. This is really, rea
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What I have gleaned from other accounts is that the process was tagged as "opening the door" rather than "removing the plug." With a door there are no bolts, so there was no QA process to inspect the bolts nor an automatically generated checklist to re-install the bolts. In no way is that a satisfactory excuse for the failure, but it is likely about what happened. The plug and interior trim were likely reinstalled without following any approved procedures.
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The "plug door" is just a normal door without a handle. It attaches and closes just fine with no bolts. The bolts are to secure it in the closed position, but that is where it normally wants to be anyway. Missing the bolts means it will stay closed, until the pressure differential finally works it open.
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No, it is not a normal door, it is an emergency exit door. Without a handle, in this case.
Re: Okay ... (Score:1)
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What about "clueless idiots" hired by "greedy and even more clueless management"? Also note that there should have been an inspection by a separate expert directly after installation and one later for final certification by yet another expert. Seems both these inspections were missing as well, doubtless to "improve profits".
Well, if you want to kill a large number of people, you really have to arrange a series of fuck-ups, so it makes sense.
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How about "Get this task done in 1 hour"?
There are several testimonials that workers at both Spirit and Boei
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Assuming this is accurate, how does a worker install this door plug, that requires several bolts to secure, and fail to also install the bolts? Smoke break? Shift change? If you're going to start a procedure, finish the procedure or leave a clear indication that it hasn't been finished, like a BIG red tag. On the other hand, kudos to the door plug design for staying on as long as it did w/o any bolts.
From what I read (from someone who claimed to be a employee) its because they found a way to avoid fully removing the door, so they didn't have to do that checklist item. Source (worth exactly what you paid for it): https://leehamnews.com/2024/01... [leehamnews.com]
Current Boeing employee here – I will save you waiting two years for the NTSB report to come out and give it to you for free: the reason the door blew off is stated in black and white in Boeings own records. It is also very, very stupid and speaks volumes about the quality culture at certain portions of the business.
A couple of things to cover before we begin:
Q1) Why should we believe you?
A) You shouldn’t, I’m some random throwaway account, do your own due diligence. Others who work at Boeing can verify what I say is true, but all I ask is you consider the following based on its own merits.
Q2) Why are you doing this?
A) Because there are many cultures at Boeing, and while the executive culture may be throughly compromised since we were bought by McD, there are many other people who still push for a quality product with cutting edge design. My hope is that this is the wake up call that finally forces the Board to take decisive action, and remove the executives that are resisting the necessary cultural changes to return to a company that values safety and quality above schedule.
With that out of the way why did the left hand (LH) mid-exit door plug blow off of the 737-9 registered as N704AL? Simple- as has been covered in a number of articles and videos across aviation channels, there are 4 bolts that prevent the mid-exit door plug from sliding up off of the door stop fittings that take the actual pressurization loads in flight, and these 4 bolts were not installed when Boeing delivered the airplane, our own records reflect this.
The mid-exit doors on a 737-9 of both the regular and plug variety come from Spirit already installed in what is supposed to be the final configuration and in the Renton factory, there is a job for the doors team to verify this “final” install and rigging meets drawing requirements. In a healthy production system, this would be a “belt and suspenders” sort of check, but the 737 production system is quite far from healthy, its a rambling, shambling, disaster waiting to happen. As a result, this check job that should find minimal defects has in the past 365 calendar days recorded 392 nonconforming findings on 737 mid fuselage door installations (so both actual doors for the high density configs, and plugs like the one that blew out). That is a hideously high and very alarming number, and if our quality system on 737 was healthy, it would have stopped the line and driven the issue back to supplier after the first few instances. Obviously, this did not happen. Now, on the incident aircraft this check job was completed on 31 August 2023, and did turn up discrepancies, but on the RH side door, not the LH that actually failed. I could blame the team for missing certain details, but given the enormous volume of defects they were already finding and fixing, it was inevitable something would slip through- and on the incident aircraft something did. I know what you are thinking at this point, but grab some popcorn because there is a plot twist coming up.
The next day on 1 September 2023 a different team (remember 737s flow through the factory quite quickly, 24 hours completely changes who is working on the plane) wrote up a finding for damaged and improperly installed rivets on the LH mid-exit door of the incident aircraft.
A brief aside to explain two of the record systems Boeing uses in production. The first is a program called CMES which stands for something boring and unimportant but what is important is that CMES is the sole authoritative repository for airplane build records (except on 787 which uses a different program). If a build record in CMES says something was built, inspected, and stamped in accordance with the drawing, then the airplane damn well better be per drawing. The second is a program called SAT, which also stands for something boring and unimportant but what is important is that SAT is *not* an authoritative records system, its a bullentin board where various things affecting the airplane build get posted about and updated with resolutions. You can think of it sort of like a idiots version of Slack or something. Wise readers will already be shuddering and wondering how many consultants were involved, because, yes SAT is a *management visibilty tool*. Like any good management visibilty tool, SAT can generate metrics, lots of metrics, and oh God do Boeing managers love their metrics. As a result, SAT postings are the primary topic of discussion at most daily status meetings, and the whole system is perceived as being extremely important despite, I reiterate, it holding no actual authority at all.
We now return to our incident aircraft, which was written up for having defective rivets on the LH mid-exit door. Now as is standard practice kn Renton (but not to my knowledge in Everett on wide bodies) this write-up happened in two forms, one in CMES, which is the correct venue, and once in SAT to “coordinate the response” but really as a behind-covering measure so the manager of the team that wrote it can show his boss he’s shoved the problem onto someone else. Because there are so many problems with the Spirit build in the 737, Spirit has teams on site in Renton performing warranty work for all of their shoddy quality, and this SAT promptly gets shunted into their queue as a warranty item. Lots of bickering ensues in the SAT messages, and it takes a bit for Spirit to get to the work package. Once they have finished, they send it back to a Boeing QA for final acceptance, but then Malicious Stupid Happens! The Boeing QA writes another record in CMES (again, the correct venue) stating (with pictures) that Spirit has not actually reworked the discrepant rivets, they *just painted over the defects*. In Boeing production speak, this is a “process failure”. For an A&P mechanic at an airline, this would be called “federal crime”.
Presented with evidence of their malfeasance, Spirit reopens the package and admits that not only did they not rework the rivets properly, there is a damaged pressure seal they need to replace (who damaged it, and when it was damaged is not clear to me). The big deal with this seal, at least according to frantic SAT postings, is the part is not on hand, and will need to be ordered, which is going to impact schedule, and (reading between the lines here) Management is Not Happy. 1/2
2/2
However, more critical for purposes of the accident investigation, the pressure seal is unsurprisingly sandwiched between the plug and the fuselage, and you cannot replace it without opening the door plug to gain access. All of this conversation is documented in increasingly aggressive posts in the SAT, but finally we get to the damning entry which reads something along the lines of “coordinating with the doors team to determine if the door will have to be removed entirely, or just opened. If it is removed then a Removal will have to be written.” Note: a Removal is a type of record in CMES that requires formal sign off from QA that the airplane been restored to drawing requirements.
If you have been paying attention to this situation closely, you may be able to spot the critical error: regardless of whether the door is simply opened or removed entirely, the 4 retaining bolts that keep it from sliding off of the door stops have to be pulled out. A removal should be written in either case for QA to verify install, but as it turns out, someone (exactly who will be a fun question for investigators) decides that the door only needs to be opened, and no formal Removal is generated in CMES (the reason for which is unclear, and a major process failure). Therefore, in the official build records of the airplane, a pressure seal that cannot be accessed without opening the door (and thereby removing retaining bolts) is documented as being replaced, but the door is never officially opened and thus no QA inspection is required.
This entire sequence is documented in the SAT, and the nonconformance records in CMES address the damaged rivets and pressure seal, but at no point is the verification job reopened, or is any record of removed retention bolts created, despite it this being a physical impossibility. Finally with Spirit completing their work to Boeing QAs satisfaction, the two rivet-related records in CMES are stamped complete, and the SAT closed on 19 September 2023. No record or comment regarding the retention bolts is made.
I told you it was stupid.
So, where are the bolts? Probably sitting forgotten and unlabeled (because there is no formal record number to label them with) on a work-in-progress bench, unless someone already tossed them in the scrap bin to tidy up.
There’s lots more to be said about the culture that enabled this to happened, but thats the basic details of what happened, the NTSB report will say it in more elegant terms in a few years.
Aaron Z
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> how does a worker install this door plug, that requires several bolts to secure, and fail to also install the bolts?
From a technical standpoint (as I understand it), these bolts didn't hold the plug in place as such. They're more like a way to prevent the plug from sliding out after it's been "clipped" into place. You could run at that plug (without bolts) and it wouldn't budge - so unless you know about the bolts, you could conceivably not know that *something* more needed to be done.
From a process po
At least 1, probably many more, head needs to roll (Score:2)
That in a nutshell is why Boeing sucks today, and why it's going to take decades to get their reputation back.
look at the case of Day Davis safety at the factor (Score:2)
look at the case of Day Davis safety at the factory is pushed a away to keep the line moving and when you have an rush mandate things get skipped
Original report is here - door had been removed fo (Score:5, Informative)
Here is the original leak by the original Boeing employee whistleblower. It explains exactly what happened at the factory in detail for this particular plane / how the mishap exactly occurred point by point.
https://leehamnews.com/2024/01... [leehamnews.com]
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Thank you, this is good stuff.
One point puzzles me where he says "The mid-exit doors on a 737-9 of both the regular and plug variety come from Spirit already installed in what is supposed to be the final configuration"
My understanding is those doors are in place but bolts are not tightened. They are not "flight-ready". The assumption is the team want to remove some or all the doors temporarily to ease the task of bringing in all the internals to the fuselage such as seats.
So it is the job of the final team
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My understanding is those doors are in place but bolts are not tightened. They are not "flight-ready".
What is your source for this?
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hell yeah love that the republicans are onboard with big government now
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Are you trolling? WTF would the Tinted One do different to solve this?
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Also, Dude, "The Tinted One" is not the preferred nomenclature. Orange Messiah, please.
Ouch (Score:1)
I’d still fly any boeing jet that’s cleared to fly, cause I’m more likely to die of a stroke walking from the departure area to the gate than die in a crash. But still
Critical processes require documentation (Score:4, Interesting)
Boeing should have a process in place to document every torque electronically with networked hand tools. The unit shouldn't be cleared for subsequent steps of production without a successful torque in their logs. Failure to complete these torques should only be overridden by a superior who documents their entire reason for clearing the failed torque (typically, electronic torques only allow a few attempts with the designated hand tool before failure to avoid stripping out holes due to crossthreads or other problems). That's the standard with a lot of automotive manufacturers, so that if there is a bad bolt somewhere, you can figure out who installed the bolt on which day and who may have overridden the torque requirement (where applicable). Instant accountability.
Plane manufacturing is even more difficult and potentially deadly for customers if it's done wrong. The need for proper documentation of torque logs is there. Does Boeing not do this?
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You mean like this :
https://www.tmz.com/2024/01/22... [tmz.com]
But in this case, it seems the airplane was still certified to fly as only 4 out of 119 were missing and they seem to not reduce integrity of the aircraft.
Got articles from a few other sources if you look it up.
Someone explain how this mess occured (Score:2)
Boeing and their supplier Spirit Aerospace were using different quality management systems. That particular door failed quality control at Spirit and they need to fix it on the Boeing side. However, there's direct translation of the issue across the systems and they use the wrong procedure to document the fact that they have to open the door to fix a seal issue, which introduced other problem.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?... [youtube.com]
good diagram of the door plug/bolts (Score:3)
diagram:
https://images.seattletimes.co... [seattletimes.com]
article:
https://www.seattletimes.com/b... [seattletimes.com]
the summary of the article is that someone claiming to be a current boeing employee posted a whistleblowey account on a forum which says that boeing's own internal documentation system points strongly to the bolts (which are not the primary load-bearing item holding the door plug in place) having never been installed.
Door seal (Score:2)
The reason that this door plug was worked on at all in Renton was because it came from Spirit with the gasket"seal. improperly installed.
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FWIW - I know plenty of incompetent white guys who manage to keep their jobs for decades thanks to unions. The amount of fuck-ups I've seen over the years in safety sensitive places is astonishing.
Not saying black people are prone to mistakes too - but it's not only them.
So Boeing does not even have decent work logs? (Score:2)
"It couldn't be determined how many people were involved with work on the plug door at Boeing's 737 factory." sounds like they should not be trusted with working on a coffee-maker, much less an airplane. There is really no hope f fixing that utterly defective company now.
Eddie Murphy tapping forehead meme (Score:2)
Can't have loose bolts, if there are no bolts...
the root cause (Score:2)
Dare we assume there was some incompetence at Boeing?
Every action has a cause.
In some cases multiple causes.
So too here.
Under these circumstances
Can we feel safe?
Knowing what we know.
Safety first please.
The root cause is not missing bolts... (Score:2)
The root cause of all this mess is the way that "do it fast" is more important than "do it right" at Boeing and its contractors.
The FAA needs to stop giving Boeing a pass on this and force them to stop prioritizing speed and cost over doing things properly (and having proper QA in place to verify that things are done properly)