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Air India Chief Says Preliminary Crash Report Raises Fresh Questions 42

Air India's chief executive urged staff to avoid drawing premature conclusions about what caused one of the airline's Boeing triangle jets to crash last month, after a preliminary investigation ruled out mechanical or maintenance issues, turning attention to the pilots' actions. WSJ: Campbell Wilson told staff that the probe into the crash was "far from over," according to an internal memo, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, in which he set out some of the findings of a report issued by India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau at the end of last week.

Wilson's memo didn't mention one of the AAIB's findings: that the airplane's fuel-control switches had been turned off one by one, seconds after takeoff, starving both engines of fuel. The switches, which sit between the two seats in the cockpit, were turned back on about 10 seconds later, but the engines apparently couldn't fully restart and gain thrust fast enough, the report said.

The crash of the London-bound Boeing 787 Dreamliner killed all but one of the 242 passengers and crew on board, as well as 19 people on the ground, when the plane slammed into a residential area beyond the airport in the Indian city of Ahmedabad. In the memo, Wilson said "over the past 30 days, we've seen an ongoing cycle of theories, allegations, rumours and sensational headlines, many of which have later been disproven."

Air India Chief Says Preliminary Crash Report Raises Fresh Questions

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  • I don't see anything new, compared with the previous story about this crash.

    https://tech.slashdot.org/stor... [slashdot.org]

  • I think I remember the angle of attack sensor being the pilot's fault for a while until two or three planes crashed
    • Well ultimately it still was the pilots fault as the pilot wasn't aware which system was malfunctioning, how the system worked, and didn't take appropriate action to correct for the problem. That is the reason why the FAA required recertification of all pilot training programs for each individual airline before allowing that airline to resume flying their 737 MAX 8s. See Appendix A https://www.faa.gov/documentLi... [faa.gov]

      Yeah the hardware was fucking rubbish, but there ultimately still was an element of pilot erro

      • Re: (Score:1, Informative)

        by Uberbah ( 647458 )

        Yes, it's the pilots fault for not having ESP training to know Boeing was corrupt, greedy and putting out faulty products and lying about retraining for profit. Inset eyeroll emoji.

      • It was never the fault of the pilot.
        Boeing specifically sold the MAX as not requiring training for the MCAS- both in advertising, and regulatory requirements.

        A pilot that was not required to be trained due to corruption of the regulatory regime has not made an error, short of being able to divine truth from corporate chicken bones.
  • What the hell is a "triangle jet"? I see MSN edited the story to remove the word "triangle"...
  • 08:08:42 Engine 1 fuel switch flips to CUTOFF
    08:08:43 Engine 2 fuel switch flips to CUTOFF

    A question: What is the the granularity of those times given? I get the impression that it is one second, but there is quite a difference between
    08:08:42.999 Engine 1 fuel switch flips to CUTOFF
    08:08:43.000 Engine 2 fuel switch flips to CUTOFF
    and
    08:08:42.000 Engine 1 fuel switch flips to CUTOFF
    08:08:43.999 Engine 2 fuel switch flips to CUTOFF
    One of those is essentially "simultaneously" and the other pretty much two se

    • 10ths of a second means significantly more data to be recorded, especially for continuously measured values. But really what is the outcome difference you're looking for? If this were a purely software error then the timing wouldn't be 1 second off (or even 1ms off). 1 second granularity is enough to tell us they changed state mechanically, whether by hand or otherwise. What additional info are you postulating to see here?

      • Are these values "continuously measured" or is the logging event driven?
        As to what the difference between simultaneous and two seconds, the "simultaneous" end of the scale is a clear indication that the switch locking mechanism was broken.

    • They don't give time stamps for the fuel cut-offs.
      Rather, the preliminary report says:

      immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec.

      The granularity for the switches might be bad, but the engine core speed is 0.125 seconds, so they should be able to infer if there was a meaningful gap between the deactivations.

  • by david.emery ( 127135 ) on Monday July 14, 2025 @03:01PM (#65520284)

    See https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob... [europa.eu] That's an old advisory (December 2018) that applies across a variety of Boeing aircraft. It should have been the case that all operators did and documented the required inspections.

    Model 717-200 airplanes; Model 737-700, -700C, -800, and -900ER
    series airplanes; Model 737-8 and -9 airplanes; Model 747-400, -400D, -400F, -8, and -8F series
    airplanes; Model 757-200, -200CB, -200PF, and -300 series airplanes; Model 767-200, -300, -
    300F, -400ER, and -2C series airplanes; Model 787-8, -9, and -10 airplanes; Model MD-11 and
    MD-11F airplanes; and Model MD-90-30 airplanes of the potential for disengagement of the fuel
    control switch locking feature.

    1) Inspect the locking feature of the fuel control switch to ensure its engagement. While the
    airplane is on the ground, check whether the fuel control switch can be moved between the
    two positions without lifting up the switch. If the switch can be moved without lifting it up,
    the locking feature has been disengaged and the switch should be replaced at the earliest
    opportunity.
    2) For Boeing Model 737-700, -700C, -800, and -900ER series airplanes and Boeing Model 737-
    8 and -9 airplanes delivered with a fuel control switch having P/N 766AT613-3D: Replace the
    fuel control switch with a switch having P/N 766AT614-3D, which includes an improved
    locking feature.

    It's my understanding that part of the cockpit was recovered pretty much intact, so I'm sure there'll be forensic investigation into those switches.

    • by sirket ( 60694 ) on Monday July 14, 2025 @04:38PM (#65520582)

      The 787 switch is slightly different from the 737 switches and there have been no known cases of them being tripped accidentally on a 787.

      Additionally, the control stand on that specific 787 was supposedly replaced a couple of times over its life so it likely would have received updated switches already.

      Plus defective switches would not explain why one switch was slipped and then the other.

    • From the preliminary report

      "As per the information from Air India, the suggested inspections were not carried out as the SAIB was advisory and not mandatory. The scrutiny of maintenance records revealed that the throttle control module was replaced on VT-ANB in 2019 and 2023. However, the reason for the replacement was not linked to the fuel control switch. There has been no defect reported pertaining to the fuel control switch since 2023 on VT-ANB."

      So the inspection recommended by the 2018 advisory you

  • This was not this plane's first flight. For both to have a problem at the same time, but never before, is highly unlikely.
  • At that particular time after take-off. I was listening to NPR story this weekend. Airline investigator was talking about how after a particular velocity on the runway, the jet must take off there is no room to abort. The plane in question was past that point and in the air. Also known that the jet could not get lift from gliding, i.e., one engine has to have fuel to get lift. Why allow both fuel switches to be shut off at this point? Surely modern craft has so many safety lockouts yet not this one.
    • Why allow both fuel switches to be shut off at this point?

      Fire? From my perspecitve (non-technical, non-aeornautical) you should not want something like this to be locked down. You should always allow for something unexpected to occur which would necessitate moving these switches in all circumstances. Locking them down would seem to deprive the pilot/co-pilot the ability to react to a situation.
    • Actually, it might be quite sensible to have some sort of interlock that causes the fuel switch to be locked in the RUN position while the power lever for that engine is at the full thrust position. Then needing to turn fuel off due to a "Fire" situation becomes a training procedure issue. i.e. In case of engine fire, step 1. Identify which engine is on fire. Step 2. Pull Power Lever back to idle. Step 3. Fuel switch to "Off". I can't think of a good reason why you would want to keep the power lever forwar
  • What is that...?

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