US Investigators Say Video Footage Overwritten of Work On Boeing Jet's Door Plug 114
The head of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) says investigators still do not know who worked on a Boeing 737 MAX 9 door plug involved in a Jan. 5 Alaska Airlines midair emergency and that video footage was overwritten. From a report: NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy said in a letter to senators that investigators sought security camera footage when the door plug was opened and closed in September but were informed the material was overwritten. "The absence of those records will complicate the NTSB's investigation moving forward," Homendy said. "To date, we still do not know who performed the work to open, reinstall, and close the door plug on the accident aircraft."
The NTSB said previously four key bolts were missing from the door plug that blew out on the plane. Last week, Homendy said she spoke to Boeing CEO David Calhoun "and asked for the names of the people who performed the work. He stated he was unable to provide that information and maintained that Boeing has no records of the work being performed." Boeing said it "will continue supporting this investigation in the transparent and proactive fashion we have supported all regulatory inquiries into this accident. We have worked hard to honor the rules about the release of investigative information." A Boeing official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters the planemaker standard practice is to overwrite security videos after 30 days.
The NTSB said previously four key bolts were missing from the door plug that blew out on the plane. Last week, Homendy said she spoke to Boeing CEO David Calhoun "and asked for the names of the people who performed the work. He stated he was unable to provide that information and maintained that Boeing has no records of the work being performed." Boeing said it "will continue supporting this investigation in the transparent and proactive fashion we have supported all regulatory inquiries into this accident. We have worked hard to honor the rules about the release of investigative information." A Boeing official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters the planemaker standard practice is to overwrite security videos after 30 days.
This is nothing for them (Score:1)
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Willing to kill, have killed on mass-scale, willing to kill some more.
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Re:This is nothing for them (Score:4, Informative)
Most likely the camera was set to record for 30 days or less. Almost no one saves all the video of an assembly line, it would be prohibitively expensive. I worked in physical security for 17 years, well over 80% of the tens of thousands of cameras I programmed recorded about a gigabyte a day, Almost always they were programmed to record 2-4 weeks, at low resolution and a very low frame rate. If they didn't need it for long term tracking it was overwritten.
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Let me introduce you to the IBM TS4500. You are looking at around $2 per camera for an entire years worth of footage. A single tape library could store a years footage from over 850,000 cameras. Tell me you don't know about long term enterprise storage without telling me don't know. Off the top of my head to have that replicated at two sites for good measure, all in less than $10 million including a couple PB of disk cache.
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Let me introduce you to the IBM TS4500. You are looking at around $2 per camera for an entire years worth of footage. A single tape library could store a years footage from over 850,000 cameras. Tell me you don't know about long term enterprise storage without telling me don't know. Off the top of my head to have that replicated at two sites for good measure, all in less than $10 million including a couple PB of disk cache.
Oh, I'm sure it could, but with that IBM brand the acquisition costs itself is prohibitively expensive, I'll bet. Our camera system keeps 2 weeks of footage and is then overwritten. Like us, most companies are not going to spend money on a tape library just for video footage, unless they are a security company. When the footage was created at the time, it probably was not anticipated that this event would occur and was allowed to age off the system. Now if it was created and a couple of days later was e
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Security departments are almost always very low on the budgetary pecking order, frequently saddled with cast off computers in a converted storage space for monitoring. The possibility of purchasing a high end dedicated tape drive system just for recording security video for anywhere but perhaps a casino is close to nonexistent. Even at AWS, where we managed security for the biggest pile of storage imaginable, we had to pay for all our video storage and it was the single largest thing on our budget.
Re: This is nothing for them (Score:2)
It sounds like an ordinary ring buffer. Everything older than 30 days will be overwritten. That's super common. Nobody anywhere ever holds on to security footage indefinitely unless an incident occurred and was discovered during the time period of the buffer, in which case it's simply copied and retained elsewhere.
no records??? (Score:5, Insightful)
OK, I can accept security footage being overwritten after 30 days. Probably not the best idea, but I can see it. But no records at all? There was no work order? No documentation that this was performed? Do they just have random people show up and work on the planes and don't even write down there names???
Re:no records??? (Score:5, Informative)
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In manufacturing, everything little thing is documented
I'm curious if it is a normal part of production to remove and reinstall the door plug. It sounds like this was some kind of exception during the manufacturing that it needed to be removed after it was already installed. That could have been done by someone not qualified to work on that specific aspect of the plane, and not properly documented as well since it had already been assembled.
Ironically this could be related to quality control and inspection, where an inspector had the door removed for some reaso
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If it's not part of the normal procedure, it should not only be documented, it should be documented in triplicate.
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My understanding is that the supplier, Spirit, delivers the fuselage to Boeing with the the door plug installed. Then it is sometimes opened or removed when installing finishes & furnishings. Also, that the supplier does not use the official production log system that Boeing has, but uses a separate, less formal one. And opening a door plug is not the same as just opening a door.
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As I read the story, actually removing the plug would require a record and an inspection, so they just cracked it open a bit to avoid paperwork and inspection
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The way I heard it reported in various aviation sources is that if you *remove* the door you have to have the reinstallation inspected and signed off on, so they choose it *almost* remove the door so that they could skip that inspection. It's one of those things you do when you want to avoid *technically* violating a rule but you don't actually care about what the rule is supposed to do.
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Iâ(TM)d think they would want them to assist in prosecuting work accident / safety failure issues.. there isnâ(TM)t a huge expectation of privacy on a factory floor.
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*Citation needed.
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Unions don't allow cameras on car factory floors at all.
Do you have a source for this statement? I can't find anything supporting your statement with my Google fu.
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Unions don't allow cameras on car factory floors at all.
Do you have a source for this statement? I can't find anything supporting your statement with my Google fu.
That's because there is none. By law cameras are allowed on manufacturing floors for safety and manufacturing reasons.
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That's because there is none. By law cameras are allowed on manufacturing floors for safety and manufacturing reasons.
Which law is that? Because there are none in any North American unionized general assembly plants. I think there *might* be a couple in the robotic paint bays, and metrology cameras for final inspection, but that's it on the inside.
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If that is your stance, show your evidence. I was unable to find any such evidence on the UAW site and since they do not list the full text of the recent Ford agreement, I can't look at what the contract says. The word camera does not appear in any previous agreement, nor in any of the changed pages of the most recent agreement.
As a rule, employers are allowed to use cameras to monitor their workplace for loss prevention, security and safety, and employee utilization of company time and resources [mosheslaw.com]. State l
Experience (Score:2)
I know a dozen people who have spent tens of thousands of hours, collectively, building out car factories for the big three. There are no cameras in unionized auto factories. I don't know what else to tell you.
The way the car factories are run is different than most other manufacturing. Nobody outside of Detroit really understands it, and not that many people inside Detroit understand it either. You have insanely complex engineering, politics, history and economics colliding with each other. It leads to a l
Source (Score:1)
Half my family works in big three car factories.
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I work in manufacturing. Not automotive, but related. That's not accurate, at least not universally. It's true, cameras are usually not allowed by visitors and such when you take a tour, but I find it extremely unlikely that cameras aren't used almost everywhere if for no better reason than safety.
Automotive (Score:2)
It's a restriction in the UAW organized automotive factories. No cameras aimed at workers while they work. There are exceptions for security cameras on gates, metrology, and I think robot-only areas.
You can take a tour of the Ford River Rouge factory in Dearborn. You can walk around catwalks and watch them build Ford F-150s below. Go find a camera on the plant floor. They aren't there.
Re: Automotive (Score:2)
your right, no union allows cameras on workers. The fear is that you might catch them doing / not doing something.
You can camera, monitor machines to your hearts content. Just don't take a picture of a worker.
Re:no records??? (Score:5, Insightful)
I don't recommend looking into how modern chicken plants are run. They stopped using government inspectors years ago and replaced them with ones picked by the industry, just like Boeing.
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Boeing talked the government into self certifying lots of things. Here we are with pieces that fall off and planes that fly you into the ground because of cost cutting and buggy software.
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Boeing saved costs by not keeping any records. Now without a clear person to blame, Boeing can shrug and carry on business as usual. Bonuses all around for the suits!
Re:no records??? (Score:5, Insightful)
Well, the right reaction would be the suits going to prison for something like this.
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Sounds like it. Sounds like they should to be allowed to make toys as they may end up killing some kids. Things are deeply rotten at Boeing.
My money is on them having had those records, but they deleted them because they are utterly damning.
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Current Boeing employee here – I will save you waiting two years for the NTSB report to come out and give it to you for free: the reason the door blew off is stated in black and white in Boeings own records. It is also very, very stupid and speaks volumes about the quality culture at certain portions of the business.
With that out of the way why did the left hand (LH) mid-exit door plug blow off of the 737-9 registered as N704AL? Simple- as has been covered in a number of articles and videos across aviation channels, there are 4 bolts that prevent the mid-exit door plug from sliding up off of the door stop fittings that take the actual pressurization loads in flight, and these 4 bolts were not installed when Boeing delivered the airplane, our own records reflect this.
As a result, this check job that should find minimal defects has in the past 365 calendar days recorded 392 nonconforming findings on 737 mid fuselage door installations (so both actual doors for the high density configs, and plugs like the one that blew out). That is a hideously high and very alarming number, and if our quality system on 737 was healthy, it would have stopped the line and driven the issue back to supplier after the first few instances.
Now, on the incident aircraft this check job was completed on 31 August 2023, and did turn up discrepancies, but on the RH side door, not the LH that actually failed. I could blame the team for missing certain details, but given the enormous volume of defects they were already finding and fixing, it was inevitable something would slip through- and on the incident aircraft something did. I know what you are thinking at this point, but grab some popcorn because there is a plot twist coming up.
The next day on 1 September 2023 a different team (remember 737s flow through the factory quite quickly, 24 hours completely changes who is working on the plane) wrote up a finding for damaged and improperly installed rivets on the LH mid-exit door of the incident aircraft.
Because there are so many problems with the Spirit build in the 737, Spirit has teams on site in Renton performing warranty work for all of their shoddy quality, and this SAT promptly gets shunted into their queue as a warranty item. Lots of bickering ensues in the SAT messages, and it takes a bit for Spirit to get to the work package. Once they have finished, they send it back to a Boeing QA for final acceptance, but then Malicious Stupid Happens! The Boeing QA writes another record in CMES (again, the correct venue) stating (with pictures) that Spirit has not actually reworked the discrepant rivets, they *just painted over the defects*. In Boeing production speak, this is a “process failure”. For an A&P mechanic at an airline, this would be called “federal crime”.
finally we get to the damning entry which reads something along the lines of “coordinating with the doors team to determine if the door will have to be removed entirely, or just opened. If it is removed then a Removal will have to be written.” Note: a Removal is a type of record in CMES that requires formal sign off from QA that the airplane been restored to drawing requirements.
If you have been paying attention to this situation closely, you may be able to spot the critical error: regardless of whether the door is simply opened or removed entirely, the 4 retaining bolts that keep it from sliding off of the door stops have to be pulled out. A removal should be written in either case for QA to verify install, but as it turns out, someone (exactly who will be a fun question for investigators) decides that the door only needs to be opened, and no formal Removal is generated in CMES (the reason for which is unclear, and a major process failure). Therefore, in the official build records of the airplane, a pressure seal that cannot be accessed without opening the door (and thereby removing retaining bolts) is documented as being replaced, but the door is never officially opened and thus no QA inspection is required.
Sounds like cutting corners (Score:2)
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OK, I can accept security footage being overwritten after 30 days. Probably not the best idea, but I can see it. But no records at all? There was no work order? No documentation that this was performed? Do they just have random people show up and work on the planes and don't even write down there names???
Calling this video "security footage" as if this was a 7-11 is likely a serious error leading to trivializing what happened here. These cameras were filming safety related work in progress, not a building perimeter, or customers walking into a store. They were documenting important safety related work and since Amazon Deep Glacier storage costs $1/month/TB compressed video could have been stored for years at trivial cost to Boeing. And they could store it themselves even more cheaply -- its a very big compa
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Yep. What Boeing is saying has gone past unbelievable into unthinkable. Even in general aviation everything gets logged.
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OK, I can accept security footage being overwritten after 30 days.
Not me. I accept that maybe unremarkable records might be overwritten, but the instant there's a major event (like a mid-flight plug blowout), you as a matter of policy pull all related records to a special "do not delete til years after forensics over" bucket. That this didn't happen has swayed me that there is a coverup actively happening.
sue me. (Score:3)
my perception is boeing is shady as fuck!
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Comment removed (Score:5, Informative)
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Well other than the fact that Gulfstream is not the only private jet company, I sincerely hope they aren't flying Boeing BBJ MAX8s. It is after all nothing more than the 737 MAX with the added benefit of having less maintenance done to it to save on costs.
I wish I was kidding.
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Decades ago, they did. It was a gesture to their customers, "We're giving you business".
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I wonder what kind of planes the Boeing executives fly in. Airbus?
Gulfstream.
You didn't think they flew commercial with the dirty plebs, did you?
Hence I would punish Boeing Execs by forcing them to fly economy class in their own aircraft every day.
Gaol 'em (Score:2)
Boeing executives should be charged with manslaughter and imprisoned for their crimes in a federal pound-em-in-the-ass facility. That'll put the fear or of God into the next bunch of money-worshipping pencil necks who're tempted to swap safety for profit.
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No one died in the "door plug" incident. Someone dying is an essential element of a "manslaughter" charge.
Perhaps there was a potential for death. But if you're in the development arena, do you think you should go to prison because you missed, for example, a defect during a code review and the defect could, theoretically, have caused a death?
Perhaps something like not properly recovering from a SQL insert failure caused by a deadlock in the underlying database in very rare circumstances resulting in the ins
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> No one died in the "door plug" incident.
346 people died in two separate 737 Max crashes because of Boeing's shitty management. Those deaths are a direct result of executive decisions. It was pure dumb luck that nobody died in the Air Alaska incident.
The 787-9 flight which suddenly lost all control and all instrumentation for 30 seconds is a human tragedy waiting to happen. Again, due to Boeing's slipshod approach to safety.
Those executives should be charged and imprisoned. Anything less, is enablin
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The 787-9 flight which suddenly lost all control and all instrumentation for 30 seconds is a human tragedy waiting to happen.
There has been absolutely nothing released (that I could find, anyway) indicating what you said there is accurate. They have an anecdote from a passenger repeating what they heard from the pilot. That's the extent of the public information so far. I'm not arguing that Boeing doesn't suck, they absolutely do, but that doesn't mean we can just make shit up about them.
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They need to pierce the corporate veil for the deaths on the MAX flights.
Re:Gaol 'em (Score:5, Insightful)
The post under discussion was about the door plug incident.
As far as the 787 flight which, according to a passenger relaying what the pilot supposedly told them, lost instrumentation for 30 seconds. At this time we have little idea what actually happened. This incident may have been the result of a maintenance failure (the airlines are responsible for maintenance once Boeing turns the plane over), a "black swan" event caused by failure of a component that was fully tested and met all design standards, or any of a number of other things. I'd wait for the report from the relevant regulatory agency before jumping to conclusions.
Just because a Boeing airliner has a problem does not mean it's necessarily Boeing's fault.
Yes, Boeing does appear to need to tighten up its QA (although, driving to the airport is still far, far, far more dangerous than flying on a Boeing airliner operated by a US domestic carrier) to meet the hyper high standards modern "first world" air travel is held to. That, however, does not imply criminal behavior on the part of anyone.
There are always cost/benefit tradeoffs.
For example, requiring that every seat have a weight sensor and, if there's a butt in the seat, and the seat belt has been unfastened for more than 20 seconds an alarm is raised and the passenger is guilty of a crime would probably have prevented almost all the injuries on that "loss of instrumentation" flight -- yet, we are not willing to go to that expense or imposition and merely "recommend" rather than "require" that passengers keep their seat belts on whenever seated.
For another example, a 777 has three main hydraulic systems and each of them have some form of safeguards even within them. Any TWO can completely fail and the plane can still be safely flown and landed (with additional effort by the pilots and, for example, likely a less silky smooth touchdown). However if some day all three fail due to a very very rare, but possible, combination of failures (each of which is known to be possible) chance and results in a crash with deaths, would you think Boeing execs should be criminally charged because they didn't redesign the 777 to have ten redundant hydraulic systems (resulting in greater weight and maintenance costs and higher ticket prices)?
For that matter, do you think every driver who causes a fatal accident because they failed to anticipate a patch of "black ice" on a bridge in otherwise clear weather with no ice/snow on the "normal" roads should be convicted of manslaughter and imprisoned? After all, careful study of the weather, bridge construction, shade, thermal transfer, etc would have prepared the person to expect "black ice" and failing to do that study before embarking on their trip is what caused the accident. After all, people without advanced engineering knowledge shouldn't be driving.
Much as people hate to believe it, "good enough" applies to airplanes as well as everything else in life.
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Much as people hate to believe it, "good enough" applies to airplanes as well as everything else in life.
I used to work in Naval Aviation Maintenance.
I do not want you, or anyone else who thinks like you, to be ANYWHERE near an airplane other than as a passenger.
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I used to work in Naval Aviation Maintenance.
I do not want you, or anyone else who thinks like you, to be ANYWHERE near an airplane other than as a passenger.
If you worked in maintenance then you were the direct result of an engineer's assessment of what is "good enough". There's no such thing as zero risk. The design (and your maintenance) of planes is subject to quite detailed statistical analysis designed to bring the risk down to a "good enough" tolerable level.
In your very industry the people who design your planes and design the maintenance regime use "deaths per flight hour" in simple cases, and a complex F-N curve describing number of incidents per year
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There is room for a clear distinction between accidents on the one hand and deleting records for a coverup on the other.
There is also room to tell the difference between good faith screwups and deliberate neglect. Like when you retaliate against a QA person for reporting problems. https://www.seattletimes.com/b... [seattletimes.com]
One of the reasons aviation was so safe for so long was indeed that people could own up to mistakes without going to prison. What Boeing has been up to appears to be well beyond mistakes.
What you are discussing is circumstantial (Score:2)
Unreal (Score:5, Interesting)
I was an avionics technician in the Marine Corps. All of the work I did was documented, checked and signed off by a CDI (collateral duty inspector, a certification I eventually obtained as well), and then checked again and signed off by QA. Furthermore we needed to write in detail every maintenance action we did into a pass-down log for the incoming crew. Those pass-down logs would then be saved when they were full. It is mind boggling to me that Boeing has no records of this maintenance action being performed. In fact it sounds like a cover-up to me knowing that all of this documentation is a must by the FAA.
Re:Unreal (Score:5, Informative)
Back when I did this work, the serial number of the torque wrench used was part of the record so one could check its calibration records as well.... so if an 'accident' like this occurred you could point to all the calibratable tools used and they each had a pedigree as to their trustworthiness.
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Yep, this was done for everything. We had to carry FOD (foreign object damage) bags with us and every little piece of scrap wire, such as safety wire, had to be placed into those bags and accounted for by the CDI and QA. All tools used were inventoried before the maintenance action and then inventoried again after the maintenance action by serial number, again checked by the CDI and QA. It's insane to think that Boeing doesn't have these controls in place as well.
Comment removed (Score:5, Interesting)
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This video by MentorPilot is MUCH better in completely addressing this specific incident
https://www.youtube.com/watch?... [youtube.com]
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They used to. Boeing is a case study in what happens when you let Next Quarter MBA assholes run an enterprise
No, the MBA's just were doing what they'd been taught to. The government is to blame, for dropping the oversight. When the cat's away, the mice will play.
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Yes, this is 'American Capitalism' where corporations are allowed to distort the free market by socialising the cost of their actions across the population. This prevents anyone from successfully competing against them if they are restricted to doing things correctly. What surprises me is how many people who think of themselves as conservative support that form of socialist subsidisation of corporations.
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I work in a heavy equipment/semi truck shop. The torque wrench used on the wheel lugs is cal'd every 6 months, and the details are recorded. Similar to aviation work, everything is logged. 80,000 lbs at 65 mph causes a lot of oh shit in a hurry if something isn't right. At best its just massively expensive. Cal and double checking is absolutely necessary for everyone's safety, for our company reputation, and for the insurance lawyers.
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> It is mind boggling to me that Boeing has no records of this maintenance action being performed.
Boeing had a whistleblower murdered. Do you seriously think anything they say can be trusted right now? This company is run by criminals.
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Indeed. Incidentally, that is pretty much how any real passenger airplane manufacturer does things. Boeing is either an impostor these days or they deleted those records intentionally because they are utterly damning. Well, maybe both.
You weren't in a union (Score:1)
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Keeping records is a liability (Score:3, Insightful)
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Not Keeping them Worse (Score:2)
Why would anyone expect a company to keep records which may represent a significant liability in the future?
Because not keeping those records is an even bigger liability. If they did have records then at least some of the blame attaches to those who did the work. Without any records not only does all the blame attach to management but the lack of proper record keeping is more evidence of their incompetence.
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Why would anyone expect a company to keep records which may represent a significant liability in the future?
Because not keeping those records is an even bigger liability. If they did have records then at least some of the blame attaches to those who did the work. Without any records not only does all the blame attach to management but the lack of proper record keeping is more evidence of their incompetence.
And not just blame but when a detailed cause of a failure like this is discovered, a specific corrective action can be created. We screwed up is bad, we screwed up and we don't know how is worse, we screwed up and identified the reason and are fixing it can help keep a companies reputation intact.
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Why would anyone expect a company to keep records which may represent a significant liability in the future?
Records are only a liability if the work you are doing is a liability. If the work you are doing meets the minimum requirements then records are assets to you which shield you from liability as they can demonstrate you made a reasonable attempt.
No your system is not designed to foster such behaviour. America and the west has literally millions of companies who have no problem doing things properly. The fact of the matter is such poor record keeping is rare enough that when it occurs it actually makes the ne
Simple Solution (Score:2)
Decertify EVERY new Boeing aircraft until they get their shit together.
CCTV Rention (Score:2)
While not keeping detailed documentation during assembly process is a bad practice, especially for jet airliner manufacturers, are they actually breaking any laws?
Comment removed (Score:5, Interesting)
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There's also the idea of keeping things longer when you know they might be needed. It would be like a legal hold for email.
SLASHDOT IS BROKEN (Score:1)
Who is the genius who put the try google cloud advertisement over the login button?
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Your browser is broken. SLASHDOT is best viewed with the latest version of G$$gle Chrome. All hail the new Internet Explorer!
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Who is the genius who doesn't know about ad blockers?
Slashdot is broken AF, though. It USUALLY is. MOST times, there is a huge delay between clicking submit and when a comment is posted. And it's maybe 50-50 whether you will get sent to the completed comment afterwards, or just a mostly blank page. OCCASIONALLY, it works correctly for a few days, then they break it again.
Also, it's broken by design. For example there are features which ONLY work in the classic interface, and the mobile interface is missing
Damning evidence (Score:3)
This is, frankly, damning evidence of malfeasance on its own. Accurate maintenance logs are required in every major industry, or sufficiently advanced practice.
They either have the logs and they're incriminating so they're lying, or they're incompetent to the extreme. Both implications are terrifying.
Add in the fact that you've got a whistleblower who fucking died mysteriously while in the middle of giving a disposition on Boeing... something's up.
Of course, they won't be held legally accountable for this. Too many military contracts need to be signed, and those lobbyists aren't being paid in rupees...
Who it was does not matter. (Score:3)
This is an issue that goes well beyond the end worker. What needs to be addressed are the underlying protocols / training / testing that let this sort of problem to occur in the first place. Workers will always make mistakes and the manufacturing process has to be designed to compensate for this fact.
Personally, I'm glad they no longer have the video because it would have resulted in all of the blame being thrust upon some worker who was having a bad day or was not properly trained. The ones who deserve the blame are those who are responsible for quality control and designed a system where such faults are not detected. No need for security camera footage to determine who is at fault here.
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Personally, I'm glad they no longer have the video because it would have resulted in all of the blame being thrust upon some worker who was having a bad day or was not properly trained.
The blame was never going to fall on that worker. This is too big of an issue to fit nicely on a single worker's shoulders.
I do not think you realize exactly HOW bad this is. This like inspecting a house and finding that termites have been eating away at the insides for decades. This is not something that can be fixed by firing the worker. This is likely the literal end for Boeing. It is THAT bad.
To quote the Church Lady (Score:2)
How ConVEEEEEEENient...
Unexplained: door plug manufactured for another AC (Score:2)
Not only is it unknown to the FAA who botched the remounting of the door plug and forgot the 4 bolts. It's not known, at least publicly, why that particular door plug is the one that was remounted.
Fact: The door plug that fell out from the sky bears the marking "LINE UNIT:8799" (source: press photo [gutzy.asia]).
Fact: Tthe NTSB preliminary report [ntsb.gov] states the accident aircraft [planespotters.net] has Fuselage Line 8789 (notice the one-digit discrepancy). And fuselage Line 8799 is that of a later aircraft [planespotters.net] delivered a month later.
Hence, the do
Easy solution (Score:5, Insightful)
If there are no records of who did the work, then the CEO of Boeing did the work.
Start with that premise, and see where it leads. I suspect they'll be sufficiently motivated to find some records.
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If you really wants to send a message then someone needs to go to jail. Hold the executives liable for the lives they put at risk. This looks like reckless endangerment at a minimum, a criminal offense.
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If you really wants to send a message then someone needs to go to jail. Hold the executives liable for the lives they put at risk. This looks like reckless endangerment at a minimum, a criminal offense.
This is why businesses have so many layers of protection, specifically so that no individual executive ever has to take culpability for their failures. At most this will be a fine and maybe, if the board gets antsy enough, a reshuffling of upper management with one or two golden-pararchuted to some other business where they'll make even more money because of their "cost saving ability", with the record of Boeing as their calling card. It's a very, very elite crowd once you get to that level of executive, an
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The law doesn't have jail as an option really for Corporations. While individuals with Corporations can be held criminally liable, I'm not sure jail time is actually an option. In reality, this action will have two results:
1. A big fine for Boeing. Which probably isn't a huge deal for Boeing in the long run.
2. Government regulation. Building planes at Boeing is about to get a lot more complicated.
There really are not a lot of other options for the Government.
I still think someone should go to jail though. T
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Not just the executives, the board.
The Boeing execs quit because of what the board wanted them to do. The McDonnell-Douglas execs are running the company because they were willing to do it.
The board must be held responsible, or this will happen again, and again, and again. Not just with Boeing, but with many publicly traded corporations.
The org tree is RIGHT THERE. Just follow it upwards from the point of the incident and hold everyone accountable until you reach the top. It's literally supposed to be their
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The reality is that Boeing will be under heavy regulation/supervision on aircraft quality. Boeing will be forced to comply or give up.